

JPRS-NEA-85-037

14 March 1985

## Near East/South Asia Report

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

14 March 1985

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Armenian Daily Comments on Soviet-Turkish Relations (Editorial, AZTAG, 2 Feb 85) .....	1
Armenian Delegation Meets Uruguayan President (AZTAG, 21 Jan 85) .....	3
Armenian Committee Issues Statement in Buenos Aires (AZTAG, 19 Jan 85) .....	4
Paper Criticizes Armenian SSR Official's Speech (Editorial, AZTAG, 29 Jan 85) .....	6
Beirut Daily Advocates Unity of Armenian Parties (K. Achekian; AZTAG, 1985) .....	10
Armenian Religious Leaders Issue Statement in Argentina (AZTAG, 19 Jan 85) .....	12

## ARAB AFRICA

## ALGERIA

Oil Uncertainties Said To Cause Planning Problems (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 4 Feb 85) .....	13
Briefs Euroloan Increase .....	14

## MOROCCO

Hassan Interviewed by Spanish TV (Rabat Domestic Service, 10 Feb 85) .....	15
---	----

## SUDAN

KUNA Views Threat to Numayri From Cut in Aid (KUNA, 18 Feb 85) .....	18
---	----

### Briefs

New Ambassador to Spain	20
New Criminal Affairs Minister	20
Arab Conference Delegates Received	20
PRC Military Delegation	20
Release of Women Prisoners	21
Discussion With PRC Ambassador	21

## ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

## LEBANON

Opposition Deputy Harb Explains Stand on Partition (Butrus Harb Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, No 397, 10-16 Dec 84) .....	22
---	----

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

AL-QUDS Urges Support for Jordan-PLO Accord (Editorial, AL-QUDS, 21 Feb 85) .....	31
AL-FAJR on Layla Sharaf's Resignation (Hatim 'Abd al-Qadir; AL-FAJR, 30 Jun 85) .....	32
Jordan-PLO Committee 'Joint Curse' (Editorial; AL-MITHAQ, 30 Jan 85) .....	34
W. Bank, Gaza Palestinians Call for Peace Settlement (THE JERUSALEM POST, 11 Feb 85) .....	35
Hebron Notable Proposes Solution for Territories (Pinhas 'Inbari; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 18 Feb 85) .....	36

## SYRIA

Deputy Premier Discusses Next 5-Year Plan (TISHRIN, 11 Nov 84) .....	37
Al-Hasakah Mechanizes Cotton, Corn Harvest (TISHRIN, 7 Nov 84) .....	47



Idlib Olive Exhibition Reported, Improvement Proposals Noted (TISHRIN, 7 Nov 84) .....	51
---	----

## SOUTH ASIA

### AFGHANISTAN

Arab Journalist Accompanies Guerrillas Inside Country (AL-ITTIHAD, various dates) .....	56
Expropriated Industries Said To Benefit Masses (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 6 Feb 85) .....	81
Mujahidin Kill 60 Soviet Soldiers (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 13 Feb 85) .....	83
Soviets Martyr, Wound Civilians (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 6 Feb 85) .....	85
Military Posts Under Siege (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 16 Feb 85) .....	87
Briefs	
Counterrevolutionaries Killed, Arrested	89
Support for Islamic Movements	89
Expansion of Ties	90
Civil Areas Bombed	90

### PAKISTAN

U.S.-Pakistan Alliance To Set Up Offices (BUSINESS RECORDER, 6 Feb 85) .....	91
Kissinger Remarks on 'Frontline' Role for Pakistan Criticized (VIEWPOINT, 24 Jan 85) .....	92
Governor Performs Groundbreaking of LBOD Project (DAWN, 17 Feb 85) .....	94
Benefits to Sind From Left Bank Outfall Drain (Syed Mukarram Ali; DAWN, 16 Feb 85) .....	97
Cabinet Approves Body To Finance Development (DAWN, 14 Feb 85) .....	101
'Generosity' Toward Ahmadies Urged (DAWN, 13 Feb 85) .....	103
Accused Denied Facilities (DAWN, 14 Feb 85) .....	104

Completion of Steel Mill Termed 'A Giant Stride'	
(VIEWPOINT, 24 Jan 85) .....	105
Training Centers for Qualified Manpower	
(DAWN, 18 Feb 85) .....	107
Planning Said Undergoing 'Fresh Exercise'	
(M. Ziauddin; DAWN, 16 Feb 85) .....	108
New Strategy for Planning Suggested	
(DAWN, 16 Feb 85) .....	110
Prospects for New Regional Organization Discussed	
(Tufail Ahmad Khan; DAWN, 16 Feb 85) .....	114
First Degree College in Private Sector Opens	
(Shahid Ahmad; DAWN, 18 Feb 85) .....	116
Briefs	
Notice to Sindhi Weekly	117
Books, Posters Forfeited	117
Grant for Farm Research	117
Nowshera-Karachi Highway	118
Rice Deal With Comoros	118
Publications Forfeited in Sind	119
Poet Ousted From Sind	119
Quami Mahaz Leader Arrested	119
MRD Men Given 'B' Class	119
Handbill Forfeited	119
Bail for 'Kalima' Wearers	119
Petition Against CMLA's Powers	120
Support for Convicted Lawyers	120
Grant for Water Development	120

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN DAILY COMMENTS ON SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS

GF181330 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 2 Feb 85 p 4

[Editorial originally published in the HORIZON daily: "In the Name of Good Neighborliness"]

[Text] "The good-neighborly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union will have new dimensions" declared Nikolay Tikhonov, chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, in Ankara on 26 December after signing a number of economic agreements with his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal. According to these agreements, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries will receive great incentive during the next 10 years. Instead of the \$570 million projected for 1985, trade exchanges from 1986 to 1990 will reach \$6 billion. At the same time new relations will be established in the cultural and scientific fields. According to Tikhonov, these agreements will contribute to world peace in the current complicated and tense international situation. Particularly, it is said that Moscow expects from Ankara that NATO military bases in Turkey (to be more exact, in western Armenia) will not contribute to the expansion of U.S. power. It is also reported that the Armenian question was discussed.

This is how our great defender, our sole honest friend and deliverer (quoting the very well-known expressions of the media of the fatherland and overseas) is in great hurry to create good-neighborly relations with our enemy for centuries. Indeed, Tikhonov is the highest official, from East or West, to visit Turkey since the 1980 military coup.

Is the Kremlin expecting the Armenians of the Armenian SSR to rejoice at this new and daring step taken in the interest of world peace? Or to express their gratitude with more enthusiasm for their "big" brother? Is it also expecting the Armenians of the diaspora to join their voices to their compatriots in the fatherland and shout glory to you?

Does the Kremlin not even care what one of the Soviet Union's republics (one of the smallest in area but not in importance) thinks or feels about this new Soviet-Turkish romance?

In fact, the leaders of Moscow today are the loyal heirs of Lenin and Stalin also in this regard. We have witnessed these laudable good-neighborly jests and enjoyed their consequences on various occasions since 1920 and 1921. In 1953 Malenkov said: "We have no territorial demands from Turkey." It is possible to sacrifice everything in the name of good neighborliness (particularly the rights of the Armenian people) and everything can be trampled upon (particularly the dignity of the Armenians).

So what if last September, during a reception hosted for the diplomats of 28 countries visiting our country, Fadey Sarkisyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, for the thousandth time reminded us that in our most difficult periods the Soviet people have helped us and at the same time was not embarrassed to say: "The majority of the Armenian people living in the Ottoman empire were subjected to oppression for centuries by Turkish military leaders. But 1915 was the most tragic year in the history of our people when under the veil of the World War I the young Turks organized the massive genocide of the Armenian people and deported and annihilated around 2 million Armenians in the deserts." Consequently, Turkey did not delay in complaining against this statement. Have the Turkish military leaders of today changed?

So what if the Armenian historians today have undertaken a constant struggle to expose the Turkish distortions of our history. So what if the Armenian writers have become the genuine translators of the aspirations of the Armenians and write about the Masis mountain and the "great dream."

So what if the catholicos of all the Armenians call Ararat mountain "the image and dream of our people's soul" and "an invitation for patriotism, a call for justice, and the affirmation of future victory."

And so what if the Armenians everywhere are making preparations to mark the 70th anniversary of the great genocide.

CSO: 4605/112

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN DELEGATION MEETS URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT

GF101032 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 21 Jan 85 p 3

[Excerpt] On Monday, 17 December, the Uruguay national central administration delegation visited President-elect Dr Julio Sanguinetti and congratulated him and wished success in his future presidential activities on behalf of the Armenian community.

The delegation comprised the chairman of national central administration Garabed Pilavjian, Krikor Keoshgerian, Haygaram Ghazarian, Garo Santurian, and A. Belian.

Dr J. Sanguinetti welcomed the Armenian delegation warmly. The meeting lasted more than half an hour during which the president-elect expressed his support for the Armenian people and their just cause and affirmed that his government will stay loyal to the official pledge of Uruguay which was adopted by the council of state in 1970 by which this freedom loving South American country decided to demand that the United Nations reopen the Sevres Treaty document.

The members of the Armenian delegation acknowledged this sympathy and the liberties granted by the Uruguayan authorities and people to the Armenian community.

CSO: 4605/113

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN COMMITTEE ISSUES STATEMENT IN BUENOS AIRES

GF101120 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 19 Jan 85 p 3

[Statement issued by the Armenian communal body for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the April genocide in Buenos Aires--date not given]

[Text] The 70th anniversary of the April genocide is 1985. The Armenian people in the fatherland and diaspora will commemorate in a worthwhile way the memory of their 1 and one-half million children, the victims of the first genocide of the 20th century while at the same time preserving the eternal heritage of the martyrs and their just cause.

The initiatives and all the activities for commemoration and demands for rights are aimed at displaying to the world the unbreakable will of our people and their determination to persist and restore their just rights. These activities should pursue united goals on the internal front which are to further unite the ranks, keep our powers in the diaspora alert and organized, and use our favorable collective or individual position in various countries in the best way.

Concentrating on the Armenian community in Argentina and taking into account our activities for April it is possible to affirm that we should and are able to display the necessary dynamism through our quantitative, material, and moral capabilities. We are aware of the difficulties set before our diaspora masses here and in other places. At the same time we are also aware that in spite of these difficulties our community has been able to preserve its structures and represents a satisfactory subsoil particularly with its material and moral capabilities.

The 70th anniversary of the genocide can be a suitable opportunity to evaluate, unite and mobilize all the powers of our community and give an incentive to the pan-Armenian initiatives and united activities.

Thus, the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the genocide, besides preserving its main goals which are the commemoration and demand of rights, will be a new opportunity for our community to realize the following needs:

- a. To strengthen the spirit of united and coordinated activities.



b. To assimilate and inspire the people who have become distant, indifferent and hesitant, through a healthy national and patriotic spirit, constructive solidarity ideas and collective achievements.

c. To create vivacity for a political way of thinking and toward the pan-Armenian issues and concerns.

d. Mobilize the youth by strengthening in them the realistic approach and the spirit of struggle.

e. To continue the constant propaganda in favor of the Armenians on the foreign arena.

To awaken sympathy in the public opinion and particularly in the intellectual, political, and diplomatic circles toward the permanent rights of the Armenians and the international recognition of the genocide.

On the path of this pan-Armenian initiative it is necessary to put aside the secondary interests and goals and approach the work without reservations with all available powers and capabilities.

At this stage of the 70th anniversary and in light of the obligations of the above-mentioned issues and dimensions it is necessary for all the powers of our community to begin work with all their capabilities. Particularly our political organizations by fulfilling their tasks unreservedly and with historic responsibility will not only lead these activities but also become an example for the large masses of the people.

In light of these propositions following the preparatory meetings of all the representatives of the organizations and unions of our community the communal body for commemorating the 70th anniversary of the April genocide was formed, which has already initiated work through various commissions.

Thus, we call on all the organizations and individuals of our community to practically contribute to the successful marking of the 70th anniversary.

The public will be kept informed on the future plans, activities and achievements.

[Signed] Communal body for the commemoration of 70th anniversary of the April genocide, Buenos Aires.

CSO: 4605/114

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

PAPER CRITICIZES ARMENIAN SSR OFFICIAL'S SPEECH

GF170804 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 29 Jan 85 p 4

[Editorial originally published in AZTAG WEEKLY-DROSHAK: "Our Direct Enemy"]

[Text] (On the occasion of the recent speech of K. Demirchian) At a time when Armenian communities in various parts of the world are undergoing grave crises and facing various difficulties and needs; at a time when in spite of these difficult and exhausting external conditions, the national unity and the harmonious inter-party cooperation is gradually consolidating and strengthening through new practical measures, which is a source of rejoicing and strength to all the Armenians; at a time when the struggle in favor of the Armenian cause and against the genocidal Turks is gradually expanding to all classes of Armenians in the diaspora through the united efforts of the Dashnak, Henschak, and Ramgavar parties and even the communist Armenians, creating a corresponding positive impression and influence on international public opinion; at a time when all Armenians in the diaspora, with all their factions and congregations, are making preparations to mark in unison the 70th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, with the natural expectation that the fatherland will lead this holy movement; and finally, at a time when the fascist Turkish Government and political leaders have resorted to large-scale anti-Armenian struggle with the same incentive against the Armenians and the Armenian cause throughout the world in propagandist, political, diplomatic, and other sectors, particularly with the clear strategy to destroy and divide the united demanding front of the Armenians from inside; and during a decisive stage when all Armenians, the old and new generations, are expecting a heartening word or a consolidating step and an initiative to give a new incentive to the internal united power and political struggle of the Armenians from the leaders of the Armenia SSR, at least on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the great genocide; exactly at such a sensitive time the unexpected and uncomprehensible took place in the capital of the Armenians, Yerevan; an event which is considered the greatest political gaffe in modern history of the relations between the fatherland and the diaspora.

An irresponsible and absurd gaffe, which through its conspicuous nature of dividing the Armenians in the diaspora into adversaries, puts a damper on the vivid national unity spirit of the Armenian people and on the constantly



growing and inspirational incentive of the demanding struggle for the Armenian cause.

In other words, the communist rulers of Soviet Armenia are trying to realize what the genocidal Turks failed to realize in spite of all their governmental means and the use of international alliances. This is a political behavior which not only inflicts a grave strike against the Armenian cause and the demanding struggle of the Armenians domestically (by endangering the unity of the Armenians), but also on the external front by creating suspicions in international public opinion on the united national will and political maturity of the Armenians.

Indeed, how can we explain the fact that the communist rulers of Soviet Armenia and their number one spokesman, K. Demirchian, first secretary of the central committee, can see nothing except various "adversary" class groups in the entire Armenian diaspora and the Armenian diaspora life? This is a classification which is fabricated and capricious even with Marxist standards.

K. Demirchian ceremoniously declared from the podium of the central committee meeting (Yerevan, 8 January) the following: "There (in the diaspora) is also our direct enemy, the Tashnak Party. We have been struggling and will continue struggling against its reactionary and nationalistic ideology, and we have been exposing and will continue to actively expose the adventurous and anti-Soviet policy of their ring-leaders. This as we have often noted, concerns the past and the present. The Tashnak Party has been and still remains an anti-revolutionary and anti-Soviet party, which serves U.S. 'imperialism' today." (ARMENPRESS, 11 January 85, 11/1, page 7, section 7)

This means that the communist leaders of Soviet Armenia do not consider the genocidal Turks, or the pan-Turkish racists, or even the Turkish and Azeri fraternity in the Armenian genocide as "our direct enemy."

Under all conditions we decisively reject this reference to the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party and consider it as a direct calumny. The Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party does not bear "direct animosity" against the communist rulers of the Armenian SSR. It remains loyal to its traditional political strategy of being an honest opposition group toward the same Soviet rulers and will continue to unswervingly and unhesitatingly proceed on the same path in the future. We believe that in a true democracy in general and in socialist ranks in particular the opposition parties are considered neither "direct" nor indirect "enemies" on either theoretical or practical grounds. In places where the opposition is declared a "direct" or indirect "enemy" and so is subjected to persecution, those places are ruled by tyranny and there is no trace of democracy and socialism; in fact it could not exist there.

In our modern history we have never encountered a situation where the relations between the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party and the national opposition parties have reached the stage of "direct animosity" in spite of certain extremities due to acute internal struggles.

Yes indeed, neither the national opposition parties nor the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party have considered the other a "direct enemy" in spite of the plots of internal or external hidden powers.

In any case the Armenian people, with their profound national awareness, high feeling of dignity and political maturity, cannot accept that their parties behave toward each other as "direct enemies."

The party which behaves this way with this or that rival party as a "direct enemy" and forgets the Turks and the genocidal Turkish racism, is not and cannot be the genuine creation of the Armenians.

Finally, people like K. Demirchian, who declare that the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party is their "direct enemy," are evidently taking the relations between the fatherland and the diaspora a step backward and pushing their anti-Tashnak rage two steps forward.

It is obvious that even during the most disturbed Stalinist days the communist rulers of Yerevan had not declared the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party as their "direct enemy." For years they kept on accusing the Tashnak Party of being "anti-Soviet," "adventurous," "traitorous," "unpatriotic," and even "the enemy of the Armenian people," but never described it as "our direct enemy" as K. Demirchian did.

Precisely for this reason a person is obliged to wonder whether he should not look for the inspiration of people like Aliyev or the pressure of Ankara as reasons for the behavior of K. Demirchian, particularly after the recent visit of Prime Minister Tikhonov to Turkey.

Under all conditions--as the experience of 65 years shows--if people like K. Demirchian believe that in this way they will force the Armenian Tashnak Party to retire and retreat, they are totally mistaken.

They are undoubtedly mistaken if they believe that in this way they will deviate the Tashnak Party from its role and strategy of an honest opposition party.

They are also totally wrong if they hold the naive belief--specially after the futile efforts over 65 years to "bury" the Tashnak Party--that through this strategy they will finally succeed in weakening the organization of the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party and its ideological and political pan-national influence.

They are totally mistaken in particular when they assume that such behavior will force the Tashnak Party to remain silent and abandon its struggle on the front for defending human and national rights of the Armenian people under the Soviet regime and the uniqueness of the Armenian language and culture against the Russian language and the destructive policy of Russianization.

On the contrary, the more it is pursued the more it will consolidate. The more they try to pressure and degrade it the more it will strengthen and rejuvenate and the more it will greatly expand its moral, ideological, and political influence on the Armenian people in or out of the fatherland.

Moreover, the more they try to divide and destroy the demanding and struggling Armenian ranks and the more they endeavor to break the revolutionary spirit of the Armenian people, the Armenian youths in particular, and degrade their healthy feeling of national dignity, the more the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party--with its concentrated and ideologist ranks and sympathising masses will decisively and constantly continue its fruitful strategy of national unity and unanimity and the more it will pursue the supreme goal of achieving the total liberation of the Armenian SSR and the Armenians.

And if such behavior will make people like K. Demirchian and his masters in the Kremlin consider us their "direct enemy" then the Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party is also ready to take this responsibility on the sacred path of its services to the Armenian people and the Armenian cause.

The Armenian Revolutionary Tashnak Party recognizes only one judge, the Armenian people. It submits to only one judgment, the judgment of the Armenian people.

CSO: 4605/109

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

BEIRUT DAILY ADVOCATES UNITY OF ARMENIAN PARTIES

GF051940 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 1985 Annual Edition p 4

[Article by K. Achekian: "The Condition for Cooperation is to Lead an Independent Policy"]

[Excerpts] The current administration of the Armenian SSR is practically absent from the Armenian struggle cause.

The undertaking and responsibility of the Armenian cause and the constant struggle has been left to the Armenians in the diaspora. For its part the Soviet Armenian diaspora follows the orientation of the Soviet Union. That is, willingly or unwillingly, it is neutralized and isolated from the path of the Armenians' struggle for existence.

The Armenian SSR's people are a part of the Armenian cause because they are the core of the Armenian struggle. It is impossible to picture a future independent Armenia without them. Furthermore, they are the authentic and encouraging cornerstone for the future free and independent Armenia. Without them it would be an illusion to picture the idea of "an integral Armenian with all the Armenians."

The Armenian SSR Government not only remains away from the struggle of the Armenian cause but is obliged to follow the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its general stance toward Turkey which certainly does not consider the supreme and elemental interests of the Armenians and the Armenian SSR in particular.

In light of this fact, which is condemnable and if necessary should be resisted, it remains to the Armenians to trust and depend on their own powers and capabilities. This means that the three Armenian parties are obliged--it is their mission itself and even the meaning of their existence--to unite and concentrate their means and capabilities in order to realize further achievements in the activities of the Armenian cause. Or else after a time their existence will be corrupted and they will become unsuitable structures for the Armenian cause. In other words they will become organizations serving their own personal purposes.

This also means that the three parties should display the maximum flexibility in their activities without engaging in secondary and factional concerns.

In one word all the capabilities of the Armenians should be used for the just solution of the Armenian cause. In this aspect the first most available and possible means is the cooperation of the three Armenian national parties.

The second is the cooperation between the diaspora and the Armenian SSR in political and diplomatic fields. This seems impossible at the moment due to its being an extremely conditional possibility. It even seems illusory to some simply because the Armenian SSR Government is only the complaisant of Moscow. In spite of this the possibility should never be forgotten and ruled out as a means.

The first possibility is not proceeding in a simple and smooth way. Or it meets various difficulties and obstacles in the real life. The reason for this are the misunderstandings and prejudices to a degree of fanaticism.

The obstacles could be overcome by mutual concessions and understanding particularly by getting rid of narrow party accounts. Instead we must always be led by national awareness and real patriotism. These obstacles are considered surmountable because they have real Armenian characteristics and depth.

There are other obstacles too due to the foreign (non-Armenian) interventions. That is, this or that party refuses the proposals of the others, or their work methods or goals. The creation and instigation of problems of this nature are unnatural and hard to overcome. This problem remains unsurmountable as long as each party is not independent in the policies defined and adopted by it and as long as it depends on the caprices and policies of a foreign (non-Armenian) power. In this case the cooperation cannot be complete, it will only be for a brief period, a matter which diverts us from the real goal and delays the possibilities and chances to resolve the inter-party adversities. This phenomenon further delays the creation of opportunities for the rapprochement of the parties. In one word the national awareness does not reach the demanded level and the parties will be carried away with the current.

Cooperation will be set on a strong and healthy national basis when each organization not only has an independent policy but a unique and personal one. Each party should base its policy on the national interests of the Armenian people.

Even though there are a lot of obstacles for cooperation, still it remains the most purposeful of our capabilities and the most valid condition ensuring the independence of our struggle.

CSO: 4605/111

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ISSUE STATEMENT IN ARGENTINA

GF101110 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 19 Jan 85 p 4

[Statement issued by the religious leaders of the three Armenian congregations in Argentina--date not given]

[Text] We are on the threshold of 1985 which is the sad 70th anniversary of the 1915 genocide organized and perpetrated by the Turkish murderers during which 2 million children of our people were martyred.

It is the first genocide of the 20th century which still remains unpunished and uncompensated. Even after 70 years, this crime against humanity and history is still proclaimed by Armenians more strongly than ever.

We demand international society to:

- a. Not encourage the criminals and not leave unpunished similar crimes committed against humanity.
- b. To give back the national rights of the Armenians.

The commemoration of the 70th anniversary is a new stage for Armenians to reflect to that black page of our history with pan-national evaluation and to pay tribute to the memory of our martyrs. It is also an opportunity for Armenian generations to reassess their determination and loyalty toward the two vows, religion and fatherland, which were not destroyed even by the martyrdom.

In accordance with the recommendation of the profound Christian characteristics of courage and loyalty, we the leaders of the three religious congregations call on the children of our people to mark this new anniversary of the great genocide with the necessary standard, in a harmonious and united atmosphere, and signify it with various activities.

We declare that all the measures undertaken by the communal body for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the April genocide enjoy our unreserved support.

[Signed] Religious leaders of the three Armenian religious congregations in Argentina.

CSO: 4605/110



ALGERIA

OIL UNCERTAINTIES SAID TO CAUSE PLANNING PROBLEMS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO In English 4 Feb 85 pp 6, 7

[Text]

Algeria's refusal to go along with the new Opec price structure is likely to exacerbate the country's uncertainties about its oil and gas earnings. Those uncertainties had already pushed back, by at least six months, the launching of Algeria's five-year development plan, which was due to be implemented in April of this year.

Part of the Algerian planners' past difficulties in projecting their income to 1989 is linked to the current instability in oil prices which not only affects Algeria's oil earnings but also its income from gas exports. Algeria, the world's fourth-largest gas power, has had a long-standing policy of linking its oil prices to its gas prices. It has, therefore, been known to favour a high official oil-price structure.

But falling oil prices coupled with the existence of a gas glut on the European market had already forced a softening in the Algerian position. In 1983 and 1984, Algeria agreed to an unprecedented reduction of its initial volumes of gas exports to Belgium and France. However, these tentative steps toward what analysts view as a more pragmatic gas-pricing policy must be set against Algeria's need to maintain export earnings.

Furthermore, support for a hard-line policy is still strong in Algeria. One of its most important champions is Dr. Yusuf Yusufi, deputy general manager of Sonatrach, the state oil and gas company. Last year, 60 per cent of Sonatrach's foreign income of \$13bn was from gas exports (both LNG and LPG). Thus Sonatrach's marketing strategy is of vital importance to Algeria's economic future. Given the country's dwindling oil reserves (they are due to run out by the end of the century), such a future

must take into account Algeria's shift from oil-exporter to gas-exporter. Algeria's gas reserves, estimated at about 3,000bn cubic metres, are exceeded only by those of the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran. Large increases in the volume of Algeria's natural gas and condensate exports in the last few years have already contributed to the increase in the country's \$13bn 1984 earnings.

As for the 1985-1989 draft development plan, it calls for a forty per cent increase in the previous five-year plan's investment allotment. However, almost 50 per cent of the \$107.5bn earmarked for investments will be going to projects already under way. Investment targets include industrial development (which is to receive 31.6 per cent of total), housing construction (15.7 per cent), followed by agriculture and water resources (14.4 per cent).

Another goal of the draft plan is aimed at cutting the level of foreign debt. Although Algeria's foreign debt fell to about \$15bn at the end of 1984, 30 per cent of export income went towards covering it. Reserves declined between 1981 and 1984, going from \$5.4bn to \$3.3bn (those figures include \$1.7bn in gold reserves). For 1983, trade and balance of payments figures show a surplus of \$3.2bn and a deficit of \$86mn, respectively.

Although Algeria, under the guidance of President Chadli Benjedid, has been gradually shifting to a liberalization of the economic system through the privatization of various economic sectors, changes have been slow in coming, mainly because of opposition from the state bureaucracy. As in the case of gas policy, opposition to change may rob Algeria of the type of flexibility required to face new global economic realities.

CSO: 4500/55

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

EUROLOAN INCREASE- Algeria's \$500mm Euroloan, which is designed to provide the country with the foreign exchange necessary to launch its second five-year plan later this year, has been bid up to \$600mm in a further expression of market confidence in the country. The loan, which is being raised on behalf of the Credit Populaire d'Algerie and the Banque Nationale d'Algerie, attracted the finest terms ever negotiated for an Algerian credit. The terms were 1/2 per cent over Libor for the first five years and 3/8 per cent over Libor for the last five years. The lead managers for the loan were the Arab Banking Corporation. Reports said a last-minute request by the Algerians for an increase to \$700mm was turned down by the loan managers as being too late considering the fine terms offered. [Excerpt] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 23 Jan 85 p 11]

CSO: 4500/55



MOROCCO

HASSAN INTERVIEWED BY SPANISH TV

LD101804 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 10 Feb 85

[Announcer-read report with two unidentified reporters reading the questions and answers]

[Excerpt] His Majesty King Hassan II, in an interview with a correspondent from Spanish television, stressed that Spain cannot keep Ceuta and Melilla after regaining Gibraltar. His Majesty talked about celebrating the accession to the throne anniversary this year in El-Aaiun, contacts at the level of the Arab Maghreb, the Arab-African Federation, Moroccan relations with the EEC, and the continental link project. Here is the text of the interview which was broadcast by Spanish television yesterday:

[Question] In March, Your Majesty will celebrate the 24th anniversary of your accession to the throne. It is said that important things will be announced on this occasion. Does this for example concern the issue of the Sahara?

[Answer] As you know, any throne speech is traditionally dedicated to what has been achieved during the year and to the most important measures which should be adopted, especially internally. It is a kind of a Moroccan state of the union speech. It is an important speech for all that concerns Morocco, but I do not think that we have anything dramatic or revolutionary for the international public opinion or even regional public opinion.

[Question] First we were told that the celebrations will take place in El Aaiun, then we were told that they will be in Agadir and Dakhla, which are within the 1956 borders. Can Your Majesty explain this matter?

[Answer] I have never visited El Aaiun. As you know, I went to Dakhla. I would like this visit to be within a regional framework to prove that there are no Saharan and non-Saharan provinces, because all the provinces are Moroccan. Naturally, we will make visits from Agadir along a line reaching to Semara. In the first stage we will visit Agadir, Goyimina, Tan-Tan, Tarfaya, El Aaiun and Semara. We will hold working sessions with the elected representatives and the concerned departments and ministries to study the issues of equipment in general. On this basis,

this visit will not be brief, but will continue for about 10 days, enabling us to get in touch with [words indistinct] and to study the problems of the provinces.

[Question] From where will Your Majesty deliver the speech of the throne?

[Answer] From the place in which the accession to the throne is celebrated.

[Question] Does Your Majesty consider that there is a military solution to the Sahara issue? If so, would your people be able to bear the heavy costs of the war?

[Answer] First, you must know that for me war is just one symptom of solving the problems, and one stage of the stages of the solution; it is not the whole solution. As far as I am concerned, all the problems should be solved through consultations. War is not itself a goal. Secondly, this war has been forced upon us; we are not the ones who leave the barracks or the Saharan cities to follow the people or attack them in their own homes. But when we are attacked by others, then we are forced to defend ourselves. God is my witness: I hope that this unjustifiable war will end as soon as possible, because in the end it is a war between brothers. I want to assess what it costs both sides; we could construct a rail line extending for hundreds of kilometers across the Sahara, or build ports at the Arab Maghreb level, which would benefit everybody. But I can tell you that the Moroccans, if ever attacked on their land, insist on defending themselves, whatever the cost might be and whatever time is needed.

[Question] It seems that Morocco is interested in holding a Moroccan summit, as there are many contacts, especially between Algiers and Rabat. Could Your Majesty give us an idea about the reality of the matter?

[Answer] As you know, there are contacts at the level of the Greater Arab Maghreb, that is Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania. There are bilateral contacts at the levels of the countries where there are disputes or bilateral problems. The two kinds of contacts are carried out simultaneously, that is, we are making our contacts for holding a Maghreb summit, and we also keep up our contacts with the countries with which we have some disputes or with which we disagree. Anyhow, I think that the holding of a Maghreb summit cannot but serve the issue of the Greater Arab Maghreb, even if there are problems about which we disagree; we do not have to discuss them during the first meeting. But I think that there are numerous common views in the economic, social and human areas which could be dealt with and would be beneficial for everybody.

[Question] It seems that Algeria makes the attendance of the SDAR, which is recognized by the OAU, as a precondition for holding this summit.

[Answer] They have never told me that. As for the recognition of the SDAR by the OAU, I consider this as a mutilation of history because during the recent Addis Ababa summit, no resolution legally consecrated such

recognition, whether by the OAU as an organization, or by the member-countries individually. As far as I am concerned, the SDAR attended the summit, but I do not know of any legal meaning for its attendance.

[Question] Some observers describe the Oujda Treaty as if it is only a military axis. Is this a correct assessment?

[Answer] This is a grave mistake, even at the geographical level. When we establish a federation with one of our neighbors, we could assume that this federation is based on a military alliance, but when this takes place with a country which is thousands of kilometers away, then this assumption is mere imagination. This is to some extent what happened with Egypt and Syria. Their greatest weakness was in the military side specifically, because a military action cannot be coordinated when the distance between the two countries is thousands of kilometers and there are no joint borders. The Oujda Treaty open to all the Arab and African countries; Morocco should in the future join the EEC; Morocco considers the continental link to be a beneficial project; requests Cueta and Melilla return (rpt referent item); says relations between Morocco and Spain are excellent.

CSO: 4500/54

SUDAN

KUNA VIEWS THREAT TO NUMAYRI FROM CUT IN AID

LD181747 Kuwait KUNA in English 1623 GMT 18 Feb 85

[Text] Washington, 18 Feb (KUNA)--The United States, Egypt and other countries were reported here Monday to be reducing their commitments to Sudan, in moves that American officials conceded could threaten the regime of President Ja'far Numayri.

The Reagan administration has frozen all economic aid to Sudan, and other countries, including Saudi Arabia, West Germany and Britain, were cutting back their assistance to Khartoum, the NEW YORK TIMES reported.

On the military front, Egypt has decided to pull out an air defense brigade that it sent to the Sudanese capital last March following an attack on the city by a lone bomber, alleged to be Libyan according to the WASHINGTON POST.

The TIMES said the economic moves were part of an effort to press Numayri into overhauling his country's ailing economy.

One State Department official said the United States had acted even though the freeze might set off events that could lead to Numayri's downfall.

Officials said U.S. delivery of economic support funds to Sudan, which were to have totaled 114 million dollars in the current fiscal year, would be delayed until Khartoum worked out an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pay its overdue debts.

An official of the IMF, who asked not to be identified, told the TIMES: "The financial difficulties of Sudan are appalling. Everything is in turmoil. There is no plan for dealing with financial relationships."

American officials claimed the decision to freeze the economic support funds involved solely economic considerations. Political factors in Sudan have no bearing on the decision, they asserted.

However, the administration is known to be concerned about Numayri's decision to apply fundamentalist Islamic principles in Sudan.

Umar 'Isa, Sudan's ambassador to Washington, told the TIMES in an interview that his government planned to make some of the economic changes sought by the IMF. "It's a matter of creating the right atmosphere to implement them," he said. 'Isa said Sudan would make changes that "we see are acceptable and workable."

He said his country moved to devalue its currency last week. But he would not provide any other specifics about the actions contemplated by his government.

The decision to freeze aid was not lightly arrived at by Washington, American officials said.

Some U.S. policymakers had argued that Sudan was so important to American interests in Africa that the aid should continue no matter what international financial condition Khartoum found itself in.

Meanwhile, the POST said the remnants of the Egyptian air defense brigade, which came armed with light, shoulder-held SA-7 missiles, were now scheduled to leave Khartoum by the end of this month, following the failure of Egypt and Sudan to set up a new permanent air defense system for the capital based on old Soviet SA-2 and SA-3 missiles.

The withdrawal of the brigade, apparently for military reasons, comes amid increasing division with the Egyptian Government over how closely Cairo should continue to associate with Numayri.

The paper said that interviews with Egyptian officials made it clear that the issue is regarded as extremely delicate because of Numayri's "unpredictable behavior" and "the possibility that he might turn to the Egyptians if they press him too hard and even make a new alliance with his chief enemy, Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi of Libya."

Close aides of al-Qadhdhafi and Numayri met secretly in Paris 2 weeks ago to discuss ending support for each other's opposition rebels, according to a press report in London Sunday.

CSO: 4500/52

SUDAN

BRIEFS

NEW AMBASSADOR TO SPAIN--Madrid, 23 Feb (SUNA)--Ambassador 'Abd-al-'Al Sinadah has presented his credentials to His Majesty King Juan Carlos of Spain as Sudan's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Spain. This took place here the day before yesterday. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1420 GMT 23 Feb 85]

NEW CRIMINAL AFFAIRS MINISTER--The president of the republic, Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, today issued a republican decree under which he amended the Republican Decree Number 37 of 1405 a.h., in accordance with which Muhammad Adam 'Isa was appointed minister of state for criminal affairs in the Attorney General's Office. The amendment provided that Muhammad Adam 'Isa be minister of state in the Attorney General's Office. [Text] [Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 23 Feb 85]

ARAB CONFERENCE DELEGATES RECEIVED--Khartoum, 22 Feb (SUNA)--President Numayri received here yesterday the heads of the Arab delegations participating in the fifth Arab conference on mineral wealth that concluded its work yesterday. During the meeting President Numayri was briefed on the outcome and recommendations of the conference. He expressed hope that the conference results will be implemented. His excellency presented a detailed explanation of Sudan's efforts in the field of economic and social development and its endeavors to promote the mining sector. The delegation heads thanked President Numayri for his patronage of the conference and for hosting it. They affirmed their readiness to offer means of promoting the mining industry in Sudan. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1040 GMT 22 Feb 85]

FRG MILITARY DELEGATION--Khartoum, 21 Feb (SUNA)--Peter Kurt Wuerzbach, FRG minister of state [as received] in the Defense Ministry, arrived here at noon today accompanied by a number of officials from the Ministry on a 2-day visit to the country at the invitation of the Sudanese Defense Ministry. The delegation was received at the airport by Lt Gen Yusuf Hasan al-Hajj, minister of state in the Defense Ministry; Maj Gen Muhammad al-Hasan al-Faki, commander of the military vocational training center; Brig Gen Ramadan Muhammad Ahmad; the FRG ambassador in Khartoum; the FRG military attache; and a number of officials from the FRG Embassy in Khartoum. The purpose of the FRG delegation's visit is to discuss the



projects resulting from FRG aid presented to Sudan from the FRG Defense Ministry. The delegation will be acquainted with the accomplishments at the vocational training center which was opened in May 1984. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1715 GMT 21 Feb 85]

RELEASE OF WOMEN PRISONERS--Khartoum, 15 Feb (SUNA)--President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri yesterday announced the release of all women prisoners in Omdurman prison who are either mothers of infants or pregnant. The pardoned prisoners will sign a pledge of good conduct at the courts that tried them. The decision includes the release of more than 840 women prisoners. This came in the speech that the president addressed to the nation yesterday at Shaykh Daf'allah al-'Arki Mosque in New Omdurman. The president called on the leaders of the Sufi tradition, the governors, the SSU leaders and branches, the Ministry of National Guidance and Information, the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs and Awqaf, and all journalists to practice their role of employing the energy of the youth and exploiting the energy of men and women in order to contribute to the national, cultural, and intellectual construction of this great nation so that this energy will not be wasted. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1025 GMT 15 Feb 85]

DISCUSSION WITH PRC AMBASSADOR--Khartoum, 17 Feb (SUNA)--'Abbas Musa, minister of state at the Foreign Ministry, received the PRC ambassador in Khartoum here today. They reviewed the warm relations between the two countries and their development following the president's recent visit to the PRC. The meeting also touched on the dimensions of the problem of drought and desertification as well as the refugee influx into Sudan and the Sudanese Government's efforts in this regard. His excellency the PRC ambassador expressed his country's sympathy with Sudan's Government and people in their efforts to overcome the consequences of drought and desertification. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1730 GMT 17 Feb 85]

CSO: 4500/52

LEBANON

# OPPOSITION DEPUTY HARB EXPLAINS STAND ON PARTITION

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 397, 10-16 Dec 84 pp 17-19

[Interview with Deputy Butrus Harb by Nabil Barakis and Nawfal Daw: "Butrus Harb Speaks to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI: Current Danger to Lebanon Is Division, Not Partition; Appointment of Deputies Wipes Out Democracy; National Unity Cabinet Needs To Be United"]

[Text] The positions taken recently by the Independent Maronite Deputies Grouping have aroused numerous questions regarding the objectives and aspirations of those taking these positions, especially since they have been characterized by opposition, beginning with opposition to the current cabinet and its policy statement and ending with the latest election for the speakership of the Chamber of Deputies. To make the picture clearer, we present here the questions posed by Nabil Barakis and Nawfal Daw and Deputy Butrus Harb's answers to these questions:

[Question] The way your positions are perceived varies from faction to faction. Some believe that you are seeking a certain Christian role, others have characterized you as people engaged in oneupmanship against the regime's progress and a third faction views you as opponents of the cabinet and its tendencies. Where do you stand vis-a-vis all this?

[Answer] It is definite and certain that the latest developments in Lebanon and the area have compelled the Lebanese cabinet to take fundamental options to face these developments. These options include abolition of the 17 May accord, the Geneva and Lausanne conferences and the contents of the cabinet statement. Therefore, the Independent Maronite Deputies Grouping has had to take frank positions emanating from the principles in which the Grouping believes and for which it works. As for the perception of our positions, no matter how much importance we attach to it, this importance vanishes when the Grouping is in harmony with itself, with its resolutions and with the patriotic view it is supposed to uphold. But we stress that we are not engaged in oneupmanship against the regime or the cabinet. We are a grouping that was formed with the aim of ending the cheap acts of political oneupmanship through responsible actions that emanate from specific principles that have been adopted as bases for political action.

As for the statement that we are seeking a political role, it is also rejected because we do not need such a role, since our role is already present and is



embodied in our representation of the entire Lebanese nation and not just of the Maronites alone, as stated in the constitution and reflected in our actions. If we have positions on social issues concerning a certain group of the people, this is due to the fact that it is natural for the Grouping to be concerned with the provinces from which it comes and in which a certain characteristic predominates. But this does not prevent us from saying that we do not cling to the sectarian character of the base we represent because we are fit to represent all the Lebanese with their various affiliations and ways of thinking.

[Question] There are those who attribute your stances of opposition to the government to the fact that you are a part of the political Maronism that rejects any reform or change in the Lebanese system. Where do you really stand vis-a-vis this accusation?

[Answer] Whoever has watched the Grouping since its emergence in 1978 finds clearly and definitely that the Grouping follows a course opposed to the "Maronite political school" because we do not believe in this school. It is true that there are in Lebanon Maronites who have a role, a presence, freedom and a place at the political level. But we believe that there is at the political level a national school that does not assume an exclusively Maronite character. We need not exploit a certain Christian fear to gain prominence because such prominence is impossible except through a sound nationalist performance of the political role, not through the exploitation of certain weak points emanating in a certain society from transient and temporary circumstances.

#### **Persons and Institutions**

[Question] So, what are the objectives of your political action?

[Answer] The Independent Maronite Deputies Grouping emerged as a reaction to political actions which took a radical and violent character. The Grouping has tried to act as the bridge linking Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and has performed its role on this basis, even in the darkest days experienced by Lebanon in the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Proceeding on this basis, we believe that our role continues to be the same as it has been, namely to bolster Lebanon's legitimate institutions--and institutions do not mean persons. Therefore, it is impermissible to consider our opposition role as being in conflict with bolstering the legitimate institutions because the biggest boost that can be given these institutions is sound democratic action in accordance with the principles calling for the presence of loyal forces and opposition. In Lebanon, we have become accustomed to seeing the opposition as an armed opposition, and perhaps even the loyal forces as armed loyal forces. But as a Grouping, we have rejected this principle. Our not resorting to violence to express a political position does not emanate from cowardice or fear but from our conviction that violence can only lead to Lebanon's destruction. I believe that our viewpoint has not been wrong because the infighting has generated nothing but more infighting, destruction and estrangement and it will, if it persists, lead to the disappearance of Lebanon.

[Question] You have said that opposition to persons does not mean opposition to the institutions. Do you imply in your words that you oppose the present regime?

[Answer] In the abstract, the so-called "regime" is an indeterminate concept. As a responsible deputy and as a lawyer who is not unaware of the constitutional law, it is my belief that there is no "regime" but there is a "government." What is symbolized by the existing practical concept of the regime in the president of the republic. By virtue of the system in Lebanon, we believe that no deputy should oppose the president of the republic but may oppose the government because the president of the republic is not, in accordance with the constitution and by virtue of the powers and presence he symbolizes, accountable. Therefore, it is the duty of every Lebanese to support the president of the republic because he is the symbol of Lebanon's unity, sovereignty and legitimacy. Consequently, opposition to the person of the president is impermissible, even though some have recently made the error of engaging in opposition against the president of the republic. This opposition violates the simplest sound democratic principles we observe.

[Question] What explanation can be given to your opposition to the election of Husayn al-Husayni as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies?

[Answer] I have said that we are in support of institutions, not persons. Our stance during the latest elections for the second chairmanship [Chamber speakership] is the best proof of this stance. The Independent Maronite Deputies Grouping supported ex-speaker Kamil al-As'ad. After the election of the new speaker, the Grouping asked to meet with him and during the meeting, it put all its capabilities at the new speaker's disposal so as to bring success to the institution, even though we did not support his election. Now that Husayn al-Husayni has become the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, it is our duty to help him succeed in his task in order that the Chamber may succeed in performing its national role under these difficult circumstances.

[Question] But it is noticed that your Grouping opposed al-Husayni's election after it had opposed the national unity cabinet by opposing its policy statement. This means that you are opposed to a certain political line?

[Answer] First, insofar as opposing the cabinet is concerned, we relied on the policy statement whose contents we studied and found to be in conflict with our principles. The appointment of deputies, for example, destroys completely the concept of democracy in Lebanon. It is tantamount to falsifying the people's will, destroying their right to elect their representatives and impounding their freedom. Considering that the primary objective of the formation of the Grouping is to safeguard the Lebanese constitution and democracy in Lebanon, it is natural for us to oppose this cabinet which is to be entrusted with appointing deputies, especially since we don't know what is the relationship of this so-called "national unity cabinet" with the people's will and what is the people's will these days. Is it the will of those who control the land with the force of arms or is there a silent majority that is not represented by anybody in this cabinet, or at least not represented by the majority of those who are in the cabinet?

[Question] The question of appointing deputies is part of a proposed solution embraced by Syria with the aim of ending the Lebanese crisis. Does your opposition to this solution put you in a confrontation with Syria?

[Answer] I wish to stress that when we take a certain stance, we do not pause to consider who will be and who will not be satisfied at the Lebanese level. So what do you imagine our position is when the faction concerned is non-Lebanese? We believe that there is a Lebanese national will that must continue to be free to take the political stance it wishes.

On the other hand, it may not be said that we are advocates of severing the Lebanese-Syrian relationship. On the contrary, we have been, are and will continue to be advocates of a clear, firm, fraternal and cooperative relationship between Lebanon and Syria. But these relations must observe mutual respect for the sovereignty of each of the two peoples and two countries, meaning that neither Syria nor Lebanon should be subservient to each other. We understand that Syria is compelled at present to deal with the thorny Lebanese dossier because of the international situation. But we hope that the Lebanese people will be able to end the problems from which they suffer by being allowed to deal with these problems on their own and by the refrainment of all groups and states from interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs. However, since we have reached a stage that requires an external control for the Lebanese crisis, we demand that this control act as the umpire in the inter-Lebanese relationship and not as the steering guide leading to the loss of our political will and freedom.

[Question] What is your visualization of the solution that is capable of eliminating the existing problem and of enabling Lebanon not to follow certain external tendencies?

[Answer] I will not follow in my words the policy of the ostrich that buries its head in the sand to hide itself. The problem of Lebanon has two clear prongs: an internal problem and a problem in Lebanon's regional and international relations.

We all know that the Lebanese problem started as a regional reality embodied on the ground--a problem in which the Lebanese land, the mosaic-like Lebanese structure and the concentrated armed Palestinian presence were exploited, thus leading to the explosion. But now that the Palestinians have departed from Lebanon as an influential and leading force, that Israel has occupied the south, Western al-Biqa' and Rashayya, that the 17 May accord and whatever accompanied it have fallen and that it has become certain that any step taken by Lebanon at the level of its relations with its environment must be coupled with the approval of the parties concerned, i.e., Syria and Israel, and, by their way, the United States and the Soviet Union--now that all this has happened, I imagine that we must deal with the reality which says that the Lebanese-Syrian relationship is a must if Syria is to help Lebanon get liberated, regain its security and safety and spread its sovereignty through Syria's readiness to facilitate the Lebanese task within the framework of what the Arabs view as a sound way of liberation that does not dismiss Arab interests and conclude a treaty with Israel at the expense of these interests.

Therefore, what is happening at present in terms of strengthening the governmental Lebanese-Syrian relationship is commendable. But as Lebanese eager for our dignity, our freedom and our political and territorial sovereignty, we hope that this relationship will be established on the said principles so that Syria may not feel that it is necessary for it to interfere in our domestic daily affairs and to exert political and nonpolitical pressures in order to feel safe insofar as Lebanon is concerned. Lebanon must persuade the Syrians that the performance of normal Lebanese political action cannot be in conflict with the Syrian interests. This may somewhat reassure the Syrians after the elimination of the residues and doubts hovering around the Lebanese regime's political behavior.

To put it briefly, no relationship can be established between Lebanon and Syria on the basis of victor and defeated. Rather, such a relationship can be established on clear, balanced and coordinated bases.

[Question] What about Israel?

[Answer] The negotiations with Israel must continue. But my observation is that serious negotiations should not be conducted via the media, as if the Lebanese negotiator needs an absolution for declaring what he rejects. The government must be given confidence on the issue of negotiations and must be given the opportunity to deal with this issue seriously and confidentially, if we want the negotiations to succeed.

[Question] Don't you think that the Chamber of Deputies must play a certain role so that the climate of the 17 May accord may not recur?

[Answer] The Chamber of Deputies is not the agency qualified to conduct the negotiations or to watch their progress from within. However, the Chamber must keep up with the negotiations by querying the government on their progress and phases. But it is wrong to say that the Chamber of Deputies was wrong to deal with the 17 May accord because the government said at the time that this accord would inevitably lead to liberation. Therefore, failure to approve what the government proposed then would have been tantamount to obstructing its progress. But as for the fact that the government miscalculated and misinterpreted the negotiations in which it engaged, the Chamber of Deputies is partly to blame for approving the pledges made by the government regarding liberation without demanding in advance that the liberation take place before approval of the 17 May accord.

In any case, the events did not permit the Chamber of Deputies to take the cabinet to task for the mistake it made, especially since that cabinet resigned and the current cabinet was formed.

[Question] How do you view the ongoing negotiations in al-Naqrurah?

[Answer] Al-Naqrurah negotiations are an external reflection of the serious discussions and negotiations taking place behind the scenes. The meeting hall in al-Naqrurah is a place where the Lebanese and Israeli military delegations meet to convey to each other the political tendencies each side carries as a



result of the negotiations conducted behind the scenes through the United Nations or the United States by way of Richard Murphy.

[Question] Do you consider the approach of indirect negotiations the safest approach at present?

[Answer] Insofar as Lebanon is concerned, the safest approach is the quickest because the Israeli withdrawal from the south cannot be tied to the Middle East issue, which may require an international conference. It must be said, however, that the mere fact of Israel's agreement to have the negotiations conducted under UN auspices is an important thing. As for the negotiations themselves, they will not be easy and they will encounter obstacles. However, their continuation must be guaranteed in order to provide possible guarantees for Israel's security in return for the liberation of Lebanese territories and for spreading the state's authority and legitimate control over its territories.

#### Sects and Dangers

[Question] Let us return to the domestic problems. The recent years have generated a certain sectarian separation. Do you see any real danger threatening a certain sect?

[Answer] When Lebanon is in danger, all its sects are in danger. If we follow at times a certain policy that may meet with the needs or objectives of one of the Christian sects, it is because of our absolute belief that preserving the rights of the sectarian groups, be they Muslim or Christian, is tantamount to preserving Lebanon's *raison d'être*, especially since Lebanese society cannot survive on one sect's persecution of another.

[Question] This means that you acknowledge the sectarian reality in Lebanon and believe that secularization is impossible at present?

[Answer] It is unacceptable to deal with the reality while ignoring its factors. Our Grouping was the first to project the concept of the comprehensive secularization of society with the aim of achieving social justice and equality and to eliminate whatever we reject in today's Lebanon. But this principle has been rejected on sectarian bases because it is incompatible with some religions which we respect and venerate and because we cannot coerce acceptance for whatever is in conflict with their principles. Therefore, any other coexistence formula must take the sectarian reality into consideration and must not transform Lebanese society into a society where the oppressor and the oppressed, the victor and the defeated and the privileged and underprivileged live. This can be achieved only through preserving the existence and rights of all the sectarian groups within the framework of the comprehensive Lebanese structure that leads to creating the just society.

[Question] The reality is currently outlining certain sectarian entities in Lebanon. Are we on the threshold of entrenching this reality and, consequently, do you see a solution to the problem of those evicted from the mountain?

[Answer] Very regrettably, the atmosphere of estrangement and infighting dominating the relationship existing on Mount Lebanon has prevented us, as a Grouping, from playing a role at the level of initiating a sound national dialogue to solve the mountain problem that has entered the sphere of one-upmanship, which leads to further intensification. But this reality has not prevented us from embarking on certain steps that are likely to narrow the existing rift. I have submitted a bill to ban the sale of land on the mountain in order to prevent the occurrence of a sectarian separation. We have found that expanding the framework of this bill to include all the provinces will prevent the occurrence of sectarian separation between the various sects in the various areas.

At another level, we as a grouping seek to initiate a dialogue between the Druze and Christian officials, especially since this issue is tied to the future of Lebanon as a homeland which was created originally on the base of Christian-Druze cooperation.

[Question] Why hasn't this dialogue started yet?

[Answer] In my view, there are two reasons. They lie in the security situation which continues to be tense and in the almost constant absence of Minister Walid Junblatt from Lebanon on the one hand and in the continued political intransigence concerning the mountain issue on the other hand.

[Question] This means that you consider yourself a party to the conflict existing on the mountain?

[Answer] Not at all. The only side to which we cling is the side of the national interest. This is our commitment and we declare it to all. We do not cling to the interests of any of the factions and we act on the basis of what we deem compatible with the national interest.

At present we are preparing, despite the national unity cabinet which needs somebody to unite its members, for a large-scale campaign of contacts to insure communication among the Lebanese, especially since the failure to return the mountain evacuees to their homes will create a social tragedy and a sort of a social revolution that may topple many things. This is what must be avoided.

#### Division, Not Partition

[Question] Don't you think that the nonreturn of the evacuees puts Lebanon face to face with the danger of actual partition?

[Answer] Today, the danger of partition no longer exists. Rather, the danger lies in the division of Lebanon between Israel and Syria. Partition cannot occur in Lebanon when Syria is entrusted with closing the Lebanese dossier, unless this partition is started by Syria. But Syria cannot permit partition to start in Lebanon, especially since such partition may reach it.

[Question] What is the nature of your relationship with ex-speaker Kamil al-As'ad, especially in light of his statements about his plan to form a parliamentary bloc which includes his supporters in the latest elections to organize opposition against the existing tendencies?

[Answer] It is well known that we supported ex-speaker Kamil al-As'ad in the latest elections, despite the friendship and respect that bind us to Speaker al-Husayni. Ex-speaker al-As'ad visited us a few days ago and we reviewed the general situation. But the idea of forming a new opposition grouping was not raised.

But if we are to anticipate developments, then I can say, without being commissioned to do so by the rest of my colleagues in the Grouping, that our Grouping seeks constantly to maintain its independence and identity. This does not mean that we are closed to entering into the framework of any bigger grouping while maintaining our independence, keeping in mind that the acts of coordination between the parliamentary blocs have never stopped at any time.

#### Relationship With Phalange

[Question] What is the nature of your relationship with the Christian leaderships, beginning with the Phalange Party and ex-president Sham'un?

[Answer] As a Grouping, we have met several times with the Lebanese Front. At times, we have had unified positions and at others we did not agree with the Front. This is how we have been able to preserve our existence as the Independent Maronite Deputies Grouping. If our positions were in total harmony with the Lebanese Front, we would have no reason to exist and we would have joined the Lebanese Front.

We hope that we will have the continued ability to meet with the Lebanese Front. We also hope that this will happen with the other factions, especially since we seek to act as the bridge that preserves Lebanon's unity. Total cohesion between us and the Lebanese Front will obstruct our role and obstruct the possibility of stifling the tragedy in the dark times of estrangement between the Lebanese.

[Question] Does the lack of constant agreement in positions between you and the Lebanese Front obstruct your political action?

[Answer] The battle we are waging as Lebanese is the battle of safeguarding our political freedom. We are waging this battle while knowing that no attempt has been made, as a result of our relationship, to confiscate our will and our decision making, as evidenced by the fact that a number of our positions have been in conflict with the Front's positions. I will cite here as an example our opposition to the current cabinet in which ex-president Camille Sham'un and the late Pierre al-Jumayyil, both of whom we respect and appreciate, have participated.

[Question] What about your relationship with ex-president Franjiyah?

[Answer] Our relationship with ex-president Franjiyah is good and ongoing. Politically, we have often met in our positions with ex-president Franjiyah. We have tried not to sever the relationship existing between us, despite the circumstances we have both experienced.

[Question] Do you plan to expand your Grouping by having more deputies join it?

[Answer] Presently, we are in the process of bolstering the national scope of our Grouping. There is absolutely no objection if one of our colleagues applies to join the Grouping, which is something that has not happened yet.

But what can be said is that the phase the Grouping is now undergoing is the phase of preparing for new political action compatible with the reality in which we live. Therefore, it might be more convenient for the Grouping not to open such a dossier at present.

8494

CSO: 4404/175



PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

AL-QUDS URGES SUPPORT FOR JORDAN-PLO ACCORD

JN241517 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 21 Feb 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Arab Countries and the Agreement"]

[Text] The PLO Executive Committee yesterday approved the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement for a joint political move. The blessing of the agreement by the committee is the culmination of long and exhausting talks that began between the Jordanian and Palestinian sides 2 and 1/2 years ago. The PNC session in Amman recommended that the Executive Committee study the proposals that King Husayn offered to the PNC during its 17th session. Therefore, the Executive Committee's approval of the clauses of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement assuredly reflects the opinions of the PNC members, who entrusted the Executive Committee to adopt whatever it would deem appropriate for a political move aimed at finding a comprehensive and just solution to the Palestine question. The Executive Committee also called on the Arab countries to support the agreement because at this time, the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement needs a broad Arab base for its future moves in the international arena.

The agreement is not confined to Jordan and the PLO. Moreover, it will not succeed without effective and real Arab support. If the Jordanian and Palestinian sides want to present their agreement to the world's countries, particularly to the West European countries and the United States on the one hand and the East European countries and the Soviet Union on the other, then there should be strong Arab support for the agreement. We do not necessarily mean that an Arab consensus should be secured. Approval by an Arab majority would be sufficient, because the agreement between Jordan and the PLO is nothing more than a chance for the Arab countries to agree on a realistic strategy for a political move. If the Arabs fail to achieve a minimum degree of unanimity, then the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement will lose its credibility before the whole world.

The Arab countries are required to define a clear position to prevent any doubts about this agreement. The negative neutrality that some Arab countries adopt regarding this agreement will weaken the Arab position and will perpetuate the stalemate that has characterized the Palestine question for years. The Arab countries should abandon inaction and indecision which have been characteristic of them for a long time. They should announce a clear and definite position. If this does not take place, the stalemate will go from bad to worse.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

AL-FAJR ON LAYLA SHARAF'S RESIGNATION

JN032018 Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 30 Jan 85 p 5

["Stop" column by Hatim 'Abd al-Qadir: "Layla Sharaf: Veto...for History"]

[Text] Jordanian Information Minister Layla Sharaf's resignation has been a real surprise, and has aroused an extraordinary political storm in both official and popular circles. For the first time in Jordan's political history, a higher-ranking government official has bravely, honestly, and sincerely said: "No," and has violently used the "veto" from a position of responsibility. There is a consensus among observers that Mrs Layla Sharaf's violent language in submitting her resignation constitutes a political shock to the Jordanian Government. The information minister not only offered her resignation to protest the new orders aimed at restricting the freedom of the press, but also went beyond that by frankly announcing yesterday to correspondents from international news agencies that the Jordanian Government's information policy does not serve society's interests, and plays with the masses' feelings and thoughts. She added that this policy has come from above, without being discussed.

Mrs Sharaf, who is one of the most educated people in the Arab homeland and who has relatively strong pan-Arab feelings, has tried to reconcile between the two sides of a different equation. She tried to reconcile between freedom of the press and the absence of democracy. She also tried to bet on the failure of the saying: "Arab media are the media of the authority, and not of the masses."

On 18 January last year, Layla Sharaf accepted the position of information minister in Ahmad 'Ubaydat's government, taking advantage of the radical atmosphere that surrounded that government's formation. She wanted to use the position to lay groundwork for a clear-cut policy in the media field in general, particularly in the press, in order to serve the interests of the homeland, the citizens, and the masses without indulging in glorification policies--thereby adopting the principles of "democracy in news media," based on the following:

1. News media are aimed at presenting facts in an objective manner, in order to help the masses form an enlightened public opinion toward the various local, Arab, and international issues.

2. Exerting efforts to limit the authority's interference in the media's work, because such interference will serve neither the masses nor the authority itself, and will make the citizen ignore the local media and fall into the grip of an aggressive media.

3. The need to give the press, the fourth estate, a distinguished role in unveiling corruption to the authorities.

These principles that Sharaf tried to apply in the news media establishments faced many obstacles, so she could only apply a few of the principles. Finally, Mrs Layla Sharaf has fulfilled a promise to journalists. She told them that she would resign the day she became unable to defend the journalists' freedom. The day has come, and she has fulfilled her promise.

CSO: 4400/89

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

JORDAN-PLO COMMITTEE 'JOINT CURSE'

JN031833 Jerusalem AL-MITHAQ in Arabic 30 Jan 85 pp 1, 11

[Editorial: "The Joint Committee?"]

[Text] We have said from the beginning that the joint [Jordanian-Palestinian] committee for "supporting" steadfastness inside [the occupied territory] is a joint curse, especially after the exposure of embezzlement and burglary of the funds for the people's institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. We have pointed out these acts and acquainted readers with them in our issues.

Since the beginning of this year, that committee has been suspending the salaries of the municipality workers and employees who are on strike because the Israelis dismissed a number of mayors and municipality councils and replaced them with others.

This decision is strange, because it was adopted under the pretext of a deficit in the committee's fund. At the same time, we hear and see that enormous amounts of money are being spent in various areas that do not serve the people's issues, but exacerbate their tribulations.

If we study the background of this decision, we will find that it follows the policy of the Palestinian rightist trend and its deviant course, which is running after a mirage of U.S. solutions and which is taking positions in the Arab reactionary trench.

The deviant Palestinian trend is no longer concerned about the national stands, which are no longer related to it. Thus, suspending the salaries of these workers and employees is a punishment for their honest stands.

The decision to suspend the salaries, even if it is not implemented--in case pressures and complaints succeed--will remain a decision against the workers and employees--not because they made a mistake, but because their national feeling prevented them from cooperating and collaborating with appointed mayors and councils.

Palestinian and Arab history will record what kind of committee this is. The fact that this committee is a joint curse will be asserted. The committee's decision will remain, as the other decisions, a mark of disgrace.

CSO: 4400/89

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

W. BANK, GAZA PALESTINIANS CALL FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT

TAl10851 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Feb 85 p 2

[Excerpt] A group of Palestinian community leaders from the West Bank and Gaza yesterday called for a peace settlement between Palestinians and Israelis as the only humane and effective solution to the conflict. Such a settlement should be based on mutual recognition, direct negotiations, rejection of both Arab and Jewish terror and the integration of Jordan in the peace process, as well as in its outcome.

The group declared that "we recognize the right of Israel to exist, but we oppose the creation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip."

Meeting at the home south of Hebron of electric engineer Muhammad Al-Nasir, the group, which says it represents the "voices of moderation," called on the Israeli authorities to grant the Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip the right of political organization and activity for the purpose of achieving a peace settlement. This should include the right of democratic elections to all representative bodies, including the municipalities.

Stating that recent disturbances in the territories are merely symptoms of the continuing military occupation, the gathering stressed that the only way to end these upheavals is to find a political solution to the fundamental problems of the region. The gathering's resolutions also emphasize that Jordan's role in the peace process will not in any way infringe on the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, but will rather be based on the existing reality of indivisible economic, demographic and cultural ties between the people of Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Among the leading participants at the meeting were Burhan al-Ja'bari, son of the late Hebron Mayor Shaykh al-Ja'bari, Muhammad Musa 'Amr, former elected mayor of Dura, Ziyad al-Shawwa from Gaza and representatives from Janin, Nabulus and Hebron. A group of Israelis invited to attend the gathering included Tzvi Elpeleg of the "Way to Peace" movement, Willy Gafni, executive secretary of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East, and Shelly Elqayam of the (Sephardi) East for Peace movement.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

HEBRON NOTABLE PROPOSES SOLUTION FOR TERRITORIES

TA181440 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 18 Feb 85 p 3

[Report by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] Burhan al-Ja'bari from Hebron, the son of Shaykh al-Ja'bari said that the Gaza Strip should be under Palestinian administration, overseen by Egypt, while the West Bank should be under Palestinian administration and overseen by Jordan. According to Burhan al-Ja'bari, a joint consultative council should be set up for the Strip and for Gaza [as published] and this council should convene at regular intervals. The Palestinians in general, or the consultative council in particular, will elect the administrator of each region, whether this be Yasir 'Arafat or somebody else. According to his proposal, the territories will be demilitarized.

The Husayn-'Arafat agreement is a serious move toward peace, according to Burhan. However, this agreement will be beneficial only if Israel cooperates. Burhan believes that UN Security Council Resolution 242 is obsolete and should be modified. It was good 17 years ago and then, too, the Arab leaders made a mistake in adopting the resolution without its implementation being guaranteed. Therefore, according to Al-Ja'bari, this resolution should not be put at the center of the political process; it is the entire Palestinian problem that should be discussed. Burhan al-Ja'bari talked with the 'AL HAMISHMAR correspondent. At the beginning of next month he will deliver a lecture to a Labor Party forum.

CSO: 4400/89



SYRIA

#### DEPUTY PREMIER DISCUSSES NEXT 5-YEAR PLAN

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 11 Nov 84 p 4

[Text] On 19 May 1984, the president of the republic issued Decree No 6 on the formation of a committee under the deputy prime minister for economic affairs to assume the task of preparing the Sixth Economic and Social Plan within the framework of long-term planning until the year 2000.

The presidential decree stipulated that the committee exist to the end of 1985 and that the committee enjoy the broadest powers to enable it to achieve its task.

Under this decree, work has actually begun on preparations for the Sixth 5-Year Economic and Social Development Plan--1986-1990--as of 1 July 1984. 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, deputy prime minister, issued Decision No 1, which stipulated the participation of all the ministries and public authorities, as well as of the popular and vocational organizations, in the process of preparing the draft of the Sixth 5-Year Plan and entrusted the State Planning Committee with submitting the final draft of this budget to the plan preparation committee for study, formulation and submission to the Higher Planning Council prior to 31 July 1985.

Within the past few months, 14 sectoral committees were formed and entrusted with preparing the draft sectoral plans. Furthermore, a committee was formed in each province to prepare for the plan at the provincial level.

His excellency the deputy prime minister also issued a decree forming a central technical committee to prepare the draft Sixth 5-Year Plan.

These committees have begun their work. They have held several meetings at their various levels and covered a reasonable amount of ground in preparing this plan--ground which permits obtaining a first glimpse of the features of the coming 5-year plan.

In this context, TISHRIN invited 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, deputy prime minister for economic affairs and chairman of the committee on preparing the Sixth 5-Year Plan, to an open session during which a dialogue took place on the general trends of the coming 5-year plan and its general features, as well as on the measures which have been achieved up to this time in the preparation of the plan's contents.

In the following lines, we present a succinct review of the proceedings of this session or meeting. The deputy prime minister has promised that such sessions will occur from time to time, particularly following the conclusion of the assessment of the Fifth 5-Year Plan, which will be completed this month, for the purpose of briefing the press and the public on the contents of the coming plan and the measures to be taken to achieve it step by step.

At the beginning of the session, 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, emphasized the importance of this meeting and of the role which the press plays in linking the masses' desires and ambitions to the central authority's trends and decisions for the purpose of making sound decisions which most respond to the masses' aspirations.

He noted the previous meetings with the editors of TISHRIN, which have always been bountiful meetings which shed light on many important points through the issues which had been raised and which reflect the actual conditions with which newsmen keep abreast through their daily contacts with citizens from the various walks of life.

After this introduction, the talk began about the preparations being made for the Sixth 5-Year Plan. The deputy prime minister said that at the end of next year, the years covered by the Fifth 5-Year Plan will end, and the process of preparing for the next plan will begin. In mid-1984, His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad issued Presidential Decree No 6 forming a committee to prepare the draft of the Sixth 5-Year Plan for the country's economic and social development. The committee is chaired by the deputy prime minister and includes as members the following gentlemen: the minister of state for planning affairs, the minister of state for cabinet affairs, the assistant planning minister and the director of administrative and financial affairs of the State Planning Committee. This committee was assigned the task of preparing for the formulation of this plan within the context of long-term planning up to 1985. The widest powers have been vested in this committee to enable it to achieve its task and to make the decisions which it deems fit within the framework of this task. The committee has also been given the jurisdiction to seek the assistance of all quarters and of all experts working in all the economic, social and service bodies.

#### First Meeting of the Plan Preparation Committee

The deputy prime minister added: At the committee's first meeting, we laid down a preliminary and basic framework based on discussions of the following points:

How did things go with regard to implementation of the program under the Fifth 5-Year Plan? Where did obstacles lay in the way of the plan's implementation? What were the results achieved in the elapsed years of the plan in the domain of implementing the projects under the plan, and what were the concepts of the previous plan and the laws which were promulgated for its implementation?

We are preparing for the Sixth 5-Year Plan. We will assess the fifth plan, and through this assessment, we will be able to determine where and how we have succeeded, how we can continue this success and promote it, where the stumbling blocks are, what their reasons are, and how we can surmount them.

Any upcoming plan must be complementary to the preceding one and must add the things which the preceding plan did not contain due to circumstances which had accompanied its preparation, whether material or time circumstances, or due to priorities.

While preparing for the next plan, it is imperative for us to know what our achievements were under the preceding plan, whether the achievements under this or that sector have become adequate and what points there were which were not exacting when the previous plan was laid down but which have now become exacting.

For the coming plan, we must study present conditions and technological progress. It is also imperative for us to study the masses' needs, which have arisen only at this time but which did not exist while preparations were being made for the previous plan, and to include these needs in our coming plan. Our plan is an integrated one which is aimed at building society. This plan takes into account the phases of society's development, the increase in the numbers of society's members and in its needs and the accommodation of these increases through this plan's programs.

#### Priorities of Coming 5-Year Plan

This question was answered by the deputy prime minister for economic affairs and chairman of the committee that is preparing the Sixth 5-Year Plan.

At the first committee meeting, the sixth plan was completed. In accordance with the leadership's instructions, three rules were set for the plan, and they may be stated as follows:

--Turning entirely toward agriculture, land reclamation and exploitation, ~~irrigation and all forms of energy.~~ This trend will provide us with the material and financial requirements for spending on the other sectors, and it requires incorporating new lands in the cultivable areas and promoting the mode of exploitation of water resources in the country to insure the ideal exploitation of these resources.

#### Industry, Transport and Communications and Tourism

Services, and this is a sector to which a special importance has been attached, because it was not heeded by the Fourth 5-Year Plan, which had turned in the direction of industrial development.

To a question about the justifications for these priorities, Qaddurah answered: In all kinds of planning, we must study all the circumstances around us, be they local or international, and we should come out with our plans having been adapted to these circumstances and to the country's requirements.

I might not be exaggerating if I say that the two most important problems which the world is now addressing are energy and food security. We are a part of the world and we are affected by its issues, whether we like it or not and whether these be negative or positive reflections.

In the middle of the current 5-year plan, we advocated the need to give priority to agriculture for the following reasons:

--Because agriculture represents an unswerving local resource which can increase in abundance and reduces, as much as possible, the linkage with the external economic circumstances and crises. Our objective behind giving priority to agriculture is to achieve a kind of food self-sufficiency in the country.

--Because of the continuing increase in the country's population. The average growth of population in our country represents the highest ratio in the world, while the amount of our cultivable lands is receding because of non-agricultural uses.

--Because agriculture is no longer what it was in the past, just for the purpose of meeting primary requirements only, and because it now constitutes the basis of agricultural-industrial integration.

--Because in this country, we still exploit only a small amount of our water from various sources. The population increase signifies, in return, a growing need for food, services, culture and so on. This population increase also means the need for more new resources to cover this growing need. The agricultural sector is regarded as the most important source of these resources.

What increases the need to attach greater importance to the agricultural sector is a review of some of the difficulties which we faced in past years. The 2 years of relative drought through which the country had passed contributed to shaking some of our plans in both the industrial and service sectors. This year, we have imported about 1.4 million tons of wheat and these imports have been made at the expense of projects which were being implemented or whose implementation had been planned. This is what we have done about fodder, of which the poultry sector requires 400,000 tons of wheat.

The deputy prime minister added: Our need for food is great and it is growing. Our planning must strive to meet this need. Under the Fourth 5-Year Plan, our industrial requirements were great. This plan included industrial projects to meet these requirements. We now give the agricultural sector and its projects priority in our coming plans to cover our food needs.

He said: When we say that our first course during the coming plan will be toward the agricultural sector, we mean not only activating this sector but also reversing all future agricultural relations and bringing about an agricultural revolution based on modern and scientific agricultural methods. Pursuing a course leading to agriculture signifies surging forth toward the

generalization and propagation of agricultural mechanization, toward the scientific use of fertilizers so far as large and suitable times are concerned, toward a continuation of pest and control the most ideal use of insecticides, toward appropriate agricultural rotations affording an intensive and ideal use of cultivable land and water resources, toward the introduction of new and diversified crops compatible with the findings of the soil classification studies and with the requirements of our factories and our daily consumer requirements, toward a higher yield within an area unit and toward an annual agricultural plan that is issued in good time, implemented scrupulously at the level of each province and district and geared to reducing our agricultural imports to a minimum.

Land is the basis, and we have endowed agricultural production with importance in our coming plans, because this production offers security to our country and because this priority was determined through the instructions issued by the party Central Committee at its meetings in 1983. These meetings then endorsed 1983 as an agricultural year during which we will lay down the basis for a future and continuing agricultural renaissance.

#### Editorial Remark

In the course of his answers to questions about the justifications for giving priority to the agricultural sector in the next 5-year plan, his excellency the deputy prime minister cited some points worth mentioning:

During the 1983-84 season, our production of cotton rose to 425,000 tons, after it had reached 355,000 tons in 1977 which, in return, resulted in a large number of pipes which the capacity of the oil presses could not handle in pressing.

At the end of last August, the Higher Agricultural Council endorsed the 1984-85 agricultural plan, including the purchase prices of crops and the cultivation places of these crops, while the current plan was endorsed in January 1983 for the 1982-83 season and in November 1983 for the 1983-84 season.

Experiments and limited cultivation encouraged by the government have proven the possibility of introducing new cultivation in some provinces, such as tobacco in Dar'a Province and bananas in al-Yarmu, Valley.

Qaddurah concluded his answer about the reason for giving priority to agriculture in the coming plan by saying: We pursue the course of agriculture because we possess all the factors of its development, or a large proportion of these factors. We have water, and we will work to exploit every drop of it; we have land, and we will work to expand its reclamation and to exploit it in the best way; and we have qualified scientists. We produce all kinds of fertilizers. This year, we have produced ammonium nitrate and have thus completed the circle of fertilizers, with the exception of potash. Our production of ammonium urea will become economical following the conclusion of the project for switching from naphtha and substituting it with gas. We have a tractory factory and we will work to expand the manufacture of agricultural machinery.



## Services in Coming 5-Year Plan

Why have not services been given priority in the areas to be followed while laying down the next 5-year plan? To this question, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs answered: The plans and projects of the Fifth 5-Year Plan attached special importance to the service sector--and in a tangible manner. While implementing this plan, we turn to projects for roads, bridges and road junctions; to housing projects--and suburbs came into existence in all Syrian cities--and to resolving the problems of electricity, telephones, drinking water and communications.

We can now say that the lower infrastructure of services has almost been completed, and we now work to improve its performance.

The railroad infrastructure has almost been completed and has connected all the country's provinces and districts. In the railroad domain, we now only need branches to connect production sources to manufacturing or production locations. In other words, we are working on the backup services.

In the field of rural electrification, the percentage of lighting was 70 percent of the country's rural areas around the beginning of the eighties. This percentage now amounts to 88 percent of the country, and to 100 percent in some provinces. We will certainly complete the electrification of the countryside before 1990.

With regard to drinking water, we have taken big leaps forward and we will continue the completion work during the coming plan.

Qaddurah added: We have made great achievements in the service and utilities sector. In 1970, the country's electric energy-generating capacity did not exceed 1 billion kilowatt-hours a year "900,000" [as published] while the present annual power-generating capacity is approximately 6.4 billion kilowatt-hours. In this respect, we can imagine the number of pylons, power transmission lines, meters and so on required to transmit this energy, and we can also imagine the volume of expenses in the completion of stations to generate this energy.

The deputy prime minister concluded his answer to this question by saying: The presence of the service sector at the bottom of the list of orientation priorities for the formulation of the coming plan does not signify that a program and plan for the benefit of services have not been listed under the upcoming plan. However, this presence reflects the fact that we in this country have completed the infrastructure for this sector and that our upcoming plan will provide for completing this infrastructure, securing the requirements of its functioning in an ideal manner and bringing these services to all the masses.

## Considerations Which Planners Must Bear in Mind

There are always specific considerations which planners put in their sights before they begin making their plans. Therefore, what are the issues or the



things which the government believes must be taken into account by those who have been entrusted with formulating the plan, while they are in the course of working out sectoral or employment plans?

To this question, 'Abd al-Qadir Qaddurah, the deputy prime minister, answered: Every plan must be aimed at man. This plan is for development, and man is its implementer and activator. Concerning the considerations to be observed in the plan, we have said that it is incumbent upon planners to know the best means of exploitation in the sectors for which plans are being hammered out and to know the potential available, the status of these sectors and what we want these sectors to be like.

He added: At the first meeting of the committee preparing the plan, we said that the following matters must be heeded:

--Raising performance standards, adhering to a positive outlook and remaining aloof from a negative attitude and tackling them.

The plan should be implementable and its returns should be known.

The plan should be prepared in accordance with the form and concept which were adhered to in the preparation of the Fifth 5-Year Plan.

--Avoiding the beginning of the implementation of any project whose economic feasibility has not been proved, seeking to exploit the existing projects in the best manner and tackling the bottlenecks and negative attitudes that hinder the functioning of projects.

Concerning the basic trend of the plan, we must know what has been implemented in the previous plan and what has not been implemented. We must also determine whether the nonimplementation was due to negligence or was due to a reason beyond our control (financing, climate). This knowledge requires a scientific, truthful assessment of the fifth plan.

--Relying on local raw materials in manufacturing products and concentrating attention on manufacturing these raw materials as substitutes for imported products for the purpose of limiting imports as much as possible.

--Learning the planning methods used in the states that pursue a socialist course and learning these states' methods of setting their priorities and of procuring their material requirements, particularly those requirements connected with loans and banks.

The plan is for the benefit of all citizens, and it is imperative for every citizen to contribute to its formulation from his position so that all will feel the usefulness of this plan. This requires knowing the roles and tasks of farmers, workers, craftsmen, organizations and so on in this plan; the relationships among the various sectors; and how these sectors serve each other for the purpose of achieving economic integration.

--Focusing attention on good-quality production and limiting squandering as much as possible to reach the minimum permissible limits.

--Laying down timetables in the various domains to dispense with foreign experts inasmuch as possible.

#### Planning Balance Among Sectors

Within the framework of the course of comprehensive planning, which our country pursues in its development process, how can we guarantee striking a balance in the coming 5-year plan, particularly because the sectoral committees prepare the plan for each sector, and what measures have been taken, or will be taken, to realize this planning balance among the different sectors within the context of overall planning?

His excellency the deputy prime minister said: When we specified the sectoral committees and when the names of their members were issued, the basic guideline given to these committees called for the need of insuring that the committee chairmen and rapporteurs stay in contact with each other, on the understanding that each sector will fulfill its requirements within the available limits and achieve the potential to be secured for each sector. The understanding also was that each committee will view its sector from the overall view of the homeland as a whole.

The element of safety in a balanced plan is achieved through the Central Technical Committee. This is a committee which includes all the chairmen of the sectoral and functional committees. This committee, which has been formed for the first time, shoulders the task of debating the reports on the handling of the various planning tasks, which have been submitted by the sectoral committees, and of coordinating among these reports and endorsing them. In other words, this committee studies the extent of the balance existing in the proposed plans and the potential available within the comprehensive plan. Furthermore, through its study of all the reports and in light of the meetings of the committee chairmen, this committee issues the guidelines insuring the required planning balance.

At this point, I want to note that the previous 5-year plans, and even the fifth plan, were formulated directly by the State Planning Committee, and the method of the sectoral committees, the sectoral subcommittees, the Central Technical Committee and the Plan Preparation Committee was not applied to the above-mentioned plans, except when the fifth plan was worked out and, at this time, while we are formulating the sixth plan.

The decision forming the sectoral committees is characterized by the creation of a new Administrative Development Planning Committee. What are this committee and its tasks? It has also been noticed that the Agriculture and Irrigation Sector Committee has, for the first time, become two committees, one for irrigation and the other for agriculture. What is the reason?

Qaddurah said: In every 5-year economic and social development plan, we include a basic subject to which we attach importance as confirmed by our

trials and experience gained in the course of implementing these development plans. In the Fifth 5-Year Plan, we attached importance to the manpower plan, and this plan began being submitted each year by the public quarters of the state to the State Planning Committee. We adhere to this plan. Furthermore, we have imbued this plan with a training and qualification potential.

In relation to the preparations for the coming plan, we have said that special importance must be given to administrative development, because this is a major and broadranging task which requires:

--Discussion of the organizational structure of the state and public sector apparatus as well as discussion of the laws and systems in force, particularly the labor laws.

--Work tools and technicalities.

--Administrative functions, the way they are performed, the problem of who will carry out the assessment processes and so on.

Therefore, we have formed a special Administrative Development Planning Committee, which includes many specialists from universities and from research and study centers, and representatives of popular organizations, the Council of State and the general civil servants register. We specified this committee's task as one of turning administrative development theories into a tangible fact. This committee was formed as a result of our feeling that great problems in the administrative domain had been remedied only superficially, and in view of our belief in the important role of administrative development.

Concerning the creation of two committees for irrigation and agriculture, instead of the one committee which had previously made plans for the two sectors, this action has come as a result of our belief in the role performed by the irrigation sector.

An Irrigation Ministry has been created in accordance with the resolutions passed by the party's Seventh Regional Congress for the purpose of achieving the best exploitation of water resources. The irrigation sector is a very broad one and its activities encompass power generation, irrigation and drainage networks, irrigation methods and water channels, and this is what has prompted us to form a special committee to plan for irrigation.

Within this context, his excellency the deputy prime minister pointed to the number of large dams which have been completed, which number about 88 dams. He also noted a number of important dams for which the cornerstone has been laid in preparation for building them or which are intended to be built in the course of the coming 5-year plan.

Local Councils' Plan Preparation Role, Basic Year

[Question] How has the implementation of the second phase of the local administration law and of the powers vested in the local councils been reflected in the contents of the Sixth 5-Year Plan?

[Answer] For the first time, we have formed committees to prepare the Sixth 5-Year Plan in the provinces. These committees function under the oversight of the local councils of the local government. These committees are chaired by the governors. They include representatives of the quarters concerned and of the sectors in which local powers were vested by virtue of the local government law. These committees study the projects they require and submit them to the competent specialized sectoral committee. The sectoral committee studies these projects and submits them to the technical committee for a decision. In other words, the provincial committees have submitting, identifying and requesting powers. However, the Central Committee has decision-making powers.

[Question] Why was 1980 set as the basic year in the formulation of the plan?

[Answer] Every plan has a basic year to which to attribute the required development averages, as well as the averages achieved, and with which to make comparisons. We did not designate 1981 as a basic year for the plan for various reasons, including:

--The various production sectors were not operating fully in 1981.

--The existence of some error in the year, specified as the basic year, when the Fifth 5-Year Plan was worked out.

--The rise in agricultural production in 1981 as a result of good rainfall.

Following ample studies, we decided to set 1980 as a basic year for the coming plan.

#### We Will Meet Again

These are some of the points of the meeting of the editors of TISHRIN with 'Abd-al-Qadir Qaddurah, deputy prime minister and chairman of the Sixth 5-Year Plan Preparatory Committee. There are other points which were raised about economic issues which we will publish later.

The meeting signaled the beginning of our own initiative in having a role in the formulation of the plan. It has been useful to us as journalists and it has placed us in the picture of what is going on in the realm of preparations for the plan. However, the coming meetings will be more useful, because the assessment of the former plan will then have been concluded, and the features of the coming plan, which will be worked out in light of this assessment, will have become clearer.

12839

CSO: 4404/149

SYRIA

## AL-HASAKAH MECHANIZES COTTON, CORN HARVEST

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 7 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Statistics point to a drop in production per worker in the agricultural sector of the developing countries, and to a rise in this production in the advanced countries. For instance, an agricultural worker produces, on the average, enough to feed 19 persons in Bulgaria, 15 persons in the Soviet Union and 14 persons in Japan, whereas in our country, we find this worker producing enough for only 3 persons. Even worse, in some developing countries, such a worker's production might even drop lower than this level, and in some of these countries an agricultural worker might not even produce enough to feed himself.

The decrease in agricultural productivity is directly linked to the extent of the spread of mechanized agriculture and to the use of modern agricultural methods. From this premise, and following the dwindling manpower resources in the countryside as a result of migration to the cities, our country pursued a policy of depending on the propagation of agricultural machinery to achieve the full mechanization of strategic crops, and our country has taken many steps in this domain in past years.

In Al-Hasakah Province, the branch of the Agricultural Mechanization Establishment planted 61,000 donums with cotton during the 1983-84 season, depending on machines and beginning with sowing and ending in harvesting.

On the generalization of agricultural mechanization, particularly in connection with both cotton and corn crops, we had a meeting with Hanna Banjaru, director of al-Hasakah branch of the Agricultural Mechanization Establishment:

Locally made machines used:

On the instructions of the General Establishment, the al-Hasakah branch of the establishment carried out a number of experiments on a number of the main crops cultivated in the province, such as cotton, corn, lentils, chickpeas, peas and so on, for the purpose of mechanizing most of the agricultural processes needed for producing these crops. Up to this time, the establishment has held integrated mechanization experiments for the cotton, corn and pea crops. These experiments have produced satisfactory results, particularly in corn and cotton crops. In carrying out these experiments, the branch



depended on local expertise, that is, on local agronomists and workers. We also focused our attention on using mechanical plows and sowers, as well as rotovators, which produced highly acceptable results. Furthermore, we can raise the production of these machines and develop them by means of making some alterations appropriate for these types of agriculture.

We took into consideration two basic aspects, to wit: first, increasing production and reducing costs as much as possible and, in fact, we can develop our work even more and carry out more of these experiments in case efforts are streamlined and cooperation is achieved with the other quarters interested in agricultural work. In this instance, it will be possible to realize integrated agricultural work and we will be able to achieve better results in a shorter time, while we will be creating an opportunity for generalizing the modern method which is applied to the crops cultivated in the province or throughout the country. Efforts should particularly be streamlined with the Research Directorate in Damascus, the Agricultural Guidance Directorate, the agricultural colleges and the peasants organization.

#### Mechanized cotton cultivation expanded:

The results of last year's experimental mechanization of cotton planting have given an incentive and generalized momentum for embarking on an expansion of the mechanization method in cotton cultivation. The cultivated area has increased from 25 hectares to 120 hectares cultivated through full mechanization, including harvesting and transporting the product in bundles to the ginning plant. We have also cultivated a number of guidance fields for our brother peasants and farmers. We used all mechanized processes, with the exception of mechanized harvesting. We have achieved very good results insofar as production is concerned, to the extent that a field was nominated a winner at the cotton festival which was held this year in Aleppo. The per-donum yield totaled about 500 kg and, thus, this field won the silver cup. This has encouraged many brothers in several areas of the province to use modern mechanical methods in their own agricultural work. This area is expected to increase next year, through the partial mechanization of cotton cultivation, by three or four times the area cultivated in the current season, after we have equipped a group of mechanical service teams, whose number amounts to five rooms distributed among the areas of Ra's al-'Ayn and al-Hasakah, and have equipped them with the most modern agricultural machines such as tractors of various sizes and also sowers for the various crops such as cotton, grains, lentils and chickpeas as well as with fertilizing equipment and other agricultural machinery.

#### Economic feasibility perused:

We asked agronomist Banjaru about the economic feasibility and about the savings achieved through the process of using this agricultural mechanization method. He answered: There is a savings equivalent to 1 Syrian pound in fertilizing 1 donum, in addition to insuring the homogeneity of fertilizer distribution in the field and to depositing the fertilizer near the plant's roots.



### Mechanized sowing:

In addition to the ease of work and the distribution of seeds at even depths in a homogeneous way throughout the field, mechanized sowing saves a quantity of seeds ranging from 7 to 10 kg per donum, at an estimated cost of 15 Syrian pounds, in addition to the other advantages, to wit: there is little need for manpower in singling and hoeing and in mechanized hoeing operations. Furthermore, mechanized hoeing permits us to carry out thinning operations at the required depth and in accordance with plant age, in addition to immunizing the plants, which fosters formation of a large root association and saves no less than 50 Syrian lira per donum, in addition to saving effort, as I have said previously.

### Irrigation process:

The modern method in use is the method of long-line irrigation, which waives a number of agricultural processes now in use in the traditional method, such as digging channels and erecting sand barriers in the fields. However, the long-line irrigation method, which achieves a savings of up to 25 percent in irrigation water, facilitates the farmer's entry in his field to observe his plants without harming them and makes it easy to carry out combat operations, if a pest attack appears, and to carry out the mechanical implementation of other agricultural operations. Furthermore, the results of experiments have shown that, through this method, it is possible for one farmer to irrigate singlehandedly an area of no less than 75 donums, while, through the traditional method, this area does not exceed 30 donums. Consequently, this method saves manpower in irrigation costs amounting to 50 Syrian pounds per donum.

### Mechanized harvesting:

Experiments have demonstrated to us that mechanized harvesting does not mean less manual harvesting, despite the numerous positive attributes of the mechanized harvesting method, such as lifting the crops quickly before rainfall and the possibility of expanding the cultivation of cotton in areas with meager manpower resources. However, manual harvesting done in return for reasonable wages remains a better method than mechanized harvesting because cotton remains clean in manual harvesting, and there is no need for using "precipitants," which have not given the hoped-for results up to this time during their use in the cotton fields to which the integrated mechanized method is applied. We carry out such experiments in preparation for the future, when the expansion of agriculture will reach its peak through the implementation of numerous enormous agricultural projects, such as the Al-Khabur dam and the Euphrates project, which will result in the irrigation of areas not exceeding 200,000 hectares. Then, it will become definitely impossible to procure the manpower needed to cover all these areas and to insure their most ideal exploitation.

This year, we used the method of transporting the cotton crop in bundles. The results were very good. By using this method, we have saved a great deal of money, because the cost per bundle is about 10 Syrian pounds. We

have also dispensed with product-packing processes and with loading the product and transporting it from the production fields to the purchasing centers at the cotton gins. We have concluded that we saved about 50 Syrian pounds per donum.

#### Corn cultivation experiments:

Following the decision to cultivate corn, we carried out experiments on the full mechanization of corn. We planted an area of 300 donums, while using agricultural machinery in carrying out all the agricultural operations, including harvesting and threshing. We used locally made or assembled agricultural machinery, such as the Furat tractors and sowers. Savings were made in both production costs and the product itself, because the productivity per donum amounted to a maximum of 325 kg and to a minimum of 250 kg. Meanwhile, we do not expect the average per-donum production in the province to exceed 150 kg.

#### Impediments hindering experiments:

His excellency the director of the al-Hasakah branch of the Agricultural Mechanization Establishment then switched to talking about the impediments which have confronted experiments with the corn, cotton and pea crops by saying:

We have planted 500 donums belonging to our brother peasants with corn. We suffered from the small area of these fields and from their dispersal, because the area of the largest field is no more than 20 donums and the distance between one field and another is extremely great. This shortcoming appeared through, and was embodied in, the harvesting operations, when we moved harvesters from one location to another. This resulted in raising the cost of exploiting these machines and, subsequently, in a decline in their productivity caused by the constant movement from one location to another in these fields.

We have also cultivated an area of 60 donums with peas to the benefit of the canned food factory, and we could not harvest the crop mechanically because the harvesting machines needed failed to arrive.

Therefore, the results have been good, even in the harvesting operations.

12839

CSO: 4404/149

SYRIA

# IDLIB OLIVE EXHIBITION REPORTED, IMPROVEMENT PROPOSALS NOTED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 7 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Although the olive tree is regarded as an important manifestation of the country's economic level, and also as a manifestation of the province's social level, we do not believe, however, that the olive tree needs an occasion through which it would be possible to cast light on the status of this tree and on the degree of development it has reached. Consequently, this talk will not die out just because the bank has been closed down. Talk is always renewed about the position of the olive tree in our national economy, not solely because there are now well over 31 million trees, as his excellency the agriculture minister announced, but also because these trees make a positive contribution to bolstering our food security and to consolidating our national economy and because they constitute a basic source of livelihood for a large number of the country's citizens.

Therefore, the olive tree enjoys the special and distinctive attention of the competent quarters at the various levels headed by our struggler comrade, Lt Gen Hafiz al-Asad. A special committee has been formed under Comrade Wahib Fadil, minister for presidential affairs, which includes as members the head of the Central Oversight and Inspection Authority and a number of specialists from the country's universities, and this committee has recently made a field visit to the province during which it has familiarized itself with the status of the olive tree as well as with its problems and with the measures guaranteeing its development.

Since the exhibition is not an end in itself, inasmuch as it is an occasion through which those selected compete in bringing forth their expertise and in acquainting themselves with the most prominent scientific developments that have occurred, we will talk briefly about the exhibition and then move to what is more important.

We will answer just one question: what about the olive tree in Idlib Province?

To begin with, it is imperative to note that this year's exhibition, so far as its framework is concerned, is considered successful as a result of the streamlining of the efforts exerted by the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the Peasants Branch Office, and as a result of cooperation

among all the other quarters concerned which participated in the exhibition. This applies to the popular organizations, such as the youth and vanguard organizations and the Women's Union, all of which have occupied their special pavilions, and to some other quarters concerned with the agricultural sector.

If we except the Agricultural Center, which participated for the first time in this exhibition with a small pavilion, and the increase in the number of the guidance plates signed in the name of the Olive Bureau, then there is nothing new in this exhibition, which decor engineer 'Abd al-Razzaq Hayani has endowed with distinctive vitality, despite the fact that it is difficult to deal with the olive for exhibition purposes. Furthermore, artist Nadir Qaddur has made the exhibition very attractive with his olive tree paintings, which have won the admiration of all the exhibition's visitors.

What we have said concerns the form. However, when it came to concept, we strongly wished that there were an actual presence of scientific establishments, which have been limited to the presence of only the Arab Center for Dry Areas and Arid Lands Studies. We also strongly wished that the Olive Bureau had acquainted the spectators with the fruit of its work through only one guidance plate similar to those which were exhibited by all the provinces, or that the Olive Bureau had at least acquainted the spectators with the primary results of mechanical harvesting, which is regarded as the most marked problem from which the olive farmers suffer.

We also wished strongly that some Arab and international scientific establishments from the olive-producing states had been invited to attend the inaugural ceremony, since our potential might not permit taking this exhibition out of the country's framework to a more general and comprehensive one, particularly because Syria is considered as being the original habitat of the olive tree, as the agriculture minister announced at the exhibition's inaugural ceremony.

On the social level, the exhibition attracted most of the citizens of the provincial center, and at least those who found in the exhibition a breather that allowed them to kill some time, particularly because the province lacks a resort at which the citizens can relax in times of leisure. Furthermore, a great deal of time was spent talking about the arts performance organized by the Revolutionary Youth Union as part of the exhibition activities. During this performance, the Al-Khansa' Girls Secondary School troupe delighted the audience with an outstanding arts performance, which was concluded with the election of this year's olive beauty queen.

After this intensive review of the exhibition's status, we again wonder about the status of the olive trees in Idlib Province.

Those who have had the opportunity to follow up the efforts, which the farmers exert here in serving the olive trees, will inevitably shake hands with the farmers and laud their deep attachment to the land. Through their efforts, the farmers this year have increased the area planted with olive trees by 3,300 hectares, thus exceeding the international growth rate of 2 percent. This is because, after the past 5 years, the growth rate in the

province reached 2.6 percent, as Ahmad Summaq, the director of agriculture and agrarian reform in Idlib, said.

Summaq added that Idlib Province is regarded as one of the four olive-producing provinces in the country, along with Aleppo, al-Ladhiqiyah and Tartus. Idlib Province comes in second place insofar as the area and the number of trees are concerned. The area planted with olive trees is 78,565 hectares, and this area constitutes a ratio of 76 percent out of the total area planted with orchards in the province.

In accordance with this year's statistics, the number of olive trees is 8.45 million trees.

This great development is due to:

1. The efforts exerted by the brother farmers and those specializing in this agriculture.
2. The suitability of soil and climate in an ideal manner for this tree.
3. The pre- and post-processing brisk markets available for this crop.
4. The ease of processing and the possibility of product storage.
5. The mechanization of the crop throughout the cultivation and service phases, with the exception of harvesting, which is still in an experimental phase.

These factors have fostered the expansion of cultivation and have contributed to increasing crops, which amounted to 43,563 tons in 1979, to 109,773 tons in 1980 and to 53,403 tons in 1981, while in 1982 the crop set a record figure of 175,805 tons. In 1983, the crop receded to 64,000 tons. However, this year production is estimated at 108,000 tons.

This product fluctuation is due to the yearly alternation in fruit bearing; one year crops are abundant but as for the other year! This is the result of environmental and hereditary factors. However, the type cultivated in the province, "al-Misri or al-Surani," is less affected by this phenomenon than the other types, because it gives a good yield in 1 year, and a medium yield in the other. This type constitutes 95 percent of the types planted in the province.

The agriculture director says that there can be no doubt that Idlib Province is on its way to a large expansion of olive cultivation. An irrigation water crisis now looms on the horizon following the drop in the ground water level, the drying up of some wells and the imminent drying up of others, and this signifies the gradual transformation of irrigated lands into nonirrigated lands. Consequently, the nonirrigated lands will turn into wooded lands, with the exception of the fertile lands with heavy red soil.



The ideal tree most suitable for the land of the province is the olive tree. Therefore, olive trees will cover the largest part of the province's cultivable land.

How about the problems from which this tree suffers?

In this regard, this talk can be divided into:

1. Diseases
2. Pests

With regard to diseases:

1. Dryness of olive tree branches is considered one of the dangerous diseases which endanger this tree. It appeared for the first time in the province in 1982, because it was unknown prior to this date. However, the rate of infection does not exceed 5 percent, despite the fact that there is no remedy for this disease, in accordance with the ministry's instructions, save for some preventive instructions.

A seminar on this disease was held in 1982 at the center for agricultural research of the ministry's directorate. During this seminar, numerous reports were discussed and the universities and agricultural scientific institutes were assigned with carrying out research and conducting studies. Up to this time, we have not received anything about the outcome of this research.

2. The Vanessa disease proliferates in the humid western and northern areas, and its remedy is considered somewhat difficult, because the disease occurs in autumn following rainfall and in March. During these two periods, the earth is usually muddy and it is difficult for vehicles to enter it. Therefore, we suggest that this disease be combated regularly from the air at state expense to fight locusts and tuberculosis.

3. Olive tree (tuberculosis) is confined to villages in the Harim area adjacent to Turkey. The number of affected trees is estimated at 40,000 trees, and there is no remedy for this disease.

These are the most important diseases from the economic perspective. Concerning the pests which attack olive trees, they can be summed up in the following:

The olive tree mite and its three generations:

The blossom, fruit and leaf generations. When it comes to the blossom generation, it is combated by the farmers. However, it is difficult to specify the time at which the fruit generation appears, which requires conducting annual and periodic studies to specify the time of its appearance and, consequently, to specify the time for combating it, because it has a dire economic effect on olive trees and on their quality as well as on product quality.



The olive fly is considered one of the insects which attack the olive fruit and lead to a sizable shortage in the product as well as in product quality and quantity. Although it is easy to combat this fly, it nevertheless causes major disasters when it is neglected or combated partially. Combating it individually does not fulfill the objective. Therefore, it is imperative to combat the fly collectively, and at specific times.

This year, the fight encompassed 1.2 million trees. We suggest that this insect be fought by means of aircraft used in agriculture, particularly because we now have six airstrips in the province, with the exception of al-Ma'arra area, where an airstrip will be built to make it possible to combat all agricultural pests from the air.

Wood leopard. Proliferation of this pest is limited to the province, because the predominant type of olive trees is resistant to this pest.

Olive tree (niran). This pest previously had a direct effect on olive trees. However, the farmers' alertness to the fact that they should refrain from using pruned leftovers has limited the spread of the disease.

At any rate, one can say that there is no fear for the future of this bountiful tree, thanks to the vigilance of the farmers, who have exerted their efforts and who have sweated for the sake of this tree, in addition to a followup of this tree by technicians on the one hand, and thanks to the interest taken in the olive tree by officials at the highest levels on the other.

His excellency the director of the agriculture department said in conclusion:

It is imperative that this evolution, which the province is witnessing in the domain of olive tree cultivation, be accompanied by a development of processing and marketing processes and by the establishment of modern olive presses in accordance with well-thought-out programs and plans commensurate to the annual increase in this crop.

It is also imperative that this expansion be coupled with olive research stations to study all the phenomena stemming from this development, such as the appearance of some diseases and pests, and also to study the types of environmental and hereditary factors that face this crop. It is also imperative to insure the presence of specialized technicians.

12839

CSO: 4404/149

AFGHANISTAN

ARAB JOURNALIST ACCOMPANIES GUERRILLAS INSIDE COUNTRY

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 22, 24, 31 Dec 84; 2, 5 Jan 85

[22 Dec 84 p 15]

[Excerpt] It has been noted from the beginning that, in the aftermath of the leftist revolution and the overthrow of the Dawud Khan republic in April 1978, Afghanistan has been divided into two basic movements.

There is a political left movement, dominated by the People's Democratic Party with its competing elements, Khalq and Parcham, and there is an Islamic political movement which is incompatible with the first and calls for the overthrow of the new leftist regime. This movement is dominated by a group of senior clerics and a number of traditional personalities.

Because the first movement controls the government, the second movement has become the opposition.

The Afghan opposition has, therefore, acquired a distinctly religious character, not only attributable to the number of clerics and the path of Sufism followed by the factions of the resistance, but also fundamentally attributable to the deep religious conviction of the Afghan people, who have clung to their Islam throughout the ages and maintained their religious heritage in the face of all foreign invasions. In fact, the Afghan people have found in their Islamic faith the motivation for the resistance and the incentive for fighting the invasion of the foreign infidels, as the Afghans describe them.

Since the dawn of history, invaders, explorers and European and Asian foreigners have passed through these Afghan mountains and their desolate canyons.

Many religions and beliefs--pagan and divine--have penetrated Afghan territory: Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam.

All have passed through here, but none, except Islam, could achieve a foothold. Islam alone has come and stayed.

[Excerpt] We can take the huge Nangarhar region as a model of the escalation of the Islamic resistance movement. We were able to enter this region with certain Afghan mujahidin groups.

In this region the resistance enjoys extensive freedom of movement, unparalleled bravery and true sovereignty since the groups of rebels have been able to liberate most of this region's plains, valleys and mountains. In addition, they have gained the support of the rebel tribes, whereas the control of the official Afghan government and the Soviets is restricted to the capital of Jalalabad and the main roads in the city. This is the capital whose hills we stood on one dawn in January 1981. We participated shoulder to shoulder with the mujahidin forces while they bombed the city's military airport in an operation that is still considered one of the boldest attack operations of the fighting revolutionaries. Thanks to advanced weapons and daily battle experience, they have truly become more daring and brave in attacking their targets, taking control of government positions and advancing on other regions outside the Nangarhar region to assist their colleagues who are charged with other missions.

We could give many examples from other regions, such as Kunar and Panjsher, to reveal how the armed resistance movement has increased against the foreign occupation that backs the Karmal government in Kabul.

However, we prefer now at least quickly to discuss Nangarhar because of its strategic importance to both sides of the struggle: the revolutionary mujahidin groups on the one hand and the Kabul government backed by the Soviet army on the other hand.

Nangarhar's strategic importance is due to the fact that it is the most important region connecting the opposition with Pakistan. Along with Kunar and Paktia, it represents an area of free movement for the rebels, who spread like raindrops among the grains of sand. They disappear moving in and out of its mountains, hills and valleys carrying weapons and supplies but, more importantly, carrying the spirit of revolution and rebellion. However, this region is distinguished from all the other border regions because it is the one that controls the roads and entrances leading to the famous and historic Khyber Pass, which extends 160 km and links the mountains of Afghanistan in the west to the plains of Pakistan in the East. More to the point, it links the highlands of central Asia to the plains of the Indian peninsula.

The Afghan government forces and the Soviets control the main entrances to the pass on the Afghanistan side and are present in large numbers at the official border crossing at Tor Kham where they try to control entry and exit precisely. Nonetheless, the stealth of the rebels has prevented their movements from being cut off through the other parts of the region and across mountain trails and the infrequently traveled paths that penetrate the Sulayman mountain range--which is part of the Himalayas--and the Kurram, Jumal, Bowlan, Khowjak and Kuhat passes in particular. All of these permit freedom of movement using guides who live in the surrounding mountains,

allowing men of the resistance to move to and from Afghanistan without being seen.

The Nangarhar region is distinguished, in addition to its rugged mountains, by its agriculturally rich plains and valleys. This provides the resistance with an inexhaustible supply of water and food. In addition, this area has a tremendous supply of people who belong to the fighting forces, especially because one of its most important large tribes, the Shinwari, rebelled and joined the revolutionaries against the government in Kabul.

Therefore, the armed resistance has found in this region a large area to operate and act boldly against the official Afghan army and the Soviet army. Meanwhile, the four main tribes that are found around and near the Khyber Pass--the Shinwari, Afridis, (Shilmani) and (Mola Juriz)--supply the resistance with an inexhaustible supply of strong fighters, food and weapons, and safe refuge that the Soviet forces cannot reach at all except with attacks from helicopter "gunships" that drop their payloads on predetermined targets and disappear quickly from the sky so that they will not be hit by snipers hiding in caves in the rugged mountains.

Given the strategic importance of the Nangarhar region, the Soviets have concentrated their forces and those of the allied Afghan government in the region. In fact, during the first year of their entry into the country, they put more than half of their invading forces in the region with the hope of striking the primary military, human and supply base of the resistance, and with the hope of closing the primary pass--the Khyber Pass--which they thought to be the only road for infiltration. However, the mujahidin confronted this intense effort with extremely simple tactics. They resorted to other passes to enter and leave the country, passes that are difficult for regimented, heavily armed troops to reach and control. Then they divided their fighting forces into small groups to facilitate their movement, speed, flexibility and ability to hide.

The commander of one of the districts in the Nangarhar region told me that his forces belonging to the "Islamic Party" had been divided into four battle districts which covered the length and width of the region. The command of each of these districts includes 12-14 units and each unit includes a total number of fighters ranging from 40 to 60. This usually facilitates night movement and sometimes facilitates day movement. It also makes it easier for them to provide supplies, weapons and ammunition, and it facilitates making field decisions in the general political context of the mujahidin organization.

The young commander also told me, "Despite the shortage of advanced weapons, the paucity of ammunition and the absence of medical equipment, and despite the savagery of the enemy's attacks, especially by helicopter, the Soviet army and its ruling leftist ally are nonetheless fighting ghosts that only appear by surprise to fight fiercely and know only victory or martyrdom." He added, "The distinguishing feature of our forces, although they are small in number and poorly armed compared to the enemy's forces, is that we fight for the cause of Islam under the banner of holy war. We fight in defense of our nationalism and religious convictions. But why have they come as invaders of

our country? They have traveled thousands of miles from the heart of the Ukraine or Georgia or even from other countries that are part of the communist bloc to come here to try to tame our rugged mountains! Haven't they read history and learned from the experiences of Alexander, Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane? Haven't they learned from modern history when "Great" Britain failed to subdue the fighting Pathan tribes that would not accept submission to foreigners?"

I said to him, "Before we go into the many other details, how do you view the results of the struggle?"

He answered with a strange sharpness, "There is only one result. It will not be much different from what has happened during the past 2,000 years: victory for the sons of the country and defeat for the invaders regardless of their names, their color or their armies. These mountains are rugged. Their villages were established by history and geography on the basis of rejection of foreign domination and domestic despotism. Therefore, our exterior has remained untarnished. What does it matter if the invaders this time are trying to instill communism to the bone in an Islamic country? They have described our country as a "mosaic" of everything--of history, geography, events, landscape and weather. This is true, but the more pertinent truth is that we, above all else, are a mosaic of struggle in defense of our nationalism and our religion."

"We come from a number of ethnic origins and sometimes we appear divided. In the face of foreign invasion, however, we are a solid and cohesive part of that surprising mosaic."

[31 Dec 84 p 13]

[Text] While I was crossing these mountain passes whose summits are generally covered with bright white ice, I felt as though I were one of the great historians, steadfast leaders, explorers, religious preachers, mischievous adventurers or devout missionaries.

Yes, for a moment I felt--probably to entertain myself or to urge myself not to fear the danger lurking on every hill and the angel of death hovering in the open sky--as if I were Herodotus or Alexander the Great or Hu Tsin Chang or Ibn Batutah or Mahmud al-Ghaznawi or Marco Polo or (Anru Wilson)?

I felt the delight of victory felt by those who for various reasons have penetrated the Hindukush mountain range across ancient "Bakhtaria" or the current Khyber Pass or, in other words, across what was the silk route in the Middle Ages and the opium route in modern times.

One cold, wild, snowy, mountain evening while I was panting behind the young Afghan guide who was steering through the rugged path, I felt as though I were carrying on my back everything borne by those great men who preceded me and who engraved their names on the stone of these harsh, hard mountains. They recorded their names in both ancient and modern history.



I truly felt as though I were carrying all the burdens of human civilization. Through Afghanistan--its passes, not its centers--were linked the civilizations of the ancient world, from the Greek and the Roman to the Arab and Islamic and on to the Pharaonic and Persian civilizations in the West, and through the Siri Mountain to the Indian and Chinese civilizations in the East. These civilizations have seen Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Brahmanism and Zoroastrianism.

I felt as though I were carrying on my weak and burdened back the philosophies and various divine religions--even their offshoots--of the ancient civilizations. With them I crossed the Sulayman mountain range. I was overcome with the strange, hidden feelings that came upon King Solomon himself. It is said that he came one day to this rugged region and stood as I am standing on the peaks of its high mountains and looked down to the East--whereas I am looking to the West--and he found the plains of the Indian peninsula open and inviting before him. Yet because they were so low compared with the towering mountains, they were pitch black. The King was grieved and turned his eyes away from the plains and, thus, did not enter them. He returned from where he had come, descending the canyons of the mountains that from that time onward took their name from his name, according to ancient Afghan legends.

However, the situation with me was different. Danger was lurking at every moment and at any moment. This prompted me to hasten my step and breathe harder in my determination to confront the burden, the cold and the fear. I panted behind my guide, a young Pathan. The historical descriptions of the tribes of this region fit him well. They say that the Pathans have black hearts, stone faces, the eyes of falcons and the legs of leopards.

My guide at once embodied all of these qualities. He jumped from hill to hill carrying on his slender back our food and water for 3 days and on top of this a rifle carefully hidden among his clothes. Meanwhile, I only carried a pen, some small sheets of paper and a small camera.

From time to time, he would whisper a word and I would respond with another. With great care, silence would dominate our conversation because no one knows what fate is hiding in every sliver of these hard mountains. I asked him one time if there were wild animals living in these areas. He answered without a thought, "Yes, many different kinds live here, but they differ from region to region, depending on the weather, the landscape and the foliage, but don't be afraid of them. Don't be concerned, the wild animals here do not represent a danger to us. The only danger comes from the wild human animals. The "infidels," that is, the Soviets, have dropped mines and booby traps of various kinds in these mountains from airplanes. Avoid stepping on anything that shines or touching anything strange unless you find a pearl or a jewel."

I was overcome with even more fear. Now I admit it because there is no benefit in fabricating bravery in situations of human weakness.

Hardly a night would pass without the armed, light, mobile ghosts appearing. They moved quickly and they controlled the high mountain peaks and they moved at will to the feet of the lowest slopes where they would monitor the



movements and activities on the main roads, small passes and mountain canyons, movements that are nearly invisible except to the trained, expert eye.

They would stop, examine, inspect and clash with ferocity or assist with grace, then they would disappear again as ghosts in the night because they simply could not operate with total freedom except at night. As for the day, they left it for others.

This is how I lived in Afghanistan, under two conflicting kinds of authority of rule, or rule of authority.

During the day the government forces under the Kabul regime supported by 100,000 Soviet soldiers control the capital, the main cities, the strategic roads and the exposed, open valleys.

During the night the mujahidin forces with their numerous opposition religious and political organizations--there are 105 organizations led by 6 large basic organizations--control the mountain peaks and rugged regions, bomb the cities, including the capital, Kabul, and cut off the roads.

The government's authority extends from dawn until 4 o'clock in the afternoon every day when government and Soviet forces move out. The authority of the mujahidin extends from 4 o'clock in the afternoon until dawn when the rebels deploy. This is not easy to understand or believe in the beginning except for one who has lived this image in reality as I lived it inside Afghan territory. There are many journalists, especially Westerners, who come to this area of the world seeking to discover what happens here. At the border, specifically at Peshawar in Pakistan, more often than not they stop, for the mortal dangers are always stronger than the desire for adventure.

However, I wanted to penetrate the heart of events until I overlooked the most dangerous locations aflame with the fierce night fighting of the mujahidin and the violent daytime pursuit of the ruling Kabul regime. Many scenes lead one to believe that neither of the two sides will be able to gain final control of this rugged mountain country or achieve absolute domination over this tribal people--about 20 million strong--who are distinguished by a spirit of fierce independence.

The military forces themselves will not decide the issue in the favor of either side, because of the topographical nature of the battle area, the independent tribal spirit that rejects all central control, and fundamentally because of the depth of the Islamic belief in the Afghan people (99 percent Muslim: 85 percent Sunni, 15 percent Shi'ite). Interspersed are Sufi orders, particularly the Qadiriya and Naqashbandiya orders.

However, before we delve into the roots of the struggle inside Afghanistan, let us first examine how the adventure of the entry into the mountain battle zone began, and how I met the at once simple and stern mujahidin, especially those from the Pathan tribes who are recalcitrant, fierce in battle, extremely noble, deeply religious, and fiercely independent and individualistic.

With the completion of the first wave of the Soviet army's march across the borders of the Islamic Soviet republics into Afghanistan to support the ruling leftist regime there, I had arrived at the Afghan border. I looked it over in fear. I was coming from a wide valley to the peaks of the Sulayman Mountains that separate Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this region alone there are elevations reaching an average 12,000 feet and covered with thick layers of pure white snow. Yet the heat of the Pathan tribes--the Pashtu--turns this snow into simmering heat.

Twice I turned to some of these tribes seeking help. In the first instance I failed because of the state of caution prevalent in these regions that are usually watched by both Pakistani and Afghan eyes. This is the hot contact point between two hostile political systems that have raised the state of alert to the maximum level.

A Pakistani friend in Peshawar advised me not to try to "perpetrate" this ill-considered adventure, so I returned to Islamabad.

There I decided to go back again to "perpetrate" the adventure, but via different roads and with the help of other Afghan mujahidin. I requested that no one be informed, especially the Pakistanis, that I was about to return to the border region. In fact, I told my country's embassy in Islamabad and Pakistani officials that I had changed my plans and that I was traveling to Karachi in preparation to leave the region entirely.

However, I returned a second time to the Pathan villages, but to a different place than the first time, and requested help. They are the only ones able to travel across the rugged mountain passes, and the only ones that no ruler in thousands of years of history has been able to prevent from moving freely through these mountains, east and west, north and south, up and down.

They are the only rulers on this territory. They acknowledge no authority except the "sanctity of the community" and no rule except the rule of the "Gurka," or tribal council.

The shaykh Najib-Allah told me, "You have entered our hearts, and when someone enters our hearts we will kill ourselves for him. But first you must change your clothes and appearance to make our job easier and to make it easy for you to disappear from wandering and monitoring eyes."

I immediately began to disguise myself in the attire of Pathan men. I put on the kalay (phonetic)--the bulky sirwal and the long shirt--and I put the khulay (phonetic)--the large turban--on my head. I wrapped myself in the wool sadir (phonetic)--shawl--and I let my beard and sideburns grow freely.

The shaykh told me, "You will rest here in our camp for several nights until we provide you with a guide who will lead you to the interior and secure the way. Night will provide cover. The mountain passes are rugged and dangerous and there is no escape from the necessity of using the accompaniment of night and traveling these passes with extreme caution."

With the first light of a cold dawn, we began the first effort in the cold, icy air. The armed Pathani guide led me across the Khyber pass. Together we rode on a large bus that was passing through the Pakistani city of Peshawar in the direction of the Afghan city of Jalalabad. We penetrated the historic rugged mountain pass that falls in a deep canyon like a bottomless groove cut between high, harsh, rock mountains. Sometimes it widens as much as a kilometer and at other times it narrows to a choking width of no more than 16 meters.

Despite this, all the invading armies coming from central Asia and from the heart of Europe traveled through this pass on their way to the East. Alexander the Great, the Aryans, the Moghuls, then the British in the last century all passed along its sides with thousands perishing because of its steep inclines, its deep ravines and its tortuous curves.

Before the border point at Tor Kham, which lies in the middle of the "Durant" line that marks the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the bus discharged us in a light rain. We proceeded by foot until we overlooked the crossing point that is controlled on one side by the Pakistani army and on the other side by the Afghan army. The one side flew the green flag with the Islamic crescent and star, and the other side flew the red flag with its red star.

We spent an entire day under a small tree on a small hill overlooking the border post. We observed and watched and waited for the appropriate time to break through this closely guarded post among the caravans of Pathans who were passing with apparent freedom, even though the observation was stern and obvious from both parties guarding the two sides of the post.

The more time passed, the more apprehensive I felt waiting for the guide's signal to move behind him so we could slip in among the groups crossing the border. But the waiting continued and with it the boredom and anguish resulting from fear of failure.

After a long silence the guide spoke. He said, "It is hopeless. We will not endanger you. The guard is too tight today. We will have to seize another opportunity."

We returned and failure followed our exhausted footsteps. A dusty, cold wind swirled around our dirty faces. The man sensed that my chest was about to burst with despair. He said, "Don't worry. You will cross the night border, God willing. Despite their ruggedness, the mountains have paths and openings, but we want another guide. Perhaps we can get help from someone from the Afridi tribes that are spread out here around the Khyber Pass. They know the other passes, especially the ones that are free of exploding booby traps that the airplanes of Kabul and Moscow have dropped in the region.

Thus, when the night fell and the mountain chill grew colder, we discovered other passes besides the Khyber Pass. The Khyber road is distinct because it is level and paved. Movement on it does not cease. Even now, it carries trade between the two neighboring countries despite the political and military tensions between them. The other passes, however, are rugged, unknown and

untraveled except by some men of the resistance who transport across them some supplies and ammunition. These men disappear into the passes' narrow trails and monitor movement from their sides.

The most prominent of these mountain passes are Kurram, Jamal, Jowlan, Kuhat and Khowjak. Some of them are laced with booby traps in the form of watches, wallets, toys, small weapons and drink containers. Some of the others are still clean.

When darkness began to creep across the horizon we set out climbing up and down to cross one of these passes. We traveled in the direction of the Afghan Nangarhar region. We walked on difficult rocky terrain and were surrounded by barrenness and a biting, wild and deadly cold.

With the dawn and after we had traveled continuously, we arrived at our first destination, the forward point for the mujahidin, where we rested and slept nearly all day long while a very small number of rebels guarded us and provided us with hearty friendship, water and food.

Again darkness fell, and we proceeded across hills that were lower and less rugged than those we had crossed the previous night. Before midnight we descended into a broad valley surrounded by hills on every side. Here the faces of the three accompanying mujahidin lit up. One said, "Starting here, we might be able to ride a taxi or a bus...we and our luck...but by God don't open your mouth and say a single word to anyone that we cross paths with, even if he asks you a question. Let us do the talking."

In fact, the venture went as well as possible. We rode a medium size truck. We paid the driver his fee. He smiled with a kindness and intelligence that lit his eyes. I felt as though he were saying to me, "I know who you are and I understand everything."

Fortunately, we did not come across a checkpoint or guardpost the whole time, perhaps because the driver avoided the main roads and always circumvented the crowded intersections.

By dawn we had arrived at our ultimate destination, the rebel camp near Kama in the hills overlooking Jalalabad, the second largest Afghan city after the capital, Kabul, and the most important of strategic regions. Here we were received warmly with verses from the Holy Koran.

The commander of the area, whose nom de guerre was "Khan ....," said to me, "The sun has come up and it is time to rest and sleep a little. We will not see anything until the darkness returns. Indeed, we only see in the dark."

Because I could not sleep, however, I continued to speak with him. After a few pleasantries when cups of hot tea passed between us, I tried to discover him from inside. I asked him, "How do you view the situation in Afghanistan now, politically and militarily?"



He said in good Arabic which truly surprised me, "I do not know which of us has better luck, you or us. Your presence here among us today is extremely important because this is the first time that a journalist has come in this deep. Therefore, we are happy to receive you, an Arab Muslim journalist, so that when you return you can tell the world the truth about the oppression that we are suffering in our country because of the Russian occupation. My colleagues have told me about the foreign journalists--Europeans and Americans--that they have met with in various regions. They have returned home and published and broadcast, but the problem is that they do not care about our cause except in the sense that it is part of the confrontation between the East and the West. They do not view Afghanistan as an independent political issue."

Khan added effusively, "We have begun a new phase of escalation using new weapons. We have left the phase of using ancient rifles from World War II, or rifles made locally and primitively, and we have entered a more advanced phase of being more strongly armed. Therefore, our attacks have more impact and effectiveness."

I said, "More importantly, how do you assess your military situation?"

He said, "As you can see, we are now in the winter season. The snow covers the mountains and is 1 and 1/2 meters deep in most of the high regions. In these circumstances, we have the edge over our enemy. We have complete control over the mountains in every region of Afghanistan. The major cities and villages, however, are located in the valleys and plains which they are truly able to control. In the daytime, they truly have weapons superiority, especially in tanks, heavy artillery and helicopters."

"The night, however, is ours despite all of these weapons that they possess. Despite this they follow a cautious policy from time to time. In response, we exploit this and raise the level of escalation."

I asked Khan, "Why do they resort to caution when they are so strong in number and with these numbers they can escalate the fighting?"

He answered, "The Soviets are schemers and experts. They advised the Kabul government to use the winter season, when extensive military movement is difficult, to de-escalate the internal situation and court the educated, the poor classes and the tribes. They are trying to rearrange the domestic situation by making certain reforms, especially in the economic, social and educational fields, in order to pull the rug of rebellion, revolution and rejection out from under the mujahidin."

"At the same time they are constantly preparing for huge, successive military campaigns that will begin in the spring when the snow melts and the roads open. Their tanks, which are nearly paralyzed now, will engage in attacks on our positions on all fronts."

"Despite their efforts to bring the fighting to a near standstill during the winter, they still pursue military plans of various kinds:

"First, they erect "fortresses" in which they concentrate the basic armed forces, particularly light mobile tanks, various caliber artillery, helicopters and rockets."

"From these forts patrols are conducted that sweep the regions, comb the valleys and protect the roads, military positions and airfields. Then they return to their fortified positions."

"Second, with these fortified positions, they avoid the need for a policy of deploying the Afghan government army and Soviet army throughout every part of the country, particularly the mountains where they have suffered serious losses from our light, mobile troops, who strike then flee and disappear in the caverns while their cumbersome forces are unable to pursue effectively."

"Third, they currently rely on helicopters for pursuit, but we have downed many of them with our small weapons. A single bullet from a sniper at the entrance to a mountain cave has downed a helicopter. They have plated these helicopters with sheets of steel to protect the bottoms and fuel tanks from the gunfire of our snipers. but we have surprised them with new rockets such as the Soviet-made SAM missiles! Yes, we have these in our hands."

"Fourth, they use napalm, as they did in the "Badakhshan" region, to burn the densely forested areas where the mujahidin hide. They also use poison gas to kill our rebels who have hidden in the mountain caves, which are hard to attack with conventional weapons."

"Fifth, they have divided Afghanistan into seven military districts, which enjoy independence in terms of command, leadership, movement and arms, in order to facilitate their confrontation of the mujahidin. Fortunately, however, we also enjoy regional independence, as you know, in accordance with the spirit of independence common among our tribes."

"Sixth, they resort to a policy of clearing the strategic regions in the country of their residents by destroying their villages, burning their farms, aerial bombing and pushing them, through eviction, across the regions of shared borders with Pakistan. This is particularly true in the northwestern border regions and the Pakistani region of Baluchistan. They do this to achieve two goals. The first is to prevent the mujahidin from having depth of human resources, and the second is to use the emigration and increasing number of Afghan refugees as a means of pressuring Pakistan, which has received about 3 million refugees."

I said to the young commander, "This, as you have described it, is Kabul's plan to de-escalate the fighting. What is your plan to escalate it?"

He said, "I hope that you will stay with us a short while to see for yourself how we escalate the military confrontation."

I did indeed stay with these rebels until I experienced a bold attack by the Afghan mujahidin at dawn one day against the main airport and huge military base in the city of Jalalabad, the most important strategic city after the capital, Kabul.



[2 Jan 85 p 15]

[Text] He who sees is not like he who hears. This is the truth, but what about one who saw, heard and lived the reality all at once?

We were climbing some high hills in the dead of night, one man behind the other, all jumping with surprising agility except for me. I was dragging my feet from hyper-exhaustion. All were weighed down with burdens of weapons and ammunition except for me. I was weighed down with apprehension and concern of the unknown. No one knew what was in store for us on this dark, cold, savage night. Perhaps we would fall into a trap around the next corner and everything would end.

When we reached the peak of one of the hills, the caravan, which consisted of 15 fighters, stopped for a moment. The commander whispered to me pointing to the right where dim lights were shining through the thick darkness of the night.

He said, "We have arrived at the target. We must now take up our fixed tactical positions for the exchange."

I did not know the exact details of the attack plan. Regardless of how warm relations had become between the rebels and me, the secrecy of operations remained inviolable in a way that relieved me a great deal.

I did not know that five or six groups similar to ours had climbed to the peaks of other hills, perhaps at the same moment, and had begun to dig themselves in or take defensive cover behind the rock outcroppings.

I did realize the truth, however, shortly after midnight, when the reverberation of rockets left a high, ringing noise and increasing echoes in all parts of the valley overlooked by the surrounding hills. The entire region lighted up with the fire of the rockets that were launched from various directions toward a single target, the area where the lights were dimly shining.

The Jalalabad airport and military base were taken by surprise with the mujahidin attack. In the wink of an eye everything on top of the hills had ended, and we began our move to withdraw quickly, a move to cling to life and continue surviving.

As we moved away, the sound increased from the return fire rockets launched from the positions of the government and Soviet armies around the airport. The armies normally pursue the attackers and strike in the direction from which the attack comes, but the attack was conducted from several directions and the attacking forces withdrew and dispersed throughout the hills and rocks, disappearing into the crevices.

The target was hit. The planes on the runways were hit as was the electric power station located near the airport. Rockets were fired in the direction of the barracks of the main military base in that region.

I still cannot believe how quickly the attack was conducted, how quickly the withdrawal took place, how we attacked and withdrew, and how we took the chance and escaped. I cannot give a specific explanation. Explaining in these cases is nearly impossible.

Two nights after this lightning strike, I was crossing the Nangarhar region to the neighboring Paktia region. The commander, named Janbaz, of a group of mujahidin that I had joined said to me, "Have you heard the latest news from Kabul?"

I was surprised by the sudden question and I answered him, asking, "How could I have heard the news? I have been with you the whole time, where I could not have heard or read anything."

He said, "Our rebels conducted a surprise attack against Kabul and destroyed the main power plant, and the government was forced to black out the capital."

We took refuge in the mountain caves to rest from traveling on foot, which is how we usually traveled, or from riding mules, as we occasionally did. Here I would usually talk with Janbaz. On one occasion, another fighter joined us in discussion. I learned that he had been a high-level diplomat in the Afghan Foreign Ministry and that he fled, announcing that he was joining the opposition.

This discussion ended with the diplomat and the fighter agreeing that the Kabul government and its Soviet allies were now following a policy of de-escalating the military and political situation in Afghanistan. There were several factors behind this policy:

1. The Islamic summit conference was approaching.
2. The Nonaligned Movement's ministerial conference in New Delhi was approaching. The leaders in Kabul wanted the period to pass without the two conferences issuing condemnations or acknowledging Afghanistan's association.

This was in January 1981.

3. It was the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to support the Karmal government, and the Soviets, in particular, did not want again to provoke international public opinion with an intensification of military activity.
4. They wanted to wait for the icy winter season in the country to end. The winter greatly impedes active military movement. After the winter they would begin to escalate the situation.

Perhaps these four reasons that led the Kabul government and its Soviet allies to pursue a temporary policy of de-escalation are precisely what prompted the Afghan resistance, especially in Paktia, Nangarhar, Kabul, Parvan, Ghazni, Badakhshan and Kunar, to escalate the fighting to prove to the Islamic world and the nonaligned countries in particular that it would fight fiercely to the

end, regardless of the sacrifices. It would exploit the enemy's political and military points of weakness to pressure and drain them to the maximum degree.

The primary practical result of all of this is that both warring parties--the Afghan resistance and the leftist Kabul regime backed by the Soviet Union--have actually entered an incessant and indecisive battle which will not be easily settled. The government army and 100,000 Soviet soldiers are not capable of subduing this entire rugged mountainous country that is not linked with a level road network, and the opposition is not able to expel the army of a superpower and thus bring down the regime that it supports.

The second practical result is that the southeast regions neighboring Pakistan and the southwest regions neighboring Iran have captured the limelight in the escalation of the fighting in view of their proximity to the outside world. The fighting here stands out as though these areas were the only ones where the opposition forces are operating. The truth that I experienced, however, is otherwise. The central highlands region, which is dominated by high mountains and which represents the very heart of Afghanistan, is the area that witnesses devastating fighting, even if a "blackout" is imposed on news of this fighting.

In these central highlands lives a group of tribes called al-Hazarah or al-Hazarajat. They are extremely unruly, have a harsh character, are violent in their steadfastness and are hostile to foreign rule in general and central government in particular. This has been the case for a long time, but has been especially true since the British occupation in 1879, through the monarchical period and at the present. These deeply religious tribes have been provoked by the presence of Soviet forces in the country and the establishment of communist system of government in Kabul. The tribes have rejected them both, first for religious reasons and then for reasons of independence.

Like other tribes that dwell in the high mountains, they have been helped by their accumulation of weapons that are part of the sign of masculinity, privilege and independence. An additional geographic element, however, contributes to their control and their independence. There are no main roads that link these central highlands with the rest of the country. There is only a main circular road that wraps around these highlands. It winds through Afghanistan and links it with Pakistan through the Khyber Pass and with the Soviet Union through the Salanj Pass. These are considered the most important strategic land passages.

Until now, the central highlands have remained beyond central government control and immune to the domination of government military forces. Still, the fighting here remains isolated from the activities of the rest of the opposition forces operating in the southeastern and southwestern regions. The rebel leadership expects that the entire country will become engulfed in a new escalation in fighting as a result of cohesion between these regions and the central highlands. They hope to unify the operational command in the future.

Before we enter into the permanence of divisiveness and the dilemma of unification, it is worth looking some into the makeup of these opposition

tribal forces, their battle effectiveness and the evolution of their military operations in light of improved arms and diversified sources.

First let us say that the man and the mountain, or the man and the stone, cooperate closely to form the setting for the armed struggle in Afghanistan. The tribal makeup, with its withdrawn, independent nature, is predominant throughout the country, including the cities. Ruling regimes, from the time of the British occupation through the periods of the monarchical and republican governments and ending with the current leftist rule, have failed to dissolve this makeup and melt the tribal spirit in favor of a state system. Therefore, Afghanistan is a society of gun-wielding, warring, independent tribes.

The harsh geography strengthens the tribal spirit and fortifies it against central control. It impels the tribes to resort immediately to weapons to defend themselves against domestic raids from competing tribes, against regimented raids from the government and against foreign invasions that come from beyond the borders.

In this setting, the fighting mujahidin groups still operate with the spirit and methods of the tribe. They rely on fighting units that are small in number and they operate in the context of their tribe's activities and area. They turn to the tribe's traditional camps and caverns for protection and refuge. From the tribe they get food and weapons. The shaykh of the tribe is also the political, religious and military leader. Their method of engagement is based primarily on setting ambushes in the mountains for the military patrols. They down helicopters, but their main weapons in most cases are light. They include rifles, machineguns and occasionally small caliber artillery.

Therefore, the most obvious phenomenon is that until now these forces have depended on individual action more than on various advanced methods--hand to hand and armed combat--of what is known as guerrilla warfare. Therefore, their primary accomplishments until now have been to "harass" the government and Soviet armies, to inflict large losses and to engage in a war of attrition through continuous battles in the heart of the rugged mountains or the dense northeastern forests.

A second phenomenon is that some of the large opposition organizations have begun to train their men in the use of modern and advanced weapons that they have obtained recently. The training is conducted by a group of Afghan officers who fled with their weapons and their soldiers from the government army and joined the mujahidin. I met many examples of these on Afghan territory, but the most impressive and compelling was a fighter named Sufiraz, an electrical engineer who studied for 6 years in the Soviet Union. When he returned to Kabul he disappeared among the ranks of the resistance and specialized in defusing and destroying the minefields planted by the government forces, especially in the mountain passes.

A third phenomenon is the appearance of modern weapons in large numbers in the hands of the mujahidin. In particular, they have 57 mm anti-aircraft



artillery, RPGs, mortar rounds, and some anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets, all of which they obtained from government army camps.

A fourth phenomenon is the absence of military and political coordination and a unified command for the fighters. This diminishes to a large degree their effectiveness and impact. Perhaps the most outstanding manifestations of this are the lack of planning for operations, the absence of good training and the absence of leadership that directs and controls activities in the field. This situation is not only attributable to the tribal backwardness that we mentioned previously. It is also attributable to the ongoing struggle at the top among the political and religious leadership of the large mujahidin organizations.

There is a fifth phenomenon. I wondered about the sources of the flow of weapons to these fighters, given the landlocked location of Afghanistan. One of the leaders that I met in the interior told me, "We rely basically on two sources of arms. First is the domestic source. Until now this has been far and away our primary source of arms. We rely on the following factors. We conduct attacks on government and Soviet army camps specifically to take over the weaponry. We get what is brought to us by troops that desert from the government army and join us. We also have local production. The Pathan tribes have been famous since the last century for their skill in copying and manufacturing weapons. Now this production has advanced and flourished. We give any new weapons that we obtain to our manufacturers. In days, the weapon and ammunition for it are available in good amounts. We have small centers with elementary capabilities that specialize in these industries spread throughout the mountain canyons. There is also a free market for the production and trade, even the smuggling, of weapons that operates in all of the surrounding mountains." The Afghan leader added, "Tomorrow we will take you to one of these centers so you can see the weapons production for yourself and believe that it exists." And so it was.

The second source of weapons is the foreign source. This is also multifaceted. The leader told me with extreme frankness, "We obtain weapons from a number of special sources. We are surrounded by four countries, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and Iran. Some of these borders are completely locked and through some of them we have a little freedom of movement."

"For example, our borders with Pakistan extend from east to west about 1,200 km through Baluchistan. Pakistan is a fraternal country that is hosting 3 million Afghan refugees. This is a heavy burden on Pakistan, but our tribes are intertwined and our lives are almost completely shared."

This is followed by our border with the Soviet Union. It extends about 1,600 km and is definitely our longest border. It runs parallel to the Soviet Islamic republics. Here our tribes are also intermixed, but this border is closed by the Soviet army, which is afraid of these Islamic republics."

"Our shortest border is with China. It passes through the Wakhan region whose mountains rise to 25,000 feet. The area is inhabited by the Muslim Kirghiz tribes, which have Turkish origins and are under the leadership of Rahman Qill. Although there are international treaties that define the location of

this Afghan region as a narrow border strip that extends like a tongue between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet army has nonetheless penetrated it and occupied it to cut off contact between our rebels and China and prevent us from obtaining Chinese financing."

"Finally, there is our border with Iran. This is also an important long border. It remains open to some mujahidin organizations, but Tehran's preoccupation with the Iran-Iraq war has made us forego Iranian support."

"Frankly, we obtain supplies and weapons across all of these borders, or most of them, but we usually prefer to remain silent on this topic so that we do not embarrass our friends and neighbors. The threats that they receive from the superpowers and the tribulations they are suffering are sufficient."

"The small Afghan people, however, will continue their battle in defense of the independence of their nation, its neutrality and its freedom."

This man stirred me with the honesty of his words and the power of his logic. What a man he is! And what people these are, these tribes whose burning issue and whose ferocious fighting, in the rugged mountains that are so wild even wild animals flee from them, preoccupy the world today.

[5 Jan 85 p 5]

[Text] The dreadful pursuit campaign ended. It was launched by the government forces using helicopters against a group of Afghan mujahidin with whom I was hiding in the narrow caverns carved in the depths of the high mountains. When it was over it was though 1,000 years had passed and the blood in our veins had frozen. Who in our position could have overcome the fear that the angel of death was hovering to take one's life at any moment.

The fighter Mirwiz Ahmad was young, slender and quick to return to our discussion that was interrupted by the helicopter raid on our position. He said, "You asked with great interest about our weapons and their weakness in confronting the arsenal of a superpower. Why don't you ask about our faith? Believe me, it is our primary weapon in the war to liberate the Afghan nation from the foreign army. It is the same weapon with which our grandfathers fought the English, and before them the Moghuls and Aryans, even the Macedonians in pre-Christian history." Mirwiz quickly added in fluent Arabic, "Our organization, the Islamic Afghan Association, has adopted many slogans, but the one that is closest to my heart is: I will live clinging to the rope of my religion and I will die content that my religion lives."

The comments of this Afghan fighter were largely accurate. The truth is that the Afghan opposition possesses a religious spirit through which a wide cross section of the Afghan people have been mobilized. The Afghan people are by nature conservative, pious and tribal. Among the society are Sufi orders, particularly the Qadiriyyah and Naqashbandiyyah orders which dominate public and private life in Afghanistan and play a prominent role in the opposition mujahidin organizations.



Despite the simplicity of its men and the weakness of their weaponry and training, the Afghan resistance has surprised the world today with its ferocious fighting and unrelenting persistence. Returning to the roots of the struggle will give us, to a large extent, the ability to understand the underpinnings of this fighting spirit and persistence.

During the past 50 years, Afghanistan has witnessed much upheaval in the various forms of government: the monarchical and feudal system, the republican system, the military system and, most recently, the communist system. Nonetheless, a number of social, economic, political and psychological phenomena have remained constant under all of these conflicting systems:

First, a deep Islamic background has had the most important impact on the development of Afghanistan. The country has held firmly to the religion of Islam in confronting foreign elements. This has been assisted by the fact of sectarian unity. The overwhelming majority of Afghans--85 percent of the populace--belong to the Sunni sect and the minority--15 percent--are Shiites. Also helping to strengthen the religious spirit are the Sufi orders with their almost totally secret principles and organizations. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has played a prominent role in bolstering the religious movement.

Second, backwardness has played its role in kindling the struggle. Afghanistan, simply put, is one of the five poorest nations in the world, according to official statistics of the United Nations, with an average per capita income of \$160 annually. Geographical and climatic factors are responsible for depriving this country of most natural resources, both agricultural and mineral. Therefore, the severe economic pressures have formed fertile ground for social conflict. Despite the emergence of unique ideological models, the country is still at least 90 percent illiterate.

Third, in this social, economic and religious context, the foundation of society remains the tribal unit, which is independent, recalcitrant, armed and rejects any kind of central authority. In addition, the tribe is withdrawn, introverted and rejects progress or intermingling with a more extensive social group out of constant fear of everything strange and new. Of course, the geography has played a fundamental role here in dividing and isolating the parts of the country with high mountain ranges and, thus, increasing tribal isolation. In fact, 55 percent of the people belong to the Pathan tribes, which speak Pashtu and are predominant in the country. Most leaders, whether the previous royal family or the current leaders, have come from these tribes.

Fourth, the Afghan people are located strategically in a deep trench between two giants, the Soviet Union and the Indian subcontinent which includes India and Pakistan. This has contributed to their isolation. Both of these giants are congested with hundreds of millions of people, whereas there are no more than 20 million Afghans. Therefore, a sense of fear has persisted that the Afghan people would always be pursued by the two giants because they have long coveted Afghan territory, which continues to be a strategic passageway linking Central Asia and East Asia and which lies near the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

Fifth, the element of fear of both domestic and foreign powers has become integral to the Afghan people. They have lived with daily fear, whether under feudal monarchical rule, especially that of King Zahir Shah from 1933 to 1973, or under republican rule headed by Muhammad Dawud from 1973 to 1978, or under leftist rule led by the People's Democratic Party, which is made up of the Communist and Parcham (Banner) Parties, from 1978 to the present. In addition, the Afghan people have lived with a historical fear of the international powers that block Afghanistan's borders.

Sixth, there have been attempts to escape from the confines of this spirit of fearful isolation through the intermingling of Afghan tribes and the tribes that dwell behind Soviet borders in the republics that used to rule the country. Despite this, the country has provided fertile ground for the development of the current struggle, based on which the change of regime occurred in 1978 as well as the domination of the radical movement under the leadership of Marxist organizations.

Seventh, the leftist government currently in power in Kabul is clearly trying to benefit from the mistakes of its predecessors. It is racing against time now to introduce economic and social reforms in Afghan society. For example, it is struggling to widen the educational system while raising the religious slogan, "Islam is a revolution of change for the sake of democracy and social justice." In addition, it has recently formed the "Land of the Grandfathers" front, with which it is trying to co-opt the various social forces and pull the land out from under the feet of the opposition.

Therefore, who are these people that make up the opposition and lead the armed resistance against the leftist regime ruling in Kabul?

Let us say that the current opposition is wide and loose. It includes the extreme right and the extreme left. It is a collection of a number of different kinds of groups, the most prominent being: the religious opposition which raises the banner of holy war against heresy; the supporters of the previous monarchy; the feudal families and senior merchants who have been harmed by the laws of the new leftist regime; the educated liberals who are opposed to Marxism; the Chinese communist organizations, particularly the "Shura Ajawid" organization; the non-Pathan tribal minorities such as the Hazarah, the Uzbeks and the Tajiks who are all opposed to Pashtu influence over society; some of the Communist Party groups, especially the supporters of the two previous presidents, Nur Taraqi and Hafiz-Ullah Amin, who both lost their prominence after the Parcham wing gained control under the leadership of Karmal; and some senior military officers who participated in the 1978 leftist overthrow, sought authority, then lost their posts, then became more angry after Soviet soldiers took control.

In this loose opposition framework, more than 100 opposition parties and organizations have recently emerged. Few of them have real domestic roots, and many of them are superficial and marginal. Some of them are fierce and strongly regimented, and some are traders and adventurers who raise the banners of the resistance outside the borders more than they practice resistance inside the country.

However, we can conclude that there are six large and basic organizations that lead the vast majority of Afghan mujahidin:

1. The Islamic Association of Afghanistan under the leadership of Dr Burhan-al-Din Rabani (a graduate of al-Azhar).
2. The Islamic Party of Afghanistan headed by Muhammad Yunis Khalis who is 72 years old--the oldest Afghan leader.
3. The Revolutionary Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (the Revolutionary Movement) under the leadership of Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi (a graduate of al-Azhar).
4. The National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan under the leadership of Sibghat-Allah al-Mujaddadi (from al-Azhar).
5. Afghanistan Melli Islami Mihadh (the National Islamic Front) under the leadership of Mr Ahmad Jilani (law degree from Kabul University).
6. The Islamic Organization of Afghanistan under the leadership of Jalb-al-Din Hikmatiyar (35 years old, B.S. in engineering).

If we were to apply accepted standards to these organizations, we could categorize them along three axes:

The first axis basically includes the groups of Sufi orders, that is, the organization of Sibghat-Allah al-Mujaddadi, the leader of the Naqashbandiyah order, and the organization of al-Jilani, the leader of the Qadirah order. Closely associated with these is the organization of Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, who relies on a following of certain religious scholars and Sufis.

The second axis includes the Muslim Brotherhood movement and is made up of Dr Rabani's organization and the organization of Yunis Khalis. Both rely on imams and religious scholars.

The third axis includes the Hikmatiyar organization, which is better financed and armed and more dynamic than any other organization, especially among the refugees. It relies on the Afghan youth and has open doors of cooperation with Pakistan and Iran in particular.

I was able to meet with most of these leaders and conduct direct interviews with them and with some of their closest advisors both on the battlefield in Afghanistan and outside of the country. Through long hours of discussion with them, I can point out the following features:

The problem of these leaders, in fact the problem of the Afghan resistance, is the spirit of division and antagonism among them. This spirit is based on the fact that each of them assumes that he has absolute popular backing and, therefore, the right to sole leadership. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood says that it has 10 million followers, or more than half of the entire population. Al-Jilani says that he has 4 million followers who are members of

the Qadiriyyah order, including 100,000 armed fighters under his leadership. The case is similar with al-Mujaddadi's men from the Naqashbandiyyah order. Hikmatiyar presumes that he is the sole leader that enjoys popularity and a following among the various classes.

Efforts have been made to unify the six main organizations and, in fact, in 1980 the "Unified Islamic Alliance" was formed, which included the leadership of the first five groups and was rejected by Hikmatiyar. It is headed by 'Abd-al-Rasul Sayyaf, 45 years old, a university professor and supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, this alliance has not been able to blend the member organizations in one melting pot. Nor has it been able to unify or coordinate their political and military activities. Therefore, differences reemerged and new efforts began to form a unified front made up of the three organizations of al-Jilani, al-Mujaddadi and Muhammadi. Later there were efforts to reunify the organizations, again under the leadership of Sayyaf.

Therefore, this spirit of divisiveness and separation represents an obvious negative in the Afghan resistance movement and has ramifications on the situation with the fighters inside the country, something which is more serious than the ramifications on the foreign image of the resistance in international opinion.

The war remains tribal in both its fundamentals and its operations. In addition, all of these organizations originally emerged from religious foundations and have established their political and military structures on religious grounds. However, if these organizations wish to continue, they need to deepen their educational and political understanding and to unify their forces into a single movement that is well trained and armed. This movement must submit to unified, expert and strong political and military leadership. In other words, all of these disparate organizations must become fused into a wider federation ruled by a unified command.

Some of these leaders believe that a government in exile should be formed, and this has become an urgent and necessary matter. Such a government could speak in the name of the entire Afghan resistance on the condition that at the outset it achieved the idea of a comprehensive federation that combined the political, religious and military leadership under a single, sturdy umbrella.

#### The Lion of Panjsher

The strategic Panjsher valley located northeast of the Afghan capital of Kabul remained calm and beyond the limelight for nearly 2 years after the left took control of government.

At a time when the border regions in particular and even the capital itself were engulfed in the first violent reactions, the Panjsher valley remained calm and intact. The government believed that the calmness was an expression of the satisfaction of the people of the important valley with the status quo. The people of the valley thought that their remoteness from the upheaval and the counter-upheaval meant that they had a security zone protecting them from the raging storms and shielding them from the evil of the bloody struggle.



However, the strategic valley erupted suddenly and its people began to carry weapons as the others had to face the new regime. In fact, the valley became the focus of everyone's attention--the government and its Soviet supporters and the mujahidin leaders and those everywhere who aided them. The entire world began to talk--those who wanted to talk--about the Panjsher valley revolution and the genius of the leader of the Panjsher valley, that legendary young man who was painted by the media as a kind of superman, an extraordinary man who fought ferociously, who always struck and fled before the rope of death could be put around his neck.

Before we delve into the identity of this legendary leader and the battles of the Panjsher valley, first we must examine the significance of the valley and the leader in the context of what we have previously discussed concerning the crisis of the Afghan resistance movement, the crisis of division and competition among its leaders, the crisis of differences among the leaders of the refugees abroad, and the fundamentals of the resistance and the fighting inside the country.

The Panjsher valley and its young leader, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud--who is still in his thirties--provide a contrasting image. He is a unique example of the leadership inside the country, that fights and lives for his principles. He eats, drinks, prays, sleeps and fights with his men. He moves from place to place and sleeps every night in a different location. He runs here and there, but he never leaves the confines of the valley, which is only about 70 miles long and has a population of less than 100,000, even under the fiercest and most violent attacks launched by the Soviet and Afghan armies against him in the course of eight long battles during less than 2 years.

Thus, the "Lion of Panjsher," as Ahmad Shah Mas'ud is known, has remained in the heart of the valley. He does not leave the valley. He fights with the instincts inspired in him by the tribal nature of Afghanistan. From his instincts he simultaneously derives the features of his political, religious and military leadership. He only identifies with the sons of the strategic valley and he only pursues his nationalist cause. He does so without being suspected of foreign influence, without being affected from over the borders, and without being accused of contact with any Western, Islamic or Eastern country because he does not share borders with any other state.

The nearest strategic features to his valley are the famous Salanj pass, which links the Soviet and Afghan borders, and the Bagram airbase, the most important airbase in Afghanistan. This concerns everybody, especially the Afghan and Soviet governments. Therefore, the past 2 years have witnessed attacks concentrated on the valley and its fighters so that they would not continue to control the security of this strategic pass and be able to threaten the pass or bomb the Bagram airbase and the roads leading to it any time they wanted.

When we view Ahmad Shah Mas'ud in this way, we cannot help but compare him, as a sample of the leadership inside the country clinging to the land, to the exile or refugee leadership that manages from abroad the political and media battle more than it manages the military battle.

There are differences concerning the estimated strength of Mas'ud's forces. Some say there are 17,000 armed fighters, while others say that there are 30,000. In any case, Mas'ud saves his valley and his forces from the suspicion of contact with foreign countries and the accusation of receiving aid from across the borders. However, the mujahidin leadership that has crossed the borders since 1978, lived in the limelight, dealt with the dazzling press, and been the object of competition among states and public and secret organizations, has fallen into the trap of these suspicions and accusations, whether directly or indirectly.

The weapon of supplying Afghan refugees and mujahidin with financial, food and military assistance has played a significant role in the race for control of these leaders, and it has played a more dangerous role in fueling the competition and rivalry for visibility, domination over these leaders and influence peddling among them.

When the resistance movement found itself facing its most dangerous malady, its leadership was competing for authority and struggling for power, even among the refugees. The leaders were racing to open lines of communication with this state or that, searching for support and political, economic and arms assistance. In such a case, it was not surprising that the outbreak of fighting at the top would have repercussions at the foundation. The leaders fell into the blunder of conflict. They failed to unify their ranks, work under the auspices of one federation or one front, and combine all of the ranks of mujahidin. When this happened, their foundation fell into the mistake of armed conflict. Some mujahidin groups fought others in fierce battles in an attempt at bloody liquidation.

Perhaps Ahmad Shah Mas'ud was the only leader that could save his forces in the Panjsher valley from these blunders. He was a counter model to what was happening among the leadership abroad.

He, his forces and his valley were the only ones subjected to the fiercest of military campaigns and comprehensive attacks from the forces of the Afghan and Soviet governments. This was because he displayed the intransigence of a fighting leader clinging to his territory, he was beyond the struggle for leadership, and he stayed in Afghanistan fighting steadfastly, despite the violent counter attacks, and threatening the most important strategic pass through which flows aid and Soviet forces to the interior of the country.

Meanwhile, the leadership abroad is fighting and competing with each other for leadership, money and the limelight. They are the architects of their own sad demise because they are devouring each other in a hellish cycle.

It is natural that the Afghan government and the Soviet forces supporting it should work to fuel the fire of this hellish cycle by all means so that the Afghan mujahidin leadership in exile will eliminate itself by itself. The government and the Soviets have cut lines of communication with the interior and have isolated the exile leadership from their domestic bases. At the same time, they have tried to begin to "neutralize" the Panjsher valley and its leader so that he cannot coordinate with the rest of the resistance groups. For 2 years in the beginning, they left the valley alone and kept it outside



the battle zone to the same extent that it was outside the control of the central government.

However, the situation quickly changed when Kabul decided that the time was right to launch the battle to subdue the Panjsher valley and eliminate the spirit of independence enjoyed by Shah Mas'ud before that spirit became

entrenched and extended to the other enemies of the regime in other parts of the country.

After a period of friendly "lenience" with Panjsher, a period of providing food and supplies and extending a hand of apparent friendship to Shah Mas'ud, the Afghan forces, then the Soviet forces with them, began to launch damaging campaigns to force the submission of the Panjsher valley.

During less than 2 years, these forces launched eight huge military campaigns. The last one was in April 1984, and it ended an official truce signed in 1983, the first of its kind between the government and one of the mujahidin leaders.

In February 1984 Shah Mas'ud made three demands for the renewal of the official truce:

1. Direct negotiations between him and the Soviet forces, not between him and the Kabul government because he does not recognize its legitimacy.
2. Agreement in principle to grant autonomy to the Panjsher valley under his leadership, and the complete withdrawal of military forces and bases from it.
3. Provision of financial assistance.

At a time when the Afghan regime and its Soviet ally were demonstrating their public desire to continue negotiations with the Lion of Panjsher, they surprised everyone by launching the two most extensive military campaigns against the valley in February and April 1984, hoping to settle the military situation decisively. At that time Kabul announced that it had destroyed the forces of Shah Mas'ud and that it had killed him. The truth, however, was otherwise. Mas'ud remains in the valley reorganizing his forces, underscoring the continuation of the internal armed resistance and affirming that military force alone will not settle the conflict in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan and Soviet governments have continued to forge ahead with a military buildup and strengthening of the war machine on Afghan territory. The International Strategic Institute in London has confirmed in its report published on 12 October 1984 that, after diminishing somewhat, the number of Soviet troops on Afghan territory has now risen to 115,000, including 10,000 intelligence people. The report states that these have come to depend increasingly on aerial domination, since they have been supplied with 180 modern fighter aircraft and 270 helicopters which represent the backbone of the attacks against the mujahidin forces throughout the country and along the borders.

At the same time, the groups of the mujahidin movement continue to conduct their operations in various places, and the Panjsher valley no longer occupies

alone the heart of the battle zone. Commando operations occur in most parts of the country, including Kabul itself.

Despite this, can the Afghan resistance movement defeat the Soviet army, force it to leave Afghanistan and forcibly bring down the ruling leftist government in Kabul?

Or will the proposed "government in exile" provide pressure for a political settlement to the Afghan crisis and work in conjunction with the armed resistance to force a political solution as long as a military solution is beyond reach?

What is the road, then, to an acceptable political solution to the Afghan crisis, what will its conditions be and who will the parties be?

12608

CSO: 4604/24

AFGHANISTAN

EXPROPRIATED INDUSTRIES SAID TO BENEFIT MASSES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 Feb 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] Tehran, Feb. 5 (IRNA)--Prime Minister Musavi today praised Iranian workers and technicians for having maintained Iran's industries despite the mass exodus of thousands of expatriate experts from Iran during and immediately following the culmination of the Islamic Revolution.

Musavi, who was talking to workers and officials of Khomein Acrylic Fiber Plant (Central Province) on the occasion of the plant's inauguration here said during the past regime more than 70% of the country's principal industries were owned and operated by a negligible minority of the upper class, but that as a result of their expropriation by the Islamic government the said industries were now under government control to the benefit of the masses.

He said by their successful day-to-day operation of plants and industries the Iranian workers had in reality dashed the cynical hopes of the Americans who had flattered themselves of the total collapse of the country's industries in the wake of their departure from Iran.

Musavi also echoed a statement by Imam Khomeini saying that Iran's Muslim people during the past six years have successfully tackled tasks, the fulfillment of which were estimated to take some 20 years. He also reminded that despite being embroiled in an unwanted war since September 1980 inflation in Iran is only 12% as compared with Turkey which has spiralling 56%.

Speaking later to a large audience at the city sports hall, Musavi reiterated that the Islamic Republic would fight on until final triumph. He also appreciated the spirit of self-sacrifice among the workers and the masses which he described as a principal counter-measure against the conspiracies of the enemies of the revolution.

The prime minister also reminded his audience that representatives of the Islamic Republic and its emissaries throughout the world are known speaking out at international forums in the interest of the oppressed masses because they are not under the spell of the dictates of any foreign powers.

The prime minister returned to Tehran Tuesday afternoon.

Musavi also echoed a statement by Imam Khomeini saying that Iran's Muslim people during the past six years have successfully tackled tasks, the fulfillment of which were estimated to take some 20 years. He also reminded that despite being embroiled in an unwanted war since September 1980 inflation in Iran is only 12% as compared with Turkey which has an inflation rate of 56%.

CSO: 4600/287

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDEEN KILL 60 SOVIET SOLDIERS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Feb 85 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, India (Dispatches)--The Mujahideen ambushed a Soviet military convoy in southeastern Afghanistan, killing as many as 60 soldiers, Western diplomatic sources reported Tuesday.

The ambush occurred recently at the Argandab River bridge, west of Kandahar. Afghanistan's second largest city and scene of fierce fighting in the past three years, the diplomatic quoted reports from Kabul as saying.

One diplomatic report said 40 Soviet troops were wounded or killed in another Mujahideen attack Feb. 1 at Karezmir, near the strategic Panjsher Valley northeast of the Afghan capital.

Heavy fighting, meanwhile, flared anew in the 100-mile (160-kilometer) long gorge last week as Soviet and Afghan government reinforcements arrived there in preparation for a major spring offensive, diplomats said.

The offensive, expected to start in March after the snow melts from the mountainsides, would be the ninth Soviet assault in the area since Moscow militarily intervened in landlocked Afghanistan in December 1979.

Soviet bombardment of the hillside town of Istalif in the Panjsher for four consecutive days last week caused heavy civilian casualties and triggered a new exodus of refugees to Kabul, the diplomatic reports said.

The Mujahideen control the upper, more rugged part of the Panjsher, which controls vital supply lines in northern Afghanistan. After being ousted from their positions last summer, the Mujahideen regrouped under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud and recaptured the towns of Bafarchin, Bain, Ayur, Shinj, Dushin, Kozak and Kunduz.

Afghan in Panjsher

The diplomats said Soviet Mi-24 helicopters gunships were bombing areas west of the Panjsher to keep the vital railroad highway to the Soviet Union through the Salang Pass safe for convoys.



Masoud's fighters overran the Pishkor Afghan military post in the center of the gorge last week, prompting the Soviets to rush reinforcements from Rokha--- the base of Soviet operations in the Panjsher, the reports said.

The Soviets wrested control of Pishkor in fierce fighting, installed an afghan army unit there and withdrew south, said the sources, who cannot be identified by name or nationality under briefing rules.

Mujahideen commander, Muhammed Amin, was reported slain in the battle.

Eight Afghan government soldiers were killed Feb. 3 when the Muslim freedom fighters raided their post at Shehardara, near Pishkor, the diplomatic accounts said.

According to the reports, eight Afghan troops also were killed in another Mujahideen attack the same day in the Logar Valley, 60 miles (100 kilometers) southwest of the Panjsher. Other Afghan soldiers at the scene reportedly ran away, leaving the Mesih post in Mujahideen custody.

Earlier this month, a mutiny by an Afghan army unit at Rishkor, near the Afghan defense ministry, was crushed by Soviet troops, the diplomats said. Casualties, if any, were not known.

The sources also reported heavy fighting with Mujahideen near the border with Pakistan, where 4,000 additional Soviet troops were deployed last month.

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in October that the Soviet strength in Afghanistan was 115,000, including some 10,000 KGB and security troops.

A highway bridge was destroyed and the road to Kunar Province was closed last week in fierce fighting near Jalalabad.

OSD. 4600/288

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS MARTYR, WOUND CIVILIANS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 6 Feb 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 5 (Dispatches)--Soviet soldiers martyred 45 civilians and wounded 17 others in a machine-gun attack in revenge for the slaying of an Afghan regime official in southern Afghanistan, Western diplomats said Tuesday.

Diplomatic sources said Mujahideen shot to death "an important regime official" on Jan. 17 in the teeming marketplace of Kandahar, nearly 300 miles (480 km) southwest of Kabul.

In revenge, Soviet troops "opened fire indiscriminately, martyring 45 civilians and wounding 17 others," one diplomat said during a briefing for Western reporters.

Prior to the fatal attack on the unidentified official, the Mujahideen fired mortars at the Kandahar Airport Jan. 12, said the source.

"Kandahar Airport was attacked and two aircraft destroyed," a diplomat said, adding that "Soviets retaliated, attacking suspected hide-outs of the Freedom Fighters in Kandahar City and its suburbs, martyring many civilians."

Mujahideen seeking to oust Soviet troops, who invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and back the government of Babrak Karmal, killed "many Soviet troops" in various successful attacks on military positions during the past month, diplomats said.

The Soviets countered the Mujahideen attacks with "increased atrocities and violence against the civilian population" to discourage them from supporting the Freedom Fighters, a diplomat said.

There have been reports from "multiple sources" of the Soviet atrocities near the towns of Sharikat and Shakarbara north of Kabul in the Panjshir Valley, where Russian troops have failed in seven campaigns to oust the Mujahideen.

A report said Soviet soldiers repeatedly raped a woman and then killed her in one area in the valley.

"In retaliation for the attack on Bagram airport, Soviet forces recently destroyed thousands of houses in the neighboring areas," one diplomat said.

Mujahideen had attacked the main Russian airbase at Bagram on Jan. 17 during a snowstorm, destroying 12 helicopters.

#### High No. of Casualties

Meanwhile, Mujahideen on Jan. 9 crippled a Soviet military helicopter that was flying near Baniya, 80 miles (130 km) northwest of Kabul. There were no casualties, one source said.

A group of Muslim freedom fighters attacked Soviet positions in three different places between Jan. 12-22, killing "many Soviet soldiers and wounding several others."

On Jan. 12 Afghan fighters attacked an armed convoy near Aqcha, near the Soviet border 250 miles (400 km) northwest of Kabul, killing seven Soviet soldiers and destroying two trucks.

In another assault on a Soviet convoy Jan. 13 near Mazar, also in the northwest, 16 Afghan and Soviet troops were killed and two armored personnel carriers and seven trucks were destroyed, a diplomat said.

The Mujahideen on Jan. 22 raided a Soviet post at Shahqa near Kandahar, killing 17 soldiers and taking 19 prisoners.

#### New Attack on Panjsher

Meanwhile, the diplomats said Soviet forces may be preparing a new attack in the mountainous Panjsher Valley, a strategic region where the Mujahideen enjoyed repeated success in attacking Russian supply convoys from the Russian border.

On Jan. 25 a large contingent of Soviet troops was seen at Charikar in northern Afghanistan, apparently on its way to the Panjsher, one source said.

During the following five days, several Soviet convoys comprising hundreds of tanks and trucks were seen moving north from Kabul toward the 100-mile (160 km) long valley, the sources said.

Some reports could not be independently confirmed because Afghanistan does not permit Western journalists into the country.

REF: 4640/244

AFGHANISTAN

MILITARY POSTS UNDER SIEGE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Feb 85 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, India (Dispatches) - The Soviet-installed regime in Afghanistan has admitted that three strategic military posts were under Mujahideen siege. The Afghan government radio said Thursday.

Western diplomatic sources in New Delhi earlier said that Soviet airborne assaults on Chamkani and Barikot failed to free the beleaguered Afghan troops. The Chamkani siege reportedly began nearly two months ago.

Soviet and Afghan military reinforcements were rushed last week to Chamkani and Bangash, in Paktia Province, the sources quoted reports from Kabul as saying.

Other reports said - five Soviet tanks were destroyed and more than 50 Soviet-Afghan soldiers were killed by Afghan freedom fighters while defending seven villages in Herat Province during the past three days.

According to this report, Soviet planes retaliated by bombarding five villages in Herat Province, as a result of which many residential units were completely destroyed and a number of Muslim villagers were martyred.

Meanwhile, Pakistan Thursday dismissed as baseless Afghan charges that Pakistan armed forces fired across their border into Afghanistan, a government spokesman said.

Two Right ministries, however, alleged that Pakistan forces fired across the border at Achikot in Herat Province Feb. 8 and at the villages of Chamkani and Bangash in Paktia Province Feb. 7 and 8.

The spokesman rejected the allegations as "entirely without foundation." He said the Afghan charge chief in Islamabad was instructed to tell his government to discontinue "such fictitious allegations" since Pakistan troops were under strict orders not to commit such violations.

"The Soviet authorities, by their frequent repetition of such baseless charges are trying to shift the blame on Pakistan for events in Afghanistan," the spokesman added.

For the past several weeks, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been trading charges.

Thousands of Afghan refugees from the five-year-old war between Soviet and Afghan government troops and Afghan resistance fighters have crossed the border into Pakistan.

CSO: 4600/288



14 March 1985

## AFGHANISTAN

## BRIEFS

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES KILLED, ARRESTED - Tehran, Feb. 12 (IRNA) -- Twenty counterrevolutionaries were either killed or arrested by security forces in Tehran, Mazandaran and Isfahan provinces, the public relations department of the ministry of information announced Tuesday. The announcement which was broadcast on the state radio further added that the counterrevolutionaries who were either killed or arrested were responsible for the assassination of a number of innocent people, including one 65-year-old grocer, a 60-year-old street vendor, a carpenter, a nut seller and a trader in door fixtures. It said 15 weapons, 30 bombs and grenades and 15 automobiles were also taken from the counterrevolutionaries by the security forces. Also seized were large quantities of documents and forgery related paraphernalia, it said. In a separate announcement, the information ministry's public relations office also said that "a severe and decisive" blow was inflicted on the remnants of the Keshtgar Faction of the Peoples Fedayeen Organization, resulting in the arrest of a large number of the group's members, cadres and organizers. The statement noted that the strike against these counterrevolutionaries coincided with the country's celebration of the sixth anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition in addition to a considerable amount of documents and machinery used for producing forged birth certificates, passports and driving licenses were also taken by the security forces, the information ministry communique said. It went on to say that the counterrevolutionaries were involved in anti-state activities that occurred in the city of Gonbad and Kurdistan Province in the first years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The information ministry's announcement ended by warning those who are still misled by counterrevolutionary elements to realize their folly and return to a proper path. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Feb 85 p 2]

SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS - Tehran, Feb 15 (IRNA) - The Iranian Islamic Speaker said Thursday that the Islamic Republic is the leading force in the global Islamic movement which should continue until all Islamic countries are freed from the domination of infidels. Hojjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was addressing members of the Islamic Revolution's Committees on the anniversary of their establishment. "We are in the forefront of a global Islamic movement and we believe as long as Muslims are oppressed all over the world and as long as even a single country is ruled by infidels, our Islamic movement must continue," he said. He added this does not mean Iran would send armies to war with other countries "But we must maintain Iran as a base for supporting Islamic movements." On the committee's activities, he said

anti-revolutionaries, liberals, prostitutes, supporters of western culture, hoarders and narcotics and smugglers are all manifestations of a single entity with roots in the United States, France and other powers. "All these circles which are against the Islamic Republic are rooted in the White House," Rafsanjani said. "As long as our people are against America, the arrogant and infidelity, these (circles) will exist and we should always be ready to confront such satanic forces." He said there are doubts in the minds of some individuals whether the committees are a necessity today and for the future, but added the committees will be effective for the country as long as its members remain Islamic and revolutionary. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Feb 85 p 2]

EXPANSION OF TIES--Tehran, Feb 8 (IRNA)--An Iranian Foreign Ministry official who is currently visiting Brazil met with the country's deputy agriculture minister, Maima Albuquerque, Wednesday. During the meeting, the Brazilian official expressed satisfaction with his visit to the Islamic Republic last week. He said there exists considerable potential for bilateral cooperation. The Foreign Ministry Director General for Economic Affairs Muhammad Hussein Adeli, also conferred with Brazilian Energy and Mines Minister Cesar Filho. They discussed cooperation between the two countries in petroleum and mining exploration. Meanwhile, the Iranian delegation also met with the deputy foreign minister of Brazil and submitted a written message from Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati for his Brazilian counterpart. Adeli said he hoped the Iran-Brazil ministerial committee, which has been agreed upon, in principle, would meet and discuss plans for the development of relations. Saying that his country is willing to establish friendly ties with Iran, the Brazilian deputy foreign minister expressed hope that mutual relations would expand in all fields. The two countries signed the draft of an agreement on the formation of a joint ministerial committee Wednesday, to be signed by the foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic and Brazil. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 9 Feb 85 p 2]

CIVIL AREAS BOMBED--New Delhi, Feb. 11 (IRNA)--Reports reaching here from Afghanistan said Soviet planes this week bombarded residential quarters of Afghan Mujahideen at Shekar Darreh 30 kilometers from Kabul. Fierce fighting continued between Muslim freedom fighters and the combined government and Soviet troops in the Panjsher Valley of Parwan Province. During encounters between the Mujahideen and Soviet troops in Baharak near Panjsher Valley the Mujahideen seized many weapons of the government troops. In a related report, 50 civilians were martyred in Ali-Abad north of Afghanistan as Soviet troops bombed the area last week. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Feb 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/100

TARLETON

## U.S.-PAKISTAN ALLIANCE TO GET 22 OFFICES

Karachi BUSINESS PUNCHER In English 6 Feb 65 pp 1, 1

[Text]

The newly organized United States-Pakistan Alliance will shortly establish its offices at Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar to promote trade, economic, educational, public relations, cultural and technological in the private sector of Pakistan.

The new Alliance is Chairman and Chief Executive of the Alliance is USA Dr. Charles Naum in an interview yesterday.

Dr. Naum, who is visiting here for Pakistan, said: "The Alliance is the first formal union of the people of Pakistan in Washington D.C. and its main purpose is to boost private sector relations between our two nations."

In addition to the government representation, membership has been America and Pakistan. The US-Pak Alliance is the only private sector organization that is broad based and representative of major US Corporations like the Chamber of Commerce, General Electric, Hughes Aircraft, Boeing, United Fruit, American Airlines, World Trade, American Hospital Association and many more." He said The Alliance Chairman emphasized that the Alliance is a strong Pakistan-S

United States Alliance with common interests to work for better economic Pakistan Government in agreement with the US Government has already formed a Joint Commission which reflects the Alliance and is ready to be pushed to a high economic development in government or government understanding of the work of private sector.

Without such guidance, he added, the Government's economic policies cannot be successful and fruitful. In this connection, the Alliance is looking for talented leadership in the private sector, Dr. Naum said.

In support of this viewpoint, Dr. Naum stated that in previous U.S. foreign relations, the United States

has been most appropriate that all of the Pakistan industrial, technical, social and cultural developmental programmes seeking American support are guided and facilitated by the United States-Pakistan Alliance. This will help the friendly businessmen in both countries, he added.

In other words, Dr. Naum said that a strong government support policy is always a result of strong public support at home and the good relations developed out of strong support are always rewarding.

### 6 COMMITTEES

Dr. Naum said the Alliance has constituted six committees: namely, agricultural development, Atomic & Energy Affairs, Education and Cultural Affairs, Public Affairs, Science and Technology and Trade and Development as equal member committees formed by the joint US-Pak Commission. These committees would coordinate with various other governmental American interest because there were no such offices between the peoples.

Then, committees and review the progress achieved from time to time he added.

The Alliance is in touch with a number of business organizations in Pakistan for the development of joint ventures between the two countries, Dr. Naum said.

Dr. Naum said that the establishment of the US-Pak Alliance has been widely hailed in the United States for leading industrialists, traders and government leaders who have considered it as a big stride in cementing the already existing good relations between the United States and Pakistan - AP.

PAGE TWO

WASHINGTON DENIES US 'IMPERIALIST' IMAGE FOR PAKISTAN DELEGATION

Source: WASHINGTON Post, Feb 24 and 25, p. 1A

[Topic] Mr. Henry Kissinger, the junior U.S. Secretary of State, said a brief visit to Pakistan last week.

Speaking of a lunch given to his honor by Planning Minister Nadeem, Mr. Kissinger said that "Pakistan will have the peace that it deserves and the progress it has earned".

In appreciation Pakistan's peaceful stance and the steady progress it has made "in spite of the turmoil around it".

Mr. Kissinger also called on the UN's President who decorated him with the Nishan-e-Millat-e-Mun, the country's second highest civil award. "For excellent peace services to international peace and for his valuable role in strengthening the bonds of friendship between Pakistan and the United States."

Earlier, talking to newsmen at the Lahore airport, Mr. Kissinger said that the President of Pakistan had been well received in the United States.

...And Another Man Under Suspicion

This drew sharp criticism from Ali Bhutto. Bhutto, the Pakistani leader, in a statement issued in Islamabad, he said Mr. Kissinger's praise for the Government was not surprising because it was "typical of the hostile attitude of some Western politicians towards the people of the Third World".

"What they support in these countries as long as they serve their purposes is not good enough for themselves. Mr. Kissinger's remarks about the role of Pakistan in a free world is a defiance of the free people and an insult to the intelligence of the Pakistani people. The people who are denied human rights in their own country can hardly be expected to do much for other people's freedom."

"However, to be pushed into the position of a free world state would be the Pakistan in the present circumstances a matter of satisfaction. As the country it is a matter of great concern for all thinking Pakistanis, particularly those who have read Mr. Kissinger's book 'The White House Years' and

have seen that in 1971 "the Indian and the United States interests in regard to Pakistan were congruent." He has written that the U.S. did not insist that East Bengal remain a part of Pakistan. Bangladesh, he has said, "would come into being in the spring of 1977 if the present processes were given a chance".

"In view of this the people of Pakistan will not receive the news of Dr. Henry Kissinger having been awarded the second highest Pakistani decoration with enthusiasm. However, he can seek solace in the thought that another of his countrymen was decorated for failing to fly a hot air balloon some time ago."

(S) 3/26/296



Pakistan

## GOVERNOR PERFORMS GROUND-BREAKING OF LBOD PROJECT

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Feb 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

MIRPURKHAUS, Feb 16. Lt Gen Jahan Dad Khan, Governor of Sind, performed the ground-breaking ceremony of Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD), one of the biggest irrigation-cum-drainage project in the world, about 15 miles away from here, on Saturday.

The project is estimated to cost Rs 900 crore to be financed by the Federal Government and world aid-giving agencies, including the World Bank. It is expected to be completed in about eight years. The stage-one project, on completion, will reclaim over 11 lakh acres of land in Nawabshah, Sanghar, Tharparkar and Hyderabad districts.

It will provide additional irrigation water in Rohri Canal, Nara Canal and Jamsho Canal of Sukkur Barrage Left Bank Irrigation System.

The project envisages sinking of over 2,500 tube-wells and construction of a 1,000-mile-long drainage or sub-surface drainage system.

Outlining the salient features of the project, the Governor said, the huge drain had started from Arabian Sea and was proceeding north on the left bank of Indus.

In stage-I of the project, three project areas were covered which would benefit the districts of Tharparkar, Sanghar and Nawabshah, besides parts of Hyderabad and Radhe districts within Kori Barrage Command.

But, he said this was not the end of the scheme, which was a national project in the true sense of the word.

The scheme would ultimately cover eight projects. The next stage in LBOD development would be to

provide drainage in the remaining areas of left bank of the River Indus right up to Kharpur. The seventh five-year plan might see the start of sub-surface drainage in Umerkot, Tando Adam, Khapra and south of Kharpur and completion of surface drainage throughout the LBOD command.

At a later stage, the LBOD might be extended further north to serve Gohki, Rahimyar Khan, Rahimulpur, and Rahowalpur areas. The drain might follow the old historic course of the Rann Mithra-Chaggar Rivers, which appears to be the natural route into Punjab.

Thus, he added, the LBOD would ultimately serve some of the drainage needs of Punjab also and become a truly national drainage project.

The Governor said all the provinces were already connected to the national power grid by electricity. They were also supplied irrigation water through an integrated river and canal system which might be termed the national irrigation grid.

Likewise, supply of natural gas was being conceived to all the provinces through a network of continuous lines. With completion of LBOD in its final shape, the drainage system would also become a national network or a national drainage grid.

All these steps showed the extent to which the provinces were inter-dependent for survival and prosperity, he said.

The LBOD diversion was yet another significant step towards strengthening economic integration.

He said the LBOD project and its

land reclamation to be undertaken would provide additional sources of irrigation water for expanding cropped areas, producing crop surpluses and gardens and allowing yields per acre of all crops.

These activities would raise the per capita income of not only the agriculturists but also of entrepreneurs and workers in industries dependent on agriculture products.

Even the transport sector would receive a boost from the need for transporting a much greater volume of agricultural products.

The local bodies in both the rural and urban spheres would see considerable increase in their income from local taxes and octroi etc.

In fact, the whole fabric of economic and commercial activity would receive a tremendous boost from the completion of LBOD project.

These activities and others being launched by the Government would create vastly expanded job opportunities for both skilled and unskilled workers.


The Government was already offering maximum employment of the local labour force in any projects coming up in both the private and public sectors.

It was now up to the people of Sind to start acquiring the skills necessary to qualify for the opportunities coming their way be added.

The Governor said the LBOD project would cater to the needs of the left bank area of Sind province. However, it did not mean that his Government was unaware of the needs and the problems of the area on the right bank of the River Indus.

He said he had already given instructions that a project should be prepared for the right bank area also.

WAPDA and Sind Irrigation and Power Departments would be planning for the right bank outfall from



LBOD) during the current Sixth Five year Plan. The RBOD might be launched in the Seventh Five year Plan.

Then the needs of the districts of Jacobabad, Shikarpur, Larkana and Dado would also be provided for and the prosperity of agriculture in that area would also be assured.

### Full-fledged school

The Governor later told a group of people of the area that a full-fledged school to provide education to the people to be associated with LBOD would be opened at the earliest.

The provincial Government, WAPDA and contractors would jointly finance the establishment of the school, he added.

Initially, he said, the school would have 50 students. Its capacity would be expanded as the course of time.

The Governor said the people who praised him for what they described as his keen and personal interest he had taken in the initiation of the project, that the present Government was making all possible efforts to remove illiteracy.

1-Lt Gen. Johan Dind said the Government was also actively engaged in removing unemployment by opening more and more public sector industries and establishing a network of industrial estates.

In reply to a question, he said election work was going smoothly. He was confident that patriotic people would feel any attempt to subvert and disrupt the election programme. He said his Government was determined to hold the coming National and Provincial Assembly elections in a fair, free

and impartial atmosphere.

Some important personalities of Hyderabad District had important meetings with the Governor at the Central House, Hyderabad.

They were: District Minister, Mr. Ali Ahmad Talpur, Provincial Minister, Sardar Akbar Yusuf Khan, Akbar Majid Akbar, Mr. Feroz Ali Talpur, and Sardar Mawad Hussain Shah, and P. J. Chaudhary, Sardar Jilani, Haji Nazimuddin, Sardar M. Chaudhary, Sardar Nizamuddin and Sardar Qasimuddin Shah. APP.

The Commissioner of Police, 1-Lt Gen. Johan Dind Khan addressed the joint Commissioners, Superintendents of Police and S.M.A.s of Hyderabad District at the Central House, Hyderabad on Saturday.

He stressed the need for maintaining law and order during the forthcoming general election.

The Governor directed them to keep a strict watch on political elements and to deal with law-breakers with an iron hand.

PARISTAS

BENEFITS TO SIND FROM LEFT BANK OUTFALL DRAIN

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 Supplement pp 11, 12

[Article by Syed Mukarram Ali, general manager (WS) WAPDA]

[Text]

Since times immemorial, river valleys have been the cradle of civilisation. Indus valley is one of the most ancient sites where nomadic tribes took roots and first started planting crops on the spill of the river. For the last 5,000 years, agriculture has been the back bone of economy in the vast tract of the banks of river Indus and its tributaries. Where water has brought prosperity to millions of acres, it has also entailed the twin menace of waterlogging and salinity in its wake.

The first Barrage on river Indus at Sukkur was constructed in 1932, followed by Kotri and Guddi Barrages in 1955 and 1963, respectively, thereby completing the present weir control irrigation system on the province. About 14 million acres of cultivable land in Sind now receive irrigation supplies from the canals off taking from these barrages. Out of this, 7.8 million acres are commanded by perennial canals, while the remaining area receives seasonal supplies.

The greatly increased and continuous use of Indus water for irrigation has significantly altered the hydrologic balance of the Indus basin. Seepage losses from irrigation channels, distributaries, minors and watercourses, and deep perco-

lation from irrigated lands have resulted in gradual raising of ground water table, thus creating the critical problems of waterlogging and salinity over a vast area. The more intensive the irrigation becomes, the lower the water table rises, causing severe salinisation of uncropped land as well as perpetuating the increase in stormwater flooding. This disease is widespread throughout the province of Sind, where a big chunk of the country's food and fibre crops is produced.

At the time of construction of Sukkur Barrage Scheme, engineers recognised the eventual need for the drainage system, but the time horizon was not specified. In the early 1960s, to relieve Pakistan from waterlogging and salinity problem in the vast tract of Indus basin, the Government of Pakistan initiated a series of Salinity Control And Reclamation Projects (SCARPs), by installing public tubewells for drainage and supplementing irrigation supplies in available fresh groundwater areas.

The first of such SCARPs completed in Sind was in the district of Khairpur. It comprised 540 tubewells, draining an area of about 6.18 million acres and was commissioned in 1970.

To ensure that drainage in Sind was tackled in a logical manner, a drainage strategy was required. Providing this strategy was part of the assignment for the team of foreign consultants who produced a Master Plan for the whole of Sind

which is known as the "Lower Indus Report".

This Master Plan was completed in 1966 and broadly put the future drainage needs into three categories.

Sub-surface drainage in fresh groundwater (FGW) areas, sub-surface drainage in most of the perennial saline groundwater (SGW) areas, and surface drainage in the non-perennial areas. The top priority was given to projects in FGW areas, because tubewell drainage would provide the benefits of not only lowering and controlling the water table at desired depth, but also, providing additional irrigation supplies.

In addition, there was no need for a disposal system. Tubewell drainage, the most economical, was therefore, recommended as the main method of sub-surface drainage in both fresh and saline groundwater areas. Where the aquifer was unsuitable for tubewells, tile drainage was proposed.

Since 1958, the Government of Pakistan expended approximately Rs. 6 billion in an Accelerated Programme of waterlogging and salinity control implemented by WAPDA. So far, most SCARPs in Sind have been in predominantly FGW areas, in line with the recommendations of the Lower Indus Report. The success of these projects is well known.

Among those already completed are Khairpur, North Rohri, Sukkur Right Bank and a number of pilot



Map of Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD), Stage I

projects which together provide tubewell drainage to over one million acres. Among the ongoing projects are Chitki FGW, South Rabi FGW and the East Kharpur Tilt Drainage Project. This last project is providing WAPDA with considerable experience and expertise in the installation of tile drains.

In 1979, the Revised Action Programme (RAP), an updated Master Plan for the whole of India has, among the drainage emphasis on the S.W. areas. However, in order to provide sub-surface drainage in the S.W. areas of India, a master outfall system is required to enable the surface effluent to be disposed of safely into the sea.

Work had already started on the

Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) through local financing with construction commencing in 1975. This spinal drain will eventually provide the means of disposing of the saline effluent for the whole of the Indian Left Bank command in India. With the commencement of construction of the spinal drain, the first steps have been taken towards construction which will eventually be one of the largest drainage systems in the world.

#### The Future Development

The next stage in the LBOD development will be provision of drainage to the remainder of the Left Bank Command. Benefits promised will be for sub-surface

drainage in both main LBOD areas located in the north and east of Stage I area and surface drainage to the south (Fig 6). The next new irrigation development affecting LBOD will be the Saharanpur Canal already proposed under Phase II of the Rabi Canal Remedial Engineering Scheme. Drainage would be vital if this improvement to the Left Bank's irrigation system is to achieve its expected benefits.

#### The need for drainage in the Stage I Area

The features of drainage in F.W. areas are clear and well known and some questions, however, question the viability of drainage in S.W. areas. The statistics nevertheless speak for themselves. At present 40% of the Stage I area has a water table depth of less than 5 feet and 10% has no better levels greater than 5 metres (16).

If no drainage, during the next 1000 years 80% of the area will have a water table depth of less than 5 feet.

#### Environmental benefits of the Project

The drainage cover provided by the project shall benefit the farmers, the general public, and the area in many ways. A brief discussion of the Project's benefits follows.

The benefits of the project can be grouped into two broad categories, viz. (1) Direct benefits comprised agriculture, livestock, additional employment and high farm income, and (2) indirect benefits encompassed related to crops, villages, towns and other infrastructure, particularly roads.

#### 1. Agricultural benefits

(a) Through control of water table at about 7 feet, per acre yield of wheat, cotton, sugarcane, and oilseeds shall increase significantly. The annual increase in production of cotton and wheat would be 0.20 million and 0.15 million metric tonnes respectively. Similarly, significant increase is also expected in sugarcane, banana, food and oilseeds. This will provide sustenance and growth to domestic agricultural production and enough food and fibre to rapidly increasing population. Due to project's favourable impact on agriculture



the project is expected to considerably improve the position of industry in food.

(b) Annual cropping intensity in project area shall rise from 40 to 120% on full development.

(c) There shall be general improvement in the level of farm incomes. The increase in incomes of small farmers would range from 22

to 118%, ensuring an annual growth rate between 1 and 5%.

(d) The per capita availability of foodgrains (wheat) shall increase from 475 Kg. at present to 550 Kg. on full development.

(e) There shall be significant improvement in Gross Value of Production (GVP) in case of Sindhar and Marwarthan components.

(f) The project shall reduce the incidence of damages to crops which occur as a result of untimely heavy and abrupt rains in some parts of the project.

## 2. Non-agricultural benefits

### (a) Savings in foreign exchange

The project is expected to increase production of many cash crops and thus contribute directly to import substitution of deficit goods. According to one estimate the annual gross foreign exchange value of the incremental production of tradables generated by the project mostly from cotton and wheat is about 7.63 billion or 20.1% million.

(b) About 2,000 additional jobs are expected to be created for operation and maintenance of project works. There would be increase in farm labour demand to the extent of 45,000 man-years plus 90,000 man-years, for unskilled labour. Nearly, 140,000 farm families and 910,000 persons may benefit directly from the project. In addition 170,000 people shall also benefit from multiplier effects generated by the project.

(c) In the economic terminology (Fig 9) the net present value of project benefits (discounted at [figure indistinct]) may be Rs. 8.7 billion and, as such is attractive both for the Staged project as a whole, and also individually for its three components.

## 3. Secondary economic impact of Project

A multi-sectoral impact model for Sind was developed to analyse the effect of the LDC Stage I on the economy of Sind as a whole and on the project districts specifically. It was found that on full development of the project, the local Value Added (LVA) in Sind would amount to Rs. 4.8 billion (in terms of 1983 constant prices). Similarly, household incomes is likely to be approximately Rs. 4.1 billion higher in real terms and an additional 250 to 500 million man-hours of employment would be created. The Government of Sind, as a result of greater tax base, even without unchanged tax structure, expects to receive an additional Rs. 45 million in tax surpluses.

The actual value added generated by the total project package on full development is estimated to be Rs. 14.2 billion of which, Rs. 5.7 billion is the direct agricultural LVA, Rs. 4.1 billion is the multiplier LVA arising from farm activities, and Rs. 4.1 billion, is attributable to the operation of the LDC system itself. The growth of LVA in Sind under "with project" condition is projected to be at a real rate of 4.40% per annum between now and full de-

employment to amount only 1,211 per annum if the project was not implemented, the net increase being 1,777 per annum.

Apart from agriculture itself, the main industries gaining from the project would be grain milling, tanning, oilpress, distillative trades and other services.

In the three districts of the project, i.e., Bawabahal, Sagar and Tharparkar, the total impact or real LVA on full maturity of the project is likely to be of the order of Rs. 1,775 million, of which the incremental portion of LVA attributed to the project would amount to Rs. 1,700 million. The highest single gainers would be Sagar Project which shall gain Rs. 1,250 million. The real LVA in Bawabahal is projected to grow at 5.1% per annum between now and at full development while, that of Tharparkar and Sagar is 1.21% and 4.43% per annum, respectively.

The Keynesian type multi sectorial model developed for Sind, therefore, indicates that the LMB Project would have a substantial impact on economic activity (business in any terms) not only in the project areas but also, in the rest of Sind. All individual industries would experience some positive effects irrespective of their size of business operation.

It, therefore, may be concluded that, the need to start remedying the wide spread twin menace, especially in the areas of the province where cultivation is concentrated on the highest lands leaving the low area as saline abandoned land, is urgent.

The LMB Stage I project is now being forward towards realizing a strong within class in the country.

Time: 10/11/50

PARISTAS

## CABINET APPROVES BODY TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Feb 85 p 2

[Text]

**RAWALPINDI** The Federal Cabinet meeting on Tuesday (partly reported in Wednesday's Dawn) approved establishment of a statutory body, to be called Regional Development Finance Corporation (RDFC) to undertake studies and promotional work and pay particular attention to development of less developed areas of NWFP, Baluchistan, FATA, Azad Jammu and Kashmir or any other area so declared by the Government.

The Corporation has already sanctioned 20 projects for these areas costing Rs. 249.165 million, with foreign exchange component of Rs. 51.44.

The projects include woolen mills, paper mills, motorcycle factory, sugar mills, shoe factory, brickmaking factory and other industrial and mineral concerns.

The RDFC, which has been functioning since May 1984, in anticipation of formal approval of the Government has already received applications for projects costing Rs. 650.72 million. Out of these, approval of projects worth Rs. 507.565 million has been completed and an amount of Rs. 249.475 million has been sanctioned for various projects.

With an authorized capital of Rs. 100 million, the Corporation will be a statutory body managed by a Board of 10 directors consisting of the chairman, the managing director, a representative of the Federal Finance Ministry and a representative each from all the four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Northern Areas, nationalised banks and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan. The

Chairman, NDPC, will act as ex-officio Chairman of the RDFC with a view to closely associating NDPC with RDFC.

The NDPC will have at least 50 per cent of the shares. The balance of capital will be open to subscription by banks and other financial institutions. The company would be exempt from payment of income tax, super tax and wealth tax.

Some of the innovative investments by the RDFC would fall in sectors which require special encouragement in less developed regions such as production of handicrafts through subcontracting, work shops in rural areas to meet the local engineering needs and the agro-industries.

The RDFC will also finance commercially viable projects in less developed areas, paying special attention to the mining sector or any such other sector of the economy as may be specified by the Federal Government, through purchase of shares, medium and long term loans, bridge financing, short term loans including working capital and guarantees for loans and advances, underwriting of stocks, bonds and debentures, participation term certificates and other such instruments as may be decided by the Board.

It will finance the construction of internal roads in mineral-bearing areas, roads if these are a part of the project; finance the establishment of machinery pool for mine owners to be set up independently or in association with banks and other organisations and formulate and implement schemes to channel loan repayments towards commercially viable project in less de-

collected cases on behalf of Pakistan abroad.

To ensure complete elimination of false evidence from the judicial system, the Pakistan Law Commission examined the entire question and recommended that the problem of perjury be tackled by punitive and preventive measures.

The Cabinet approved the recommendations made by the Pakistan Law Commission.

The Cabinet agreed with the suggestion that in the field of punitive measures the sanctity attached to true evidence by the Holy Quran and Sunnah should be highlighted through information media; presiding officers of courts should warn witnesses about the consequences and punishments provided for giving false evidence; and police authorities should be directed to avoid undue delay in recording evidence and save witnesses from harassment.

The preventive measures approved by the Cabinet include: — Curtailing of time taken by the police in investigation and initiating action against the delinquent investigation officer; — frequent

use of relevant sections of PPC which provide punishment for giving false evidence; Action should be taken against such persons who give false information with intent to make a public servant to use his lawful powers to the detriment of another person; Such police officers should be punished who record false evidence and implicate innocent persons.

The Cabinet also approved that criminal cases should be thoroughly examined by some independent agency before submission to the trial courts with a view to minimizing chances of false allegations of innocent persons or exclusion of real culprits.

It was also approved that those guilty of giving false evidence, in addition to punishment under relevant laws may also be awarded lashes.

### N Areas

The Cabinet considered report of the 'Secretariat' Committee on Northern Areas and approved its recommendations for strengthening the organisational set up for administration and development of the Northern Areas APP.

PAKISTAN

'COURTESY' TOWARD AHMADIYES 22572

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Feb 85 p 2

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb. 12. Mohammad Hanif Ramay has criticised what he called the unjust treatment being meted out to Ahmadis and called upon the people to reconsider their attitude towards that community and show generosity in religious matters.

In a press statement, Ramay, who heads the (defunct) Pakistan Movement Party, said that removing the Kalim-i-Tawheed from the Ahmadiya places of worship and snatching Kalima badges off the chests of the members of that community amounted to opposition to the Kalima itself and "betray our own claim that Islam is a universal faith."

Ramay, clarifying that he was not an Ahmadi, criticised the religious leadership in the country and said that instead of spreading the message of the Kalima-i-Tawheed and proving that Islam was a complete

code of life they were, in deep prejudice and with narrow-mindedness, trying to curb the religious rights of a community which was being subjected in all manner to excesses on the national level.

"Allah is *Khalidul Qaim* and His last Prophet (peace be upon him) is *Khatamul Qaim* and Islam is the common heritage of all nations, groups and peoples in the world."

Deplored "our collective attitude towards the Ahmadis," Hanif Ramay said "In a state which came into being in the name of Allah and the Kalima-i-Tawheed, no one has the right to curb the religious freedom of any community, particularly the minorities. This amounts to creating the impression that Islam was spread by the sword-point and not as a result of its benevolence and universal appeal."

DAW 4600/296

PAKISTAN

# ACCUSED DENIED FACILITIES

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Feb 85 p 2

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb 11 The Kot Lakhpat jail authorities have ordered that the 54 accused now awaiting judgment by a special military court cannot keep their pairs and pants and trousers nor can they call for food from home.

Family members of some of the accused told "Dawn" that their wards had told them that if the jail authorities did not reverse their decision, they would go on a hunger strike again.

The special military court, which had tried the 54, reserved judgment in November last, after the accused had given up their defence in protest against the denial of proper trial facilities.

Meanwhile, mother of accused Rafi Malik has complained that her son is not being shifted to hospital although he has developed dangerous sores on his legs as he has been constantly in shackles. She appealed to the Punjab Home Department to order the Kot Lakhpat Jail authorities to provide immediate medical relief to her son.

The Political Prisoners Release and Relief Committee has disclosed that two approvers in the Libya Conspiracy Case, Nasser Ahmad Baluch and Mansoor Ahmad, have also been put in fetters.

Both the accused were earlier declared as approvers but during the proceedings, they did not support the prosecution's case and were illegally put in fetters. The committee said both the accused were seriously ill and needed urgent medical help.



[illegible]

Copyright © 1996 by Academic Press. All rights reserved.

Source: FERNANDEZ de CASTRO, 24 Jan 86, p. 10.

Third, high completion of the Karachi Steel Mill, and various industrial and development projects. Pakistan has taken a giant stride forward towards economic independence. The country is now in a position to attempt the basic plans of the industrial base and build the infrastructure required to make up the long years of neglect. The Five year plan initiative in this direction was taken in 1955 after decades of inactivity, principally induced by the virtual absence of industrial organizations and the consequent indifference of local business-people. They both agreed that Pakistan should be initiation with import the all the iron and steel requirements because it did not possess the above-mentioned top infrastructure, the requirement as well as essential technology. This approach was in conformity with the prevailing conservative philosophy that one needs the country's economic policies subservient to the state sector and one kept the industrial planning restricted largely to the production of consumer goods utilizing price controls, without much regard for the country's long-term development or the wider national interests. Certainly any steel, for example, to manufacture and plastic resin, while basic industries were not given only attention. Unfortunately, in the matter of steel, good news will surely follow once the objectives formulated for state-aided manufacturing institutions and the green signal for the steel mill was given during the discussion. However, only a faint

Study. It was decided to negotiate an agreement with a Sovietist State, in this case the Soviet Union. They, most other advanced, industrialized countries, either all involved in the large European community, technical and financial assistance and training facilities for thousands of Cubans, and most of all to accept the standing Soviet offer to purchase all the oil's most useful production without payment in the soft loans prepared for this purpose. Since the check contracts were signed in 1974, the Cuban price has been compared with immediate efficiency and speed, and the financial problems affecting from the rise in costs were programs in early enough up to December Soviet assistance. It also needs to be noted with justification that, notwithstanding recent policy differences between the two countries, there are no major differences. There may never have any indication of a desire to reduce the support for this and other Soviet aided projects. Following are remarks that about the Soviet Ambassador described as symbols of Cuba-Soviet friendship will make for the time, from understanding between the two countries.

and their peoples - long after the storm on Pakistan's western border has subsided, as it must one day despite the continuing Washington effort to fuel the flames of civil war in Afghanistan. In keeping with this outlook, the Soviet Government has offered to build another steel mill in Pakistan and assist it in the energy sector as well as with exploration of Pakistan's largely untapped mineral wealth.

The Rs. 25-billion Pakistan Steel Mill, with a capacity of one million tons of high quality steel - which can be doubled in due course - gives Pakistan's industry a frame of steel. This major achievement virtually ends the country's dependence on imports of this vital commodity, and creates the opportunity for us to build a whole series of what are called downstream projects, of which twenty-five are already in an advanced planning stage. It means, in simpler language, that Pakistan is now in a position to enter the field of fabricating capital goods, making machines to make machines, and this opens up endless vistas of steady progress. To derive full benefit from the breakthrough that has been accomplished at Pipli, future planning will require greater care and foresight than has been employed in the past by our own planners and decision-makers. Among other things, we should learn to show less respect to foreign advisers of the sort who had forcefully pleaded about twenty years ago that Pakistan's textile industry should limit itself to producing yarn, leaving the production of cloth to other nations which had greater experience and superior skills. Skill and experience will surely come if our policy-makers realize the full potential of this country and its people, and if they can plan for the future with a vision instead of being too busy looking at things in terms not only of today and tomorrow but also of the day after. In regard to the future, it is obviously necessary that Pakistan's economic relations should be diversified on a wider scale, so that our economy does not remain tied to the West and we can expand our ties with other countries, particularly the Socialist States and our peers in the Third World. Experience over the last decade or two makes the choice even more imperative if Pakistan is to escape the traps that threaten many countries in the poverty-stricken South.

END 1000/788

PAKISTAN

## TRAINING CENTERS FOR QUALIFIED MANPOWER

Karachi DAWN in English 18 Feb 84 p 2

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 17. The Government is to set up two training centres in Sindh and Punjab this year to produce qualified manpower for ensuring safety for workers against industrial hazards in the country.

A spokesman of the Labour Division told AFP here on Sunday that one of the two centres (Mine Rescue and Research Centre) to be set up in Khanate in Sindh will cost 14.16 million.

The second centre for the improvement of working conditions and environment will be established in Lahore at a cost of Rs 13.12 million, he added.

The ILO will provide training facilities and technical assistance to the centres to improve the safety measures being taken by the Government for the workers, the spokesman said.

These safety measures are much needed to reduce the industrial hazards, particularly in industries such as chemicals, glass manufacturing, oil and more, he added.

The spokesman said the workers were facing industrial hazards which caused various diseases and

fatalities among the workers.

During the year 1983, 61 workers died and 177 injured of industrial accidents in coal mines and other industries. It was all the more essential to make available improved safety measures in order to protect the lives of industrial workers, he added.

The centres will impart advanced training to those engaged in enforcing precautionary and safety measures in various industries, he said.

The spokesman deplored that the employers were reluctant to provide adequate safety measures in their units.

The training centres, which would start functioning by the next financial year, would go a long way in ensuring safety for workers and eventually increasing industrial production in the country, he said. AFP

CSO: 4600/298

## PLANNING SAID INDICATING 'FRESH EXERCISE'

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 Business Supplement pp 1, IV

[Article by M. Ziauddin]

[Text]

**UNREALISTIC** projections of the Sixth Plan, its failure to provide for increased resource generation to match its ambitious targets, and the delays in implementation schedules are said to have caused the government to take another look at the whole exercise of planning and bring about conceptual changes in the process through increased bureaucratisation.

As a first step, the responsibility of formulating the next year's Annual Development Programme (ADP) has been passed on to the Secretary General of the Planning Division who, it is said, was not associated with the recent projects prepared by the Planning Division which have predicted nearly 10 per cent growth rate for the current year.

Knowledgeable circles believe that the government had found the dream content in the Sixth Plan politically handy so far. But it would not need it after the election. Therefore, it is now prepared to jettison it and erect in its place what is termed as "bureaucratic realism" in the planning process.

### ADP size

As it is, the current Annual Development Plan, whose size was budgeted at Rs 11.1 billion out of which Rs 25.9 billion were earmarked for Federal ADP, is reportedly facing the prospect of a massive shortfall because of re-

source constraints and delays in implementation schedules.

The current year's Federal ADP had allocated Rs 10.5 billion for water and power development. But according to latest official estimates so far only Rs 2 billion are said to have been spent on these projects, first for want of ready resources and secondly because of

country's refining capacity is not limited in value. Six million domestic oil production. At present the capacity is estimated to be around 174,000 barrels a day. Against this the country's present total capacity demand is 136,000 barrels a day. 38,000 barrels a day of imported crude and 20,000 barrels a day of domestic crude.

## An "accountant's plan" for the next three years, to be implemented within available resources, could push other problems under the rug

delays in implementation programme.

Similarly, a number of social sector projects like education and health as well as projects in mineral sectors are said to have been held up for the same reasons. In view of this, knowledgeable circles do not rule out the possibility of a Rs 7 to 8 billion shortfall in the total ADP size of Rs 11.1 billion by year end, unless the process of release of finances is speeded up and implementation schedules are highly accelerated in the remaining four months.

The government is also reportedly worried over the situation developing in the oil sector. The Sixth Plan had projected the domestic oil production to increase from around 11,000 barrels a day to about 20,000 barrels a day in the next five years. In the very first 18 months the domestic oil production, according to official claims, has more than doubled to 20,000 barrels a day.

The planners now seem disturbed by the fact that the

This means that there is a spare refining capacity of only 8,000 barrels a day. And even if the domestic oil production remains static at the present level for sometime, the projected growth rate in import of oil at 11.5 per cent a year would render the present refining capacity totally inadequate by next year.

In what is regarded as a typically bureaucratic approach to the problem, it is being argued in official circles that in order to keep the problem from going out of hand, the efforts being made for domestic oil exploration should be stopped forthwith and the money now being spent on this effort should be diverted to complete the Mohan Raftery and to initiate the Indus-Raftery project which was shelved recently for unknown reasons. Pakistan Refinery is said to have already prepared a plan in this connection.

Since additional refining capacity cannot be brought on line too quickly, it is possible that government would opt for increased imports of deficit products in the in-

reversing period. But even more expected to create a more serious problem, that of balance of payments, as the pressure on the country's foreign-exchange-earning capacity is expected to increase manifold from edible oil imports whose bill is estimated to go up to the level of the present petroleum import bill within the next two years.

### Implementation delays

However, all these have become *taboo* issues in view of the serious implementation delays in the power sector. According to recent estimates, due to these delays power capacity deficit or WAPTA share is expected to be around 20 per cent of peak demand in 1987-88 and beyond that the deficit is projected to exceed 40 per cent of peak demand. On the other hand, natural gas deficit is projected to remain as high as 18 per cent of peak demand in 1987-88.

According to a latest study on energy, only about half of the Sixth Plan's projected capacity additions will be realised by next year.

In view of the above it is assumed by informed circles that next year's AIP, which is expected to be of the size of about Rs 16 billion, will put more emphasis on completing the delayed power projects at the cost of social sector and other equally important projects.

In all likelihood, they said, as much as Rs 12 billion, out of Rs 16 billion, will be allocated in the next year's AIP for power projects. A big chunk of next year's AIP is also expected to be reserved for subsidising Pulvina Steel products in the domestic market. The subsidy component is expected to go up as high as 50 per cent of the price hike.

Another big chunk — as much as Rs 6 billion — is expected to be allocated for transport and communications because the government has already taken in hand a number of projects in this sector and these cannot be abandoned at this stage.

### Resource shortage

However, in view of the continuing shortage of resources it is feared that once again the AIP (1985-86) will face the prospect of shortfall of something like Rs 5 to 6 billion bringing the total shortfall

by the end of the third year of the Sixth Plan to about Rs 20 billion against an expenditure projected for the three years at Rs 105.6 billion out of the total Sixth Plan public sector development expenditure of Rs 210 billion.

According to informed circles, the Finance Ministry with the help of the bureaucrats in the Planning Commission, are engaged in hammering out an "accommodative plan" for the next three years which could be implemented within the resources available and push the other problems under the rug, to be sorted out by the next bunch of bureaucrats who will replace the present ones, on their retirement, in a year or two.

The failure of the Sixth Plan is said to have thrown up another problem, that of the deteriorating balance of payments position. The repayments on debts are expected to reach about one billion dollars a year by next year.

Remittances are expected to come down from the three billion dollars in 1982-83 to about two billion dollars during the current year. And exports are not expected to cross the three billion dollar a year mark for another two to three years. Meanwhile, the import bill is expected to go up to around 7 to 8 billion dollars a year by 1987-88.

### Balance of payments

This situation, independent economic experts said, is likely to cause the balance of payments position to deteriorate from the present 1.2 billion dollars to more than 2 billion dollars a year in the near future.

These economic experts said that the dreamers and the bureaucrats responsible for the planning and management of the country's economy have, between them, inflicted severe injuries to the economy.

While the dreamers tried to stretch the economy beyond its capacity, the bureaucrats held it back from progressing even on its own momentum by wasting the available resources on non-development avenues to make policymakers happy, they said.

In the opinion of these experts, now, only radical and revolutionary changes in the approach and concept of planning and financial management can pull the country's economy out of a difficult situation.

## NEW STRATEGY FOR PLANNING SUGGESTED

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 Business Supplement pp 1, 1V

[Text]

A TEAM of senior economists of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has pointed out some basic flaws in the domestic resource mobilisation schemes of the Sixth Five-year Plan and has set out a challenging course of action for the planners, if they want to achieve what they have written in the Plan.

"The claim that if congenial climate is created, private investment will bring forth the demobilised savings of the private sector in a massive way, is more in the nature of an expression of hope than a conclusion based on a detailed analysis of the past behaviour of savings in Pakistan," Mr Graham J. Abbott, Senior Economist and Mr Dean A. Debus of ADB say in a detailed study presented to the private sector representatives recently.

"Whatever past experience may have been, much more is now expected of the financial sector and the challenges it now faces are more complex because, among other reasons, of the measures being introduced to eliminate interest. Our examination of the present structure and operations of the financial system suggests that major changes will be needed," they maintain.

### Rate of return

Dealing with Pakistan's lacklustre savings performance, the study says there is no solid foundation on which policies and programmes for private savings mobilisation could be built.

Rate of return on deposits of savings has been an important determinant of the national saving rate and it must be ensured that this rate provides a positive real return. "It should also be ensured that comparative yields on bonds, shares and insurance provided under national savings schemes and by banks are such as not to divert a disproportionate amount of private savings to the government sector."

The nationalised commercial banks have always been free to pay depositors higher rates than those set down in the State Bank schedule, but they have not done so because in part, at least, the constraints imposed on their lending by SBP and the system of credit planning reduced their inclination to mobilise deposits.

Stressing that the current credit plan system needs to be abolished, the ADB says "it is incompatible with our objective of liberating the creative energies of the private sector through massive deregulation." The case of reforms and reorganising the present system becomes weak when its effects on savings mobilisation are considered.

Following is a summary of the study:

"The Sixth Plan does not specify how private investment is to be financed, claiming this is neither possible nor necessary. It acknowledges that 'to ensure a steady flow of credit, a package of sound measures and national institutions restructuring will be required', and cites some examples of changes

needed, among others, capital guarantees for the credit contributing mechanism for the private sector, and the creation and encouragement of more equity finance institutions. It does not, however, indicate the exact form these measures should take or how they should be put into operation."

This approach stems from a claim that sufficient resources have been deployed in the past 'whenever profitable investment opportunities are opened up and the necessary investment funds as demand are made freely available. This provides the basis for the claim that the congenial climate to be created for private investment will bring forth the demobilised savings of the private sector in a massive way."

This claim is more in the nature of an expression of hope than a conclusion based on a detailed analysis of the past behaviour of savings in Pakistan. The strategy to which it gives rise does not fully address the question whether sufficient private savings can be mobilised to finance the very large increase in private investment over the next five years proposed in the Sixth Plan without radical changes in the structure and methods of operation of financial institutions.

Whatever past experience may have been, much more is now expected of the financial sector and the challenges it now faces are more complex because, among other reasons, of the measures being introduced to eliminate interest. Our examination of the present structure and operations of the financial system suggests that major changes will be needed.



If the conventional programmes are used in the Sixth Plan it is to be emphasized in its entirety and continued in the way as previously proposed, the national and also the domestic saving rate have to be raised to an extent beyond that achieved in any previous five year period.

One frequently-cited explanation of Pakistan's lacklustre saving performance is the loss stemming from remittances induced by external factors.

## Taxes

Taxes on consumption, as suggested in the Sixth Plan, could help raise the level of saving, but their introduction alone cannot bring about an increase in private saving of the magnitude required over the next five years.

Other measures will also be needed, but a dearth of research into the determinants of saving means there is no solid foundation on which policies and programmes for private savings mobilization can be built. The Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan observed once that too much work has been done to analyse the reasons for low voluntary savings in Pakistan. This is still the case.

Some of the reasons put forward imply that while even the present externally-induced stimulus to consumption persists, the only way in which private saving can be increased is by introducing some form of forced saving.

Others, however, imply that for best long-run measures could help to bring about the desired results, e.g. ensuring the return on financial assets is real and positive would help increase household saving, which constitutes by far the largest proportion of personal saving.

The analysis of the determinants of saving made as part of this study shows, that deposit rate of return has been an important determinant of the national saving rate. But we did not perceive that Pakistan's low saving rate can be explained with its reference to the very low or negative rates of return which have prevailed since 1960.

Other factors obviously affected households' ability and willingness to save and also their decisions about the forms in which savings were to be held for the period now marked domestic and external changes

which created considerable uncertainties.

We do suggest, however, that the real rates of return on financial assets have been a more significant determinant of national saving than was recognized by policymakers in the past, and that this could well be the case.

## Priority sectors

There are, however, other ways of ensuring that priority sectors receive the volume of credit they require and the possibility of progressively doing away with the present Credit Plan system is one that warrants serious consideration. It adversely affects the mobilization of savings and it seems incompatible with the objective of liberating the creative energies of the private sector through a programme involving a massive deregulation of the economy to dispense with discretionary administrative controls and to replace them with a policy framework that promotes both private initiative and social interests.

The Sixth Plan acknowledges that there are deficiencies in the way credit is allocated in the industrial sector under the present system but it simply suggests some reforms designed to improve co-ordination. If the effects the credit allocation system has on savings mobilization are taken into consideration, the case for reforming and retaining it becomes weak.

We stress the importance of providing more effective ways of mobilizing rural savings. Pakistan's efforts to mobilize private savings are still not geared to the fact that a large volume of income is generated in rural areas and that a large proportion of remittances flows to these areas.

## Institutions

There is much to commend the idea of using existing institutions as the means of improving the mobilization of rural savings and the provision of credit in rural areas. The nationalised commercial banks already have an extensive network of branches in rural areas. The problem is whether these banks can and will change their procedures in order to bring them into line with local needs.

They have not done so in the past, their traditions and their aversion to 'unduly competition'

which seems to be regarded as encompassing all forms of competition, have reduced their willing-ness to be innovative, while their size and structure make them favour maintaining uniformity in their operations.

Banks have, with some prompting, increased the number of their rural branches and Pakistan now seems to have a low figure for number of rural population per rural bank branch compared with many other developing Asian countries. This expansion in the number of rural branches involved setting up and providing facilities in rural areas similar to those in urban centres. These do not adequately cater to the requirements of rural areas.

In fact one of the reasons for the initial success of the private finance companies set up in the later 1970s in attracting such a large volume of deposits was deficiencies in the services provided in rural areas by the nationalised commercial banks.

## Innovative schemes

Judging from their previous performance there seems to be little reason to suppose that the nationalised commercial banks will suddenly become interested in developing and adopting new ways of mobilizing rural savings or for that matter, in formulating and introducing innovative schemes for agricultural credit. Such are needed if the rural strategy set out in the Sixth Plan document is to be successfully implemented.

But improving the delivery of agricultural credit and the mobilization of rural savings should not be regarded as separate issues, nor should they be viewed in isolation from the need to provide credit to agro-industries and small-scale industries in rural areas and from the problem of diverting a far larger proportion of the remittance which flows to rural areas to saving and investment.

The Sixth Plan regards each of these as separate issues, each of which will require a separate institutional response. But if the ultimate objective is to create a well-coordinating system of rural finance, these issues must be seen as inter-related. And they can best be approached bearing in mind the emphasis placed on promoting rural development through local institutions and efforts in the Sixth Plan.

which also refers to the desirability of considerable decentralization and for spreading the traditional outflow of educated persons from the rural areas to the urban areas." Such objectives should be taken into consideration when designing schemes for the mobilization of rural savings and for rural credit.

### Remittances

The South Plan indicates that particular emphasis will have to be placed on mobilizing remittances to cover for savings and investment. A number of measures are being adopted for this purpose, including making available to Pakistanis residing abroad financial institutions that have facilities been available only in Pakistan, and to better to encourage emigrants to establish small or medium scale industrial enterprises. But there is evidence which suggests that persons sending remittances would prefer to be able to use them to benefit the areas from which they come.

If so, this provides the basis for a case for considering the establishment of local financial institutions to serve specific areas.

The success of the private finance companies in mobilizing deposits in the late 1970s may be taken as evidence strengthening this case. Even though funds taken as deposits were reduced, the fact remains that these companies were able to attract a large volume of deposits within a comparatively short time. What is more the formation of these companies represents the early experiments with other methods of mobilizing rural savings so far made in Pakistan. The lessons that might be drawn from this episode should not be brushed aside simply because of the way deposits that the companies mobilized were misappropriated or otherwise misused.

There are advantages in having local financial institutions mobilizing rural savings in that areas are often willing to deposit their savings if they feel that the funds thereby mobilized are to be used within the area. There are also advantages in allocating and disbursing credit in that local institutions can more readily assess the creditworthiness of applicants for loans, and in that a closer link between the act of saving and the availability of credit can be established and can be perceived by

customers, under the present arrangements. Savings (as) and disbursement (as) coming from some distant source, which partly accounts for local default problems.

### Rural case

There is a case for setting up local financial institutions to mobilize rural savings and to provide rural credit — not just in rural areas — and these institutions could be designed to provide an avenue for the investment of remittances. One possibility is to have or link these institutions with cooperative societies, the past performance of which however has been unimpressive.

Similar reforms are to be made during the next few years to improve co-operatives, but their implementation will take some time and it will take even longer to build up the confidence of the rural population in order to enable co-operatives to mobilize rural savings in the scale required.

### Private banks

A second possibility is to establish local private banks, but a major problem with this suggestion is that the failure of the private finance companies has left a legacy of mistrust and private local banks may not be able to overcome this for many years.

A third possibility, which might overcome this problem, is for the nationalised commercial banks to establish a number of rural bank subsidiaries each of which is to operate in a specific local area, and to make available up to 50 per cent of the shares in each subsidiary to organizations and persons residing in or coming from the area the rural bank is to serve. These subsidiaries could provide an important source of remittance income, and they would enable a suitable degree of local control to be exercised.

The whole question of rural savings and rural credit deserves immediate consideration. The present approach under which co-operative credit, credit for agriculture and small-scale industries and co-operatives are regarded as separate issues will not have the results desired or wanted. Such evaluation is essential to suggest that the best approach would be to establish a number of local financial

banks, and given the present circumstances, these might best be created as subsidiaries of the nationalised commercial banks with a proportion of the shares being made available for persons and for organizations associated with the regions the rural banks are to serve.

However, this possibility and the others need to be carefully considered. We suggest that the Asian Development Bank might consider providing assistance for a survey of rural financial needs and an assessment of suitable institutional arrangements to improve rural finance and the mobilization of rural savings in Pakistan.

### Focus

We have emphasized rural savings and finance but this is the area in which attention must be focused in the immediate future if the South Plan is to achieve its objectives in the way envisaged.

This does not mean that other areas do not require attention. The provision of adequate equity finance is not, but this is a complex issue. There are already a number of specialized institutions providing equity funds and more are proposed.

At the same time, however, the debt-equity ratio required by new companies will be combined with the realization that the provision of a company should build a base for part of the change in return earned if it starts the flow of private savings requires financing.

Another area to which attention could be given is the commercial companies in which development finance institutions by the virtue of the fact that they are scheduled banks, NBFIs, which is not recognized in the law, has been able to attract deposits. Other development finance institutions mobilization efforts have lagged far behind and they will attract the bulk of the funds they need from NBFIs and/or foreign sources.

It is difficult, however, to suggest possible courses of action for the future operation of these entities, even will be affected by the Islamic finance measures that have been introduced and others that may be introduced in the near future. Some facts are in the process of financial intermediation as it exists at present may be overcome by Islamization but the issue that Islamic intermediation is likely to be an

some is still not clear.

Nevertheless it is clear that Pakistan must mount a well formulated and decisive savings strategy if the Sixth Plan investment programme is to be implemented in its present form. The Sixth Plan touches on some of the issues involved in ensuring that the saving rate reaches the required level and that credit flows to planned investment, but in general it seems to assume that if there are sufficient private sector investment opportunities, enough private savings will be forthcoming.

### Deficient base

Yet the domestic and national saving rates achieved in the 1970s fell short of the targets set, and the target set for the national saving rate in the present Plan involves securing a proportionate increase greater than that obtained in any five year period in the country's recent history.

A clear and definite saving strategy needs to be formulated. Unfortunately, however, the present statistical base is deficient and inadequate for the research needed for the formulation of such a strategy and of the policies and programmes needed to give it effect. Research designed to provide the necessary statistical base on which to analyse saving behaviour in depth is urgently required. We suggest that the Asian Development Bank might consider providing assistance for such research.

Fundamentally, the success of the Sixth Plan will depend primarily on the creative energies of the private sector. A large part of the financial sector is government owned, and a large part of the operations are government controlled, in one way or another. Unless it is given sufficient scope to be innovative, the benefits that the creative energies of the private sector are expected to produce will not be forthcoming.

PAKISTAN

## PROSPECTS FOR NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 Business Supplement, p. 111

[Article by Tufail Ahmad Khan]

[Text]

IRAN, Pakistan and Turkey ratified on January 28 last, the decision taken earlier in October 1984 to set up an Economic Cooperation Organisation.

This new body, must be defined as merely a revival of the erstwhile RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) established in 1964. Notwithstanding that both the past and the new body comprise the very same three countries, the fact is that ECO is a new organisation created under different circumstances while RCD belongs to a dead past.

ECO is a body brought into being particularly on Iranian initiative. Iran has strenuously kept aloof from the two super powers.

### Circumstances

The circumstances of the birth of ECO are different: the post-war Breton Woods arrangement has virtually broken down due to the policies and measures of the developed countries themselves. Multilateralism in international trade now exists nominally as a result of the protectionist barriers even against the simple trade facilities of developing countries.

Exorbitant interest rates and external values of US dollar and other hard currencies, have inflated the indebtedness of poor countries and intensified exploitation by industrial countries.

### Trade

The leading industrial countries refuse to have a dialogue with developing and poor countries under the aegis of the United Nations for

the establishment of a new international economic order.

The countries of the Third World find no option but to come closer together and forge economic cooperation among themselves. ECO is one such regional effort.

The fact that the trade among Iran, Pakistan and Turkey has vastly increased is another vital aspect of the new circumstances. RCD had been able to increase their mutual trade to the extent only of one to two per cent.

Iran is now the biggest buyer of Pakistan's exports. Iran's imports from Pakistan rose from Rs. 821.1 million in 1981-82 to Rs. 4,275.5 million in 1982-83, and further to Rs. 5,944.4 million in 1983-84. Pakistan's imports from Iran also rose from Rs. 22.5 million in 1981-82 to 1,144.6 million in 1982-83 and further to Rs. 1,202.0 million in 1983-84.

Our exports to Turkey rose from Rs. 56.3 million in 1981-82 to Rs. 206.1 million in 1982-83, again to Rs. 66.0 million in 1983-84 and further to Rs. 146.2 million in 1984-85. Pakistan's imports from Turkey have also been rising, from Rs. 201.9 million 1981-82 to Rs. 306.1 million in 1982-83 and again to Rs. 808.6 million in 1983-84.

A more or less similar story has taken place in Turkish-Iranian trade. Turkey's exports to Iran rose from US \$791.06 million in 1982 to \$1,087.71 million in 1983 and Turkish imports from Iran climbed up from \$247.50 million in 1982 to \$1,222.51 million in 1983.

According to press reports, Iran is negotiating for the construction of an oil pipeline through Turkey for the export of its crude.

## Joint decisions

ECU will serve the cause of the member countries if it readopts some of the important and good decisions taken during the RCD era. Here one cannot help recall the summit-level decision and commitment of April 1976 taken at Iqbal that Iran, Pakistan and Turkey should become a 'free trade area within a period of 10 years. That period was to come to an end in April 1986.

The decision came in the wake of recommendations of UNCTAD, whose services had been procured by RCD to advise how to increase trade among the three countries. The UNCTAD report was, however, not made public.

The report and recommendations could be made public now for the guidance of the private sectors of the three countries, and the governments should restart study with a view to ascertaining how far the recommendations should be implemented in the new circumstances.

## Projects

Although the immediate scope of ECU seems limited and it should first build physical infrastructure (transport, communication etc.), it might be worthwhile to pick and choose from among the joint purpose projects approved by Inter-governmental RCD Planning Council.

There were in all 49 joint purpose enterprises proposed to be established in the three countries as a means to increase their mutual trade, 11 to be located in Iran, 14 in Turkey and 24 in Pakistan. From the total of 49, only 17 projects had come into production or were expected to go into production by 1976.

The 17 were banknote paper, machine tools, gear boxes, urea formaldehyde, ultramarine blue [words indistinct], jute mills, ball bearings and shock absorbers located in Pakistan, aluminium, seamless steel pipes and tubes and glycerine in Iran and borax, boric acid, centrifigals, special filters for chemical industry and locomotive diesel engines in Turkey.

The 49 approved joint purpose projects included carbon black, carbon rods and products, rotary electrical machinery, diesel engines for location in Iran, kraft paper and pulp, organic pigments, dyes, oil refinery, polyurethane, diesel engines for marine craft, heavy truck and buses and tractors for location in Turkey and kraft paper and bags, textile machinery, earthmoving equipment, polyurethane fibre, electric engines for location in Pakistan.

Additionally, petrochemical industries, RCD Advisory and Design Centres were approved for establishment in all the three countries.

Further, a feasibility study was

undertaken to set up an RCD Heavy Engineering and Electrical Corporation. The study was assigned to UNIER.

Some of the projects have been set up. The ECU would do well to review the list of enterprises and remove those which could not be implemented and add or subtract to meet the changed conditions.

If ECU also reviews the RCD commitments that the product of what every enterprise they decide upon shall be bought by the three countries, it will go a considerable way to increase the regional trade and integrate the economies to the region's benefit as a whole.

## Commitment

ECU comes to be linked through its members with three other regional organisations: (1) EEC (European Economic Community) (2) SARC (South Asia Regional Cooperation) and (3) the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange which is the private sector wing of OIC (Organisation for Islamic Conference).

In view of the rising trend of regional cooperation in the economic field in the Third World, the co-ordinated efforts of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to set up a basis of close cooperation among them holds out great prospects.

PAKISTAN

FIRST DEGREE COLLEGE IN PRIVATE SECTOR OPENS

Karachi DAWN in English 18 Feb 85 p 8

[Article by Shahid Ahmad]

[Text]

KARACHI, Feb 17 Karachi has got its first degree college in the private sector since the nationalisation of educational institutions in the country in the early seventies.

The Karachi University has granted "provisional affiliation" to Jinnah College for Women, Nazimabad, subject to the final approval by the University's Academic Council in due course.

Established by Anjuman-e-Islamia which had also set up a chain of educational institutions in the city till the seventies, the girls degree college will have facilities for teaching of Science and Arts subjects.

The Secretary of the Anjuman, Masooma Razaullah Ahmad, said "Down" about 800 admissions had already been finalised for the current academic session—150 for the arts faculty and 150 for science faculty.

In both faculties, teaching facilities have been provided as per approved syllabus for admission.

The Anjuman has also approached the university for permission

to conduct post graduate classes in Education and M.S. (Chemistry), he said in response to a question.

In anticipation of the permission, the college has admitted girl students but would not be charging any fee till the university approval is received, he added.

The college has been established in a building belonging to the Anjuman, and adjacent to Jinnah College, which was also established by the Anjuman and is now being run as a nationalised institution.

Masooma Razaullah said the College had recruited properly qualified teachers and there was a sufficiently stocked library and a well equipped science laboratory.

The fee structure was duly approved by the University authorities. Rs 150 would be charged at the time of admission, while the monthly fees would be Rs 120.

Mr Razaullah said the Anjuman had plans to upgrade the Jinnah College for Women into a full fledged women's University, for which the Government had already been approached.





United States Agency for International Development to this project to 10 million dollars. The 30 million dollar project, it said, is designed to enhance the ability of the National Agricultural Research System to generate and disseminate appropriate high quality agricultural technologies to the farmers of Pakistan. The project is aimed at increasing agricultural production as well as farmer's income and also supporting activities at the Arid Zone Research Institute in Baluchistan. Substantial resources will be made available to assist and strengthen the Provincial Agricultural Research Institutions, the press release said. The agreement was signed by the Joint Secretary, Economic Affairs Division, S Nisar Ali Shah, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan and by the USAID Mission Director, Dr. Donor H. Lioa, on behalf of the US Government. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 14 Feb 85 p 1]

POSHNERA-KARACHI HIGHWAY--Islamabad, Feb 13: The World Bank has expressed its willingness to underwrite upto 40 per cent of the construction cost of the proposed Poshnera-Karachi Highway estimated at Rs. 8000 million. This was stated by the Director General National Highways, Brig. (retd) Khalid Ishaq in an interview here yesterday. He said the projected 8-5 additional carriageway will reduce the transportation expenditure to the extent of Rs. 1200 million in the first year of its completion. Underlying the importance of the carriageway, he said, out of the 60,000 road mileage, half the burden of the traffic is borne by the existing Peshwar-Karachi Highway. He said the project is yet to be approved by the Federal Government although the Rs 3000 million cost was worked out in 1982. The present allocation for the construction and improvement of the National Highways is too meagre to effectively solve the growing road communication problem of the country. He emphasised that an upward revision in the funds allocation for the highways is imperatively needed. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 14 Feb 85 p 1]

RICE DEAL WITH COMOROS--The visiting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperatives of Comoros Said Kafi stressed the need for increased trade and economic relations between his country and Pakistan to their mutual benefit. In an interview in Karachi yesterday he said, that during his current visit he was negotiating with Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan for the purchase of 25 to 30 thousand tons of Irri rice from Pakistan. Said Kafi said that there existed tremendous scope and opportunities for enlarging trade and economic relations between the two countries. The visiting Minister referred to the recent havoc wrought in by torrential cyclone in Comoros and appealed to the international community in general and Muslim countries in particular to rush relief and succour for the distressed people. He said the natural calamity had caused colossal damage to the crops and the economy as a whole. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 14 Feb 85 p 1]

**PUBLICATIONS FORFEITED IN SIND--Karachi, Feb 15:** The Government of Sind has ordered the forfeiture of all copies of the Urdu weekly "Sandesh", published by A. S. Shamsa and their Indian agent in London, says a notification of the Sind Home Department. The above weekly contained an objectionable material. Sindhi book entitled "Mirza Jo Hachab" has also been forfeited as it contained 'objectionable material'. Urdu booklet 'Aik Azeem Sanha-Inhadan Jannat-al-Baghih, another handout said. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 p 2]

**POET OUSTED FROM SIND--Karachi, Feb 15:** The Sind Government expelled Habib Jalil, the well-known poet, from the Province on Thursday night. He was picked up by Ferozabad police soon after he came out of the Friendship House where he presided a Mushaira in connection with the birth anniversary of the late Faiz Ahmed Faiz. He was kept in Ferozabad police station for sometime. Later, he was boarded a plane for Lahore late in the night. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Feb 85 p 24]

**QAMRI NAHAZ LEADER ARRESTED--Karachi, Feb 14:** The Shah Faizal Colony police arrested Mr. Mahmoodul Hassan, Acting Information Secretary of the defunct Qamri Nahaz-i-Azadi, on Wednesday. He was produced before a military court on Thursday and remained in judicial custody. He was arrested outside his Shah Faizal Colony residence and booked under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Feb 85 p 20]

**THRO MEN GIVEN 'C' CLASS--Karachi, Feb 14:** Mr Fatchiyah Ali Khan, Mr Iqbal Balder and Mr Alauddin Balder have been given 'C' Class in Central Prison, Karachi. They were arrested in January last and detained for 60 days under the Maintenance of the Public Ordinance and were kept in 'C' Class. The family of Mr Iqbal Balder was followed to see him on Wednesday. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Feb 85 p 20]

**HANDBILL FORFEITED--**The Government of the Punjab has proscribed the handbill captioned "Qamri Nahaz" issued by the Anjuman Fiday-yan-e-Islam-o-Mashlikat-e-Matam for containing objectionable material within the meaning of the West Pakistan Press and Publication Ordinance, 1963, says a handout. All copies of the above mentioned handbill have also been forfeited to Government with immediate effects. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Feb 85 p 3]

**BAIL FOR 'KALIMA' WEARERS--Lahore, Feb 13:** The Session Court, Faisalabad, has granted bail to 22 persons charged with wearing Kalima-i-Tayyaba badges on their chests. The petitioners, Mr. Samiullah, Mr. Rafi Karim, Dr. Fazal Karim and others, were arrested under section 295-C of the PPC. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Kalima was the cornerstone of their faith, and Section 295-C was not applicable to them. They submitted that no reasonable man could be provoked by the display of the Kalima badge. The court, after hearing the counsel granted bail after arrest on the security of Rs 10,000 and one surety each in the same amount. According to a Press release of the Ahle-Sunnat Free Legal Aid Committee, six more persons were arrested by the Faisalabad police today for wearing Kalima badges. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Feb 85 p 2]

PETITION AGAINST CMA'S POWERS--Islamabad, Feb 17: Malik Naveed Ahmad, Chairman, Pakistan Solidarity Front, is making a petition to the Supreme Court on Monday praying that the court may kindly clarify its earlier judgment in a constitutional petition as to whether it had given unlimited powers to the Chief Martial Law Administrator in regard to the 1973 Constitution. Malik Naveed said here this evening that he was making the request to the Supreme Court because, according to him, the proposed constitutional amendments by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq would exceed the limits imposed by the Supreme Court in its earlier judgment in the Begum Nusrat Bhutto case. Malik Naveed said he would submit to the court to call as witnesses some of the retired judges of the Supreme Court who dealt with the constitutional petition and had recently made public statements which, in his view, tended to uphold the point that he was attempting to make in his petition. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 18 Feb 85 p 1]

SUPPORT FOR CONVICTED LAWYERS--Toba Tek Singh, Feb 16: A meeting of the District Bar Association held here assured of its full moral and legal support to two local lawyers, Rao Munawwar Ali and Mr Tanveer Alam, who have been recently sentenced to a total of 15 months, imprisonment each by a Civil Judge on the charge of contempt of court. The meeting also formed a committee, to deal with the matter comprising of Chaudhry Ziauddin, President of the District Bar, Chaudhry Mohammad Shoaib, Secretary, Chaudhry Wali Mohammad, Rana Sultan Sikandar, Mohir Noor Ahmad and Chaudhry Nukhtar Zafar. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 17 Feb 85 p 4]

GRANT FOR WATER DEVELOPMENT--Quetta, Feb 9: The Asian Development Bank has committed 20 million dollars credit for exploration and exploitation for ground water resources in Baluchistan. This was disclosed by a team of Asian Development Bank during its meeting with senior WAPDA officials here today. The meeting decided to appoint foreign consultants to prepare feasibility study on development of ground water resources in five areas of Zhob, Killa Saifullah, Margha Kibzaf, Pishin Lora and Lamosa Lora. The foreign consultants would submit their report to the WAPDA by June next year. Meanwhile the meeting reviewed the progress of work on development of water sector in the province by the hydrogeology of WAPDA. The meeting expressed its satisfaction over the development of water resources in local district and it also expressed satisfaction over the pace of progress for a similar project on Sibi-Bandak water scheme. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 10 Feb 85 p 1]

CSD: 4600/290

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

25 MARCH 85